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Abstract
UNDERSTANDING affective signals from others is crucial for both human-humanand human-agent interaction. The automatic analysis of emotion is by andlarge addressed as a pattern recognition problem which grounds in early psy-
chological theories of emotion. Suitable features are first extracted and then used as
input to classification (discrete emotion recognition) or regression (continuous affect
detection). In this thesis, differently from many computational models in the literature,
we draw on a simulationist approach to the analysis of facially displayed emotions -
e.g., in the course of a face-to-face interaction between an expresser and an observer.
At the heart of such perspective lies the enactment of the perceived emotion in the ob-
server. We propose a probabilistic framework based on a deep latent representation
of a continuous affect space, which can be exploited for both the estimation and the
enactment of affective states in a multimodal space.
Namely, we consider the observed facial expression together with physiological
activations driven by internal autonomic activity. The rationale behind the approach
lies in the large body of evidence from affective neuroscience showing that when we
observe emotional facial expressions, we react with congruent facial mimicry.
Further, in more complex situations, affect understanding is likely to rely on a com-
prehensive representation grounding the reconstruction of the state of the body associ-
ated with the displayed emotion. We show that our approach can address such problems
in a unified and principled perspective, thus avoiding ad hoc heuristics while minimis-
ing learning efforts. Moreover, our model improves the inferred belief through the
adoption of an inner loop of measurements and predictions within the central affect
state-space, that realise the dynamics of the affect enactment.
Results so far achieved have been obtained by adopting two publicly available mul-
timodal corpora.
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1.1 Emotion processing during social dyadic interaction. Emotions that are
expressed by one person, influence the emotions and expressions of
the other person. The two individuals not only mimic each other’s fa-
cial expression, but they also link and synchronise with one another at
the physiological level. This basic mirroring processing grounds in the
common shared neural architecture and body-proper, which is the basis
for social perception, understanding and empathy. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The shaded grey box highlights the process that we are modelling in this
thesis. The expresser’s emotional state is reflected in nonverbal motor
movements, namely, a facial action. Observer’s perception activates
neural representations (shared with the expresser) that in turn triggers
somatic and autonomic responses resulting in somatomotor mimicry
and autonomic, visceromotor reactions. A simulation-based loop fa-
cilitates physiological and motor feedback enacting emotion in the ob-
server. These mechanisms are fundamental for further grounding em-
pathy and other’s understanding, issues that will not be addressed here. 4
1.3 Diagram of the presentation flow adopted in this thesis. Each step cor-
responds to a specific chapter, starting from Chapter 2 and ending in
Chapter 6. The black lines below the modules ideally divide the thesis
into two main parts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 A map of the main research programs in which the field of computa-
tional modelling of affect has been developed: machine learning-based
models, robotic models, artificial intelligence (AI) based models. Boxes
and related arrows represent independent research areas and theories
that have mainly contributed to such field. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Schematic representation of the three main psychological theories of
emotions, compared to common sense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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2.3 Pessoa’s conceptual proposal for the relationship between anatomical
sites, neural computations and behaviours. Brain areas, which are con-
nected to form networks (ellipses), are involved in multiple neural com-
putations and specific computations are carried out by several areas.
Therefore, the structure/function mapping is both one-to-many and many-
to-one; in other words, many-to-many. Multiple neural computations
underlie behaviour. Each behaviour has both affective and cognitive
components, indicated by the affective and cognitive axes. Axes are not
orthogonal, indicating that the dimensions are not independent from
each other. (Figure from Pessoa (2008)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 The emergent variable model of fear expressed adopting structural equa-
tion model. In this representation, latent variables are drawn as circles.
Manifest or measured variables are shown as squares. Residuals and
variances are drawn as double headed arrows into an object. (Figure
from Barrett and Russell (2014)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 The latent variable model of fear. (Figure from Barrett and Russell
(2014)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 The facial affect detection pipeline. The input is a single image (It)
for spatial representations or a set of frames (Iwt ) within a temporal
window w for spatio-temporal representations. The system output Yt
is discrete if it is obtained through classification or continuous if ob-
tained through regression. The recognition process can incorporate
previous (Yt−1, · · ·Yt−n) and/or subsequent (Yt+1, · · ·Yt+m) system out-
put(s). (Scheme from Sariyanidi et al. (2015)). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 Machine Learning (ML) approaches adopted in computational models
of emotions. DA: Discriminant Analysis, k-/NN: k-/Nearest Neighbour,
NB: Naive Bayes, SVM: Support Vector Machine, RF: Random Forest,
SR/MR: Simple/Multiple Regression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8 Artificial Intelligence-oriented (AI) approaches adopted in computa-
tional models of emotions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 The levels of explanation in cognitive/behavioural sciences. Left: Marr’s
original proposal (Marr, 1982). Right: Marr’s revision according to
Yuille and Kersten (adapted from Knill et al., 1996). . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Capturing psychological theories in a PGM. Left: a schematic represen-
tation of the assumption that event and context, together, trigger agent’s
internal emotional state, which is then externally displayed via facial
expression. Right: the probabilistic directed acyclic graph (Bayesian
network) where nodes represent the RVs of interest and arrows encode
conditional dependencies between nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
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3.3 A classic outline of some of the pathway from perception to emotion,
in a lateral view of the brain of the macaque monkey. Connections are
shown in the ventral visual system from V1 to V2, V4, the inferior tem-
poral visual cortex, etc., with some connections reaching the amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex, as, arcuate sulcus; cal, calcarine sulcus; cs,
central sulcus; lf, lateral (or Sylvian) fissure; lun, lunate sulcus; ps, prin-
cipal sulcus; io, inferior occipital sulcus; ip, intraparietal sulcus (which
has been opened to reveal some of the areas it contains); sts, superior
temporal sulcus (which has been opened to reveal some of the areas it
contains). AIT, anterior inferior temporal cortex; FST, visual motion
processing area; LIP, lateral intraparietal area; MST, visual motion pro-
cessing area; MT, visual motion processing area (also called V5); PIT,
posterior inferior temporal cortex; STP, superior temporal plane; TA,
architectonic area including auditory association cortex; TE, architec-
tonic area including high-order visual association cortex, and some of
its sub-areas TEa and TEm; TG, architectonic area in the temporal pole;
V1-V4, visual areas 1-4; VIP, ventral intraparietal area; TEO, architec-
tonic area including posterior visual association cortex. The numerals
refer to architectonic areas, and have the following approximate func-
tional equivalence: 1,2,3, somatosensory cortex (posterior to the central
sulcus); 4, motor cortex; 5, superior parietal lobule; 7a, inferior parietal
lobule, visual part; 7b, inferior parietal lobule, somatosensory part; 6,
lateral premotor cortex; 8, frontal eye field; 12, part of orbitofrontal
cortex; 46, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Quantitative analysis of brain connectivity reveals several clusters of
highly interconnected regions (represented by different colours). In this
analysis, the amygdala (Amyg, centre of figure) was connected to all
but 8 cortical areas. Figure from Sporns et al. (2004) . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Haxby et al. (2000) model of the distributed human neural system for
face perception. The model is divided into a core system, consisting of
three regions of occipitotemporal visual extrastriate cortex (IOG, LFG,
STS) and an extended system, consisting of regions that are also parts
of neural systems for other cognitive functions. Among them, there are
the structures involved in the emotional response. Interactions between
these representations in the core system and regions in the extended
system mediate processing of the spatial focus of expresser’s attention,
speech-related mouth movements, facial expression and identity. Ab-
breviations: IOG, inferior occipital gyrus; LFG, lateral fusiform gyrus;
STS, superior temporal sulcus. Adapted from (Haxby et al., 2000) . . 44
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3.6 Time course of facial expression perception and recognition according
to Adolphs (2002a,b). The figure begins on the left with the onset of the
stimulus, a facial expression of emotion, and progresses through per-
ception to final recognition of the emotion on the right. Certain brain
structures are preferentially engaged in processing structural informa-
tion of the stimulus (early perception), whereas others participate more
in retrieving conceptual knowledge or linking the per- ceptual represen-
tation to the modulation of other cognitive processes or to the elicitation
of physiological states (e.g., an emotional somatic reaction to a stimu-
lus). Attempts to localise the perception/recognition of the stimulus in
space or in time have trade-offs: spatial localisation permits us to tie as-
pects of the processing to particular brain structures but suffers from the
fact that the same brain structure participates in different components of
processing at different points in time. Temporal localisation that treats
the brain as a dynamical system has the benefit of describing the evo-
lution of perception and recognition more accurately in time, although
this will usually encompass a large set of different structures. A full
account will need to describe both the spatial and temporal aspects of
processing, a description that is becoming possible by combining tech-
niques with high spatial resolution, such as functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, with techniques with high temporal resolution, such as
event-related potentials. Note that the figure omits many structures and
connections to provide a schematic overview. Adapted from Adolphs
(2002a,b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 Neural mechanisms of imitative learning and social mirroring. Top:
a representation of the core circuitry for imitation on the lateral wall
of the right cerebral hemisphere, together with the internal models the
circuitry implements during imitation. Bottom: imitative learning is
implemented by interactions among the core imitationcircuit, the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (BA46) and a set of areas relevant to mo-
tor preparation (PMd, pre-SMA, SPL), whereas social mirroring is im-
plemented by the interactions among the core imitation circuit, the in-
sula and the limbic system. Abbreviations: MNS, mirror neuron sys-
tem; STS, superior temporal sulcus, BA46, Brodmann area 46; MNS,
mirror neuron system; PMd, dorsal premotor cortex; pre-SMA, pre-
supplementary motor area; SPL, superior parietal lobule. Adapted from
Iacoboni (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.8 Chakrabarti et al. (2006) modification of Haxby et al. (2000) model of
distributed neural system for perception of dynamic facial expressions
of emotion. The model incorporates a module for “action perception”
based on the human MNs. Abbreviations: IOG, inferior occipital gyrus;
LFG, lateral fusiform gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus. Adapted
from (Chakrabarti et al., 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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3.9 Left: the classic motor pathway for controlling the facial expression.
Right: amygdalo-motor pathways. The lower half of the face is con-
trolled by the coordinated activity of three motor areas: M1, primary
motor cortex; PMCvl, premotor cortex ventrolateral division; and M4,
caudal face area of the midcingulate cortex. The upper half of the face
is controlled by the coordinated activity of two motor areas: SMA, sup-
plementary motor area; and M3, the anterior face area of the midcin-
gulate cortex. The black arrows indicate direct projections from the
basal nucleus of the amygdala to PMCvl, M3, M4, and SMA, The first
segment of the orange and green lines indicate the corticobulbar tract.
VII, pontine facial nucleus that contain the motor neurons that synapse
on the muscles of facial expressions. The medial division of the facial
nucleus contains the motor neurons that control muscles in that upper
half of the face (in green) while the lateral division contains the neu-
rons that control the muscles in the lower part of the face (in orange).
Note that the amygdala receives multiple lines of viscerosensory input
(red arrows, top) that are likely integrated in the output directed at facial
motor areas. Adapted from Gothard (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.10 A motor perspective of somatic and affective control at the brainstem
level. The overall motor system consists of two subsystems, the vol-
untary and the emotional motor systems. The voluntary motor system
allows the individual to move its body parts voluntarily, whereas the
emotional motor system controls basic motor activities such as blood
pressure, heart rate, respiration. Both consist of medial and lateral com-
ponents. These subsystems have access to premotor interneurons and
motoneurons. Adapted from Holstege (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.11 Architecture of a distributed neural system for perception of dynamic
facial expressions of emotion. Two, reciprocal, heavy arrowheads in-
dicate “forward” and “backward” projections between areas (boxes).
Light dotted projections indicate the possible subcortical dual route
from SC/Pulvinar to limbic areas (not included in the current model,
but discussed later). Only the main area of interest have been included.
The architecture incorporates a module for “action perception” based
on the human MNs, which mediates between the external stimuli (ex-
presser’s facial action), as processed along the visual route, and the in-
ternal motor/action representation. The MNs provides the necessary in-
put to activate the core affect system, represented by the amygdala, the
insula and the OFC. This system coordinates the dynamics of the activ-
ities occurring along the visuomotor and visceromotor loops, either by
modulating perceptual representations via feedback, and by generating
an emotional response in the subject, via connections to motor struc-
tures, hypothalamus, and brainstem nuclei, where components of an
emotional response to the facial expression can be activated. Moment-
by-moment, the output can be in terms of observer’s overt or covert
facial mimicry and physiological responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
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3.12 A functional architecture for face-based emotion understanding. Num-
bered modules are those considered in this study. In brief, the visual
system for dynamic facial expression perception interacts with an ex-
tended system, which involves the emotion system (dotted box) and
high level cognitive/conceptual processes. Interaction is regulated by
the visuomotor mediation of a module for action perception. The latter
transforms the sensory information of observed facial actions into the
observer’s own somatomotor representations. The activation of the vi-
suomotor route in turn triggers visceromotor reactions through the me-
diation of the core affect state-space. From there on simulation-based
dynamics involving all components unfolds to support the whole pro-
cess. Dashed grey lines distinguish between the hierarchical levels of
control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
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CHAPTER1
Introduction
SEAMLESSLY, in the course of our entanglements and conflicts, dealings and strug-gles, we “perceive” the social signals brought on by others, and we recognise andunderstand their meaning. Yet, gazing at a gesture, glimpsing a smile or hearing
a laugh involves a kind of perception which is different from the appraisal of the life-
less world. A large body of evidence (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016; Gallese et al.,
2004) shows that alongside the sensory information concerning others’ social stim-
uli - actions, in a wide sense -, one’s own motor and visceromotor representations of
those stimuli are enacted. Humans mirror gestures, postures, emotions, speech of other
perceived humans, at least neurally, and sometimes bodily and behaviourally. These
mirroring processes ground the capability of own reproduction of the action in ques-
tion “as if” a similar action were performed or a similar emotion experienced. Such
simulation-based mechanism is likely to play a crucial role in individual cognition and
social interaction (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016; Gallese et al., 2004).
The rationale behind this study is thus straightforward and stems from the attempt
at answering a deceptively simple, albeit overlooked question: can we exploit such
primitive and fundamental simulation-based mechanism for designing artificial agents?
Answering this question is important as witnessed by the growing interest for the
computational modelling of emotion in the realms of natural interaction, cognitive
robotics (Ziemke and Lowe, 2009), gaming industry (but see (Breazeal, 2003a; Trovato
et al., 2013; Lim and Okuno, 2015) for specific discussion and examples). Precisely,
it is of twofold value. First, at the individual level (“internal”) emotions can influence
reasoning and planning as happens in humans (Damasio, 1999); second, at the social
level (“external”, involving expression and detection) participating in interaction (e.g.,
human-robot or with animated virtual characters as in computer games) requires affec-
tive interplay.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
If we go along with these assumptions that emotions are important for artificial
cognitive systems, then the issue arises as to how such mechanisms can be suitably
modelled. In a subject such as this, it is perhaps best to start by establishing models of
an apt generality, so to avoid ad hoc heuristics, while considering relevant and yet well
defined case studies, in order not to complicate an already difficult problem.
Hence, in this thesis we shall focus on the case of emotional facial expressions, but
in a simulation-based context also involving the observer’s physiological reactions (see
(Adolphs, 2002a) and (Wood et al., 2016) for a review). In particular we address the
issue of facial expression mirroring and mimicry, which is at the heart of simulationist
accounts.
Face perception is likely to be the most developed visual perceptual skill in humans
and, cogently, most face viewing occurs in the context of social interactions (Wood
et al., 2016). Not surprisingly, automatic analysis of facial affect has fostered a wealth
of approaches (for an in-depth review, see (Sariyanidi et al., 2015)). By and large,
these approaches - grounding in early inferential theories of emotion (Goldman and
Sripada, 2005) - share the assumption that understanding affective states from facial
expressions can be accomplished through a computer vision and pattern recognition
“pipeline” (Sariyanidi et al., 2015): namely, visual feature extraction/reduction fol-
lowed by classification (discrete emotion recognition) or regression (continuous affect
detection).
The (often concealed) rationale behind such attitude grounds in early psychological
theories of emotion: the visual perception of emotional stimuli is followed by cognitive
or appraisal/interpretative processing of the stimulus, which in turn triggers affective
responses and feelings. Spelling out such account for faces, when an expresser is ob-
served displaying a particular facial expression, the observer utilises the large amount
of visual features/properties to infer and attribute an emotion state to the expresser.
However, facial expressions are facial actions and their perception is likely to draw
on simulation mechanisms underlying action perception in general (Wood et al., 2016;
Adolphs, 2002b). Clearly, part of the ability to extract affective information from faces
can be attributed to visual expertise, and current computer vision techniques can pro-
vide flexibility and adaptivity to robotics systems (Fanello et al., 2017).
But people do indeed recognise emotions from other people’s faces by experiencing
changes in their own physiological state. Beyond visual expertise, visuomotor and
visceromotor simulations play a key role. Indeed, when we observe emotional facial
expressions, we react with congruent facial muscle mimicry, and this mirroring process
is likely to reflect internal embodied simulation of the perceived facial expression (see
Figure 1.1).
Visuomotor simulation concurrently supports cross-modal influences on visual pro-
cessing and the activation of autonomic activities. Jointly, mirroring mechanisms con-
cerning autonomic, visceromotor actions take place. Altogether, they participate in
building a deep understanding of the perceived affective expression.
The lesson taken from affective neuroscience is that the development of social cog-
nition is closely related to the development of emotional and affective communication
between an infant and his or her mother, which grounds our remarkable capacity to
share others’ affective states and empathise with them. Actions, emotions and sensa-
tions experienced by others become meaningful to us because we can share with them:
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Figure 1.1: Emotion processing during social dyadic interaction. Emotions that are expressed
by one person, influence the emotions and expressions of the other person. The two individ-
uals not only mimic each other’s facial expression, but they also link and synchronise with
one another at the physiological level. This basic mirroring processing grounds in the com-
mon shared neural architecture and body-proper, which is the basis for social perception,
understanding and empathy.
a capability that roots in the very fact that evolution has endowed us with common
neural structures and body-proper.
In this dissertation we propose a novel, probabilistic scheme for dynamic affective
facial expression processing relying on a mirroring mechanism, which involves both fa-
cial gesture and autonomic, physiological simulation. In brief, in the course of a dyadic
engagement, the observer’s visual system, while perceiving expresser’s facial display
(Figure 1.2), interacts with an extended system, which involves the emotion system.
Interaction is regulated by the mediation of a visuomotor component for somatic action
perception. The latter transforms the sensory information of observed facial actions into
the observer’s own motor representation, which, in turn, via interaction with a central
valence/arousal affect space, triggers visceromotor processes. The simulation-based
dynamics of the visuomotor and visceromotor routes can generate observer’s actual
responses, namely facial mimicry (observable) and physiological responses (hidden).
The overall goal of the approach is to allow the modelled observer to reach a core
affect state (in terms of valence and arousal) similar to that of the expresser. Indeed,
meeting such condition is preliminary, in the embodied perspective, to ground subse-
quent processing for affect understanding, e.g. the retrieval of conceptual knowledge
3
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1.2: The shaded grey box highlights the process that we are modelling in this thesis.
The expresser’s emotional state is reflected in nonverbal motor movements, namely, a facial
action. Observer’s perception activates neural representations (shared with the expresser)
that in turn triggers somatic and autonomic responses resulting in somatomotor mimicry
and autonomic, visceromotor reactions. A simulation-based loop facilitates physiological
and motor feedback enacting emotion in the observer. These mechanisms are fundamental
for further grounding empathy and other’s understanding, issues that will not be addressed
here.
about the emotion signalled by the expresser (Adolphs, 2002a; Wood et al., 2016).
The dissertation unfolds as follows (see Figure 1.3 for a graphical illustration):
Chapter 2 broadly reviews the different contributions to the conundrum of affective
modelling. The attempt here is also to identify some general perspectives to better
frame our subsequent work.
Chapter 3 discusses the rationales behind our approach and presents the necessary
neurobiological background for further modelling steps. The chapter has two ob-
jectives: firstly, to make clear what is the methodology followed in this thesis,
namely, a multilevel analysis of the problem, which is instantiated at the theoreti-
cal model and at the implementation model levels. Secondly, to devise a suitable
distributed neural architecture to be used as a blueprint, at a more abstract level,
for a functional architecture. The latter will be used to constrain the structure
of the probabilistic graph structure, which scaffolds the theoretical model. The
somatomotor and visceromotor routes together with the core affect mediating be-
tween them are introduced and defined.
Chapter 4 formalises the proposed model. At the theoretical level, the model is instan-
tiated in the form of a dynamic Probabilistic Graphical Model. The graph struc-
ture is shaped on the basis of the functional architecture previously devised, which
constrains conditional independence assumptions between the graph nodes. A
simulation-based internal loop is defined, hierarchically involving the somato-
motor and visceromotor components with central affect mediation. The simu-
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lation loop unfolds the dynamics of the observer’s emotional perception of the
expresser’s facial actions. Subsequently, the implementation model is discussed.
The aim here is to devise - relying on the compositional representation provided
by the probabilistic graph -, an effective realisation of each sub-graph correspond-
ing to the main functional components. As to the central affect level, we resort
to a Deep Gaussian Process model. The somatomotor component assumes at its
core an internal somatomotor state-space, which serves the purpose of both enact-
ing observer’s actual facial mimicry and predicting the dynamics of expresser’s
visual cues. A visuomotor mapping is defined to support the transformation from
expresser’s facial visible cues to observer’s internal motor representation. A
prediction-correction approach is also devised for the visceromotor state-space,
in terms of a variational Kalman filter, to learn and represent internal stochastic
dynamics of physiological signals.
Chapter 5 illustrates the experimental work to validate the model and discusses results
achieved so far.
Chapter 6 discusses some theoretical implications of the model;
Chapter 7 summarises the key contributions of the thesis and presents some conclud-
ing remarks.
Figure 1.3: Diagram of the presentation flow adopted in this thesis. Each step corresponds to
a specific chapter, starting from Chapter 2 and ending in Chapter 6. The black lines below
the modules ideally divide the thesis into two main parts.
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CHAPTER2
What is an emotion? State-of-the-art of different
accounts
TRYING to review the contributions to the field of computational models of affect,and thus of affective facial expressions, in order to systematically compare thedifferent approaches is a mind-blowing endeavour. That being so, we arm the
reader with a preliminary map outlined in Figure 2.1.
Such map shows at a glance that there are different research programs that con-
tend for such field, which can be roughly identified as machine learning-based models,
robotic models, artificial intelligence (AI) based models. Several research areas have
contributed, in different vein and substance, to such programs, psychological and neu-
robiological theories providing the necessary underpinning, at least in our view. Hence-
forth, from such theories we will make a start on. Other areas that have fostered the
flourish of methods are machine-learning and artificial intelligence (AI), either in their
classic knowledge-based or the probabilistic, uncertainty-based accounts.
Although it is not possible to exhaustively cover a century of scientific research on
emotion, in this chapter we will not only make an effort to get the gist of the field, but
to outline some general trends/dimensions to frame our work and to better compare it
with other proposals.
Early theories
The “theories of emotion” ground their roots in the great classical philosophers as Plato,
Aristotle and Descartes. The dominant theory, advanced by the Stoics in the 3rd cen-
tury AD, was to consider the emotions as a threat to reason, a danger that alters the
opinion of humans and therefore an obstacle to virtue. This dualistic vision that clearly
7
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Chapter 2. What is an emotion? State-of-the-art of different accounts
Figure 2.1: A map of the main research programs in which the field of computational modelling
of affect has been developed: machine learning-based models, robotic models, artificial
intelligence (AI) based models. Boxes and related arrows represent independent research
areas and theories that have mainly contributed to such field.
separates ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’ is also carried out by Socrates and his student Plato,
and represents the basis of a secular debate among supporters of Platonic theses and
those who claim for emotions a different role. An alternative view, proposed by Aristo-
tle in Rhetoric, establishes a relationship between reason and emotion as it argues that
some physical reactions are caused by our convictions and our way of interpreting the
world and the people around us. Emotions (or pathe), therefore, are considered for the
first time as the result of a rational process.
This dichotomous conception remains in force throughout the Middle Ages, until
the Les passions de l’âme (1649) of Descartes and the theories of Spinoza that enshrine
the beginning of scientific studies on emotions. A century later, during the fervour of
Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume in the second, undervalued, part of A Treatise of
Human Nature (1739) defined the emotion as a ‘kind of impression’, pleasant or un-
pleasant, which (as in Descartes) is physically elicited by the movement of the ‘animal
spirits’ in the blood.
Going forward to the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin studies mark the beginning
of modern evolutionary theories. In his 1872 work, The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals, Darwin proposed the ‘principle of serviceable habits’, claiming that
8
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2.1. Early theories
the expressions of emotions are inherited from habitual patterns of behaviour developed
during the evolution of primate.
At this point we may assert that an emotion constitutes an internal state with a
related behaviour which is triggered by a specific stimuli, endogenous or exogenous to
the organism. A crucial point in the theories of emotions has been the relationship and
the direction of causality between the internal state and the physical action or behaviour.
Some of these theories are listed in the next sections, differentiating between purely
psychological ones, in Section 2.2, and those with neurobiological bases, in Section
2.3.
Around 1884, the American psychologist William James (James, 1884) and the
Danish Carl Lange, published, independently of one another, a similar theory of emo-
tion. The purpose was to challenge what they called the theory of ‘common sense’,
according to which when someone is asked why he shakes, he usually answers: ‘Be-
cause I’m afraid’, or, as he cries, he answers: ‘Because I’m sad’. These responses imply
that the feelings come first, which, in turn, produce the physiological and behavioural
aspects of emotions. According to James and Lange, the theory of common sense must
be reversed, since we do not cry because we are sad, but we feel sad because we cry;
we do not shake because we are scared, but we are scared because we are shaking.
In brief, James-Lange’s theory argues that emotion is the sensation of physiological
modifications.
James-Lange’s theory has dominated for several years and has stimulated numerous
research into the physiological processes involved in emotional states. In 1927, a phys-
iologist, Walter Cannon (Cannon, 1927), published a criticism that met a remarkable
success. His writings raised many and important objections to James-Lange’s theory
and convinced many psychologists that it was an unsustainable theory.
Cannon pointed out that visceral organs are relatively insensitive structures, scarcely
provided with nerves. For this reason, visceral modifications are rather slower than the
changes we feel in emotional states. So how can visceral changes produce our rapid
mood changes? In addition, emotional reactions are also present when the visceral
organs have been surgically isolated by the central nervous system (CNS). When the
spinal cord and vagus nerve were cut in a dog, so that the bowels had no connection
to the brain anymore, the animal was still acting as if it were experiencing emotions.
When it was threatened or hit, it barked, snarled, just as it did before the intervention.
Cannon (1927) advanced his hypothesis on the origin of emotions, hypothesis that
was subsequently elaborated by Bard (1929), according to which the thalamus plays a
critical role in emotional experience. For Cannon and Bard, nerve impulses that pass
sensory information are then retransmitted through the thalamus, that receives this in-
put upward from the cortex (causing a subjective emotional experience) and downward
to the muscles, glands, and visceral organs (producing physiological modifications).
Cannon and Bard argued that the subjective and physiological components of emotion
are simultaneous, in disagreement with James, who argued that physiological modifi-
cations precede and trigger subjective states.
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Chapter 2. What is an emotion? State-of-the-art of different accounts
Psychological theories
Towards the end of the 1950s, cognitivist psychologists expanded this view, suggesting
that the most important factor of the emotion we feel is the way we evaluate and inter-
pret situations. In other words, it is not the environment itself that affects us, but the
way we represent the environment itself. One of the first cognitive theories of emotion
was formulated by Arnold (1960). Her theory of cognitive assessment suggests that
when we come for the first time in a situation we evaluate it spontaneously as good or
bad, useful or damaging. According to Arnold, these first evaluations are mediated by
the limbic system. The evaluations, in turn, introduce ‘tendencies to act’. Emotions
emerge from both our assessment of the situation and our actions. For example, joy
appears when we evaluate something as good and we are pushed in its direction. There
is, instead, a state of anger when we judge an event bad and we feel its aversion.
In 1962, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer proposed a two-factor theory of emo-
tion (Schachter and Singer, 1962). The theory assumed that when an emotion is felt
there are two components: a physiological arousal and an interpretation (appraisal) of
the state of arousal, which determines which emotion will be experienced. The spe-
cific emotion depends largely on the situation and the immediate environment where
the person search for emotional cues to label the physiological arousal (Fig. 2.2).
The idea of appraisal since then has been dominant in the cognitive approach to
emotions. This been extensively described in the Handbook of Cognition and Emotion
(Dalgleish and Power, 2005) or by Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) and encompasses the
work of psychologists such as Bower, Mandler, Lazarus, Roseman, Ortony, Scherer,
and Frijda, among the most influential.
In this perspective, the cognitive-motivational-relational theory (Lazarus, 1991; Rose-
man, 1984) states that in order to predict how a person will react to a situation, the
person’s expectations and goals in relation to the situation must be known. The the-
ory describes how specific emotions arise out of personal conceptions of a situation.
Roseman (1984) have developed structural theories where a set of discrete emotions is
modelled as direct outcomes of a multidimensional appraisal process. The cognitive
theory by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (OCC) views emotions as reactions to situational
appraisals of events, actors, and objects (Ortony et al., 1990). The emotions can be
positive or negative depending on the desirability of the situation. They identified four
sources of evidence that can be used to test emotion theories: language, self-report,
behaviour, and physiology. The goal of much of their work was to create a computa-
tionally tractable model of emotion.
Roseman’s and Ortony’s theories are similar in many ways. They both converge
upon the “universality” of the appraisal process. These models can be used to auto-
matically predict a user’s emotional state by taking a point in the multidimensional
appraisal space (think of each contextual feature or appraisal variable as a dimension)
and returning the most probable emotion. Despite its success, the appraisal theories are
not able to explain a number of questions. Briefly, these include issues such as:
1. the minimal number of appraisal criteria needed to explain emotion differentia-
tion;
2. should appraisal be considered a process, an ongoing series of evaluations, or
separate emotion episodes;
10
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Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the three main psychological theories of emotions,
compared to common sense.
3. how can the social functions of emotion be considered within the cognitive ap-
proach;
4. how do appraisal theories explain evidence that preferences (simple emotional re-
actions) do not need any conscious registration, or that emotions can exist without
cognition.
Despite these questions and limitations, as we will see in brief, the computational mod-
els derived from appraisal theories have proven to be useful to both Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) researchers and psychologists by providing both groups with a way to
evaluate, modify, and improve their theories.
A different view stems from Darwin’s work, which mostly addresses the commu-
nicative function of emotions (emotions as expressions). Researchers have expanded
Darwin’s evolutionary framework toward other forms of emotional expression. The
most notable ones are from Tomkins (1962), proposing that there is a limited number of
pan-cultural basic emotions, such as: surprise, interest, joy, rage, fear, disgust, shame,
and anguish, and by Ekman and Friesen (1971). In particular, Ekman’s facial action
coding system (FACS, Ekman and Rosenberg, 1997) influenced considerable research
that tackles the affect detection problem developing systems that identify the basic emo-
11
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Chapter 2. What is an emotion? State-of-the-art of different accounts
tions though facial expressions (and in particular extracting facial action units).
Neurobiological theories and embodiment
Despite the efforts of the various currents of psychology, it was only with the work
of the neuroanatomist Papez that emotion started to have a coherent theory of flows
involved in emotional and memory functions. In confirming the importance of the
structural component, and not just the psychological one, in the analysis of behaviour
and discomfort situations, Papez was the first to imagine the existence of a real intra-
cerebral pathway (Circuit of Papez) involved in emotional responses. A pathway that
for the neuroanatomist follows the route cortex-hypothalamus-thalamus-cortex.
Finally, Paul MacLean’s studies (MacLean, 1949) gave a clear and exhaustive pic-
ture of the existing ties between cognitive and emotional processes. According to
MacLean, emotional stimuli of the outside world produce "in the bowels" reactions,
the messages of these reactions return to the brain (neocortex) where they are inte-
grated with the perceptions that come from the outside world through the thalamus.
The integration of these perceptions (visceral and cortical) is the mechanism that gen-
erates the emotional experience. If Papez is recognised with the intuition that emotions
do not originate in a precise point in the brain but in an action involving multiple nuclei
(circuit), MacLean deserves to have guessed that the amygdala plays a central role in
communication between the upper cortical areas and the hypothalamus, namely that
part of our brain where the central nervous system connects to the endocrine system
which is then entrusted to the hormonal responses of our body.
MacLean’s conjectures have been experimentally confirmed by several neuroscien-
tists including Joseph LeDoux. His studies (LeDoux, 1998) have made it clear that
some of the fundamental structures, including hippocampus, are specialized in record-
ing and understanding perceptual patterns while others, such as the amygdala and the
circuits connecting it to other parts of the brain, are more involved in emotional reac-
tions.
More recently, in 1991, the studies on the body implications in emotion have been
carried on by Damasio and colleagues, with the outline of the somatic marker hypoth-
esis (Damasio, 1997) that considers, instead, the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC).
The somatic marker hypothesis reflects the original ideas of James and Lange, and
finds its roots on the earlier work of Nauta (1971), who coined the term ‘interoceptive
markers’, and Pribram (1970), who used the phrase ‘feelings as monitors’.
The decision process, to make a choice between two or more alternatives, according
to Damasio, is often far from an analysis that takes into account the pros and cons of
each choice. Most often, especially when dealing with complex problems, we are led
to use a different strategy that refers to the outcomes of past experiences, in which
we recognize some analogy with the present situation. Those experiences have left
traces, not necessarily conscious, that call into us emotions and feelings, with negative
or positive connotations.
Damasio calls these somatic codes, processed in the ventromedial PFC, somatic
markers: somatic because they relate to bodily experiences, both visceral and non-
visceral; the mark term comes from the notion that the particular body state invoked is
a sort of “marker” or label.
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Current knowledge, however, does not allow the ‘cognitive’ brain to be so clearly
separated from the ‘emotional’ brain. In Pessoa (2008) the brain conceptualization as
composed by ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ regions is questioned. Pessoa, indeed, states
that the separation in ’emotional brain’ and ’cognitive brain’ is problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. In fact, brain regions considered as ‘affective’ are involved in cognitive
processes and vice versa; moreover, the cognitive and emotional processes are clearly
integrated with each other so that they jointly contribute to behaviour. Such state of
affairs can be summarised as in Figure 2.3. It is worth remarking that such a multiscale
Figure 2.3: Pessoa’s conceptual proposal for the relationship between anatomical sites, neural
computations and behaviours. Brain areas, which are connected to form networks (ellipses),
are involved in multiple neural computations and specific computations are carried out by
several areas. Therefore, the structure/function mapping is both one-to-many and many-
to-one; in other words, many-to-many. Multiple neural computations underlie behaviour.
Each behaviour has both affective and cognitive components, indicated by the affective and
cognitive axes. Axes are not orthogonal, indicating that the dimensions are not independent
from each other. (Figure from Pessoa (2008)).
nature of cognitive and behavioural processes calls for a multi-level analysis of these
processes, an issue we will confront with in Section 4.
We will not go further in the review of neurobiological facets of emotion, because
these aspects are cogent to the work presented in this thesis and they will be discussed
in some depth in Section 4.
A broader view on the theories of emotion
In the two former sections we presented a brief account of the developed theories of
emotions, both psychological and neurobiological. At a first sight it is somehow diffi-
cult to identify some “essential variables” suitable to provide a clear road map in order
to exploit them for the construction of a model, namely a computational model. In
this section, before reviewing the current state of affairs in computational models we
thus discuss some broad dimensions in order to more firmly ground our efforts. These
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dimensions can be defined in terms of the fundamental rationales behind the different
approaches.
The generative problem: assumptions on the arrow of causality
The many theories previously introduced reflect a strong disagreement over the primary
question of the direction of causality between emotional states and their associated
behaviours. A common intuition, shared by Charles Darwin, is that the emotional state
causes a related action. However, the psychological view of ‘I cry because I am sad’ is
not the predominant one, which typically makes the behaviour a cause of the emotion.
William James, indeed, argued that the direction of causality is the opposite of the one
mentioned above: ‘I feel afraid because I run from the bear’. Even if this version of
the relationship between emotion and action may seem counterintuitive and others have
argued against it (Cannon, 1927), it remains a defended view.
The constructionist view, for example, suggests that emotions emerge from the in-
teraction of several factors, among which the core affect is the prominent one. The core
affect, as described in Russell (2003), is an internal state that can be experienced as free
floating, resulting in mood, or can be attributed to some cause, bringing to the begin of
a perceived emotional episode. In the latter case, there are involved processes respon-
sible of the perception of the altering properties of stimuli as well as physiological and
expressive changes.
As presented in Barrett and Russell (2014), this approach can be formalised adopt-
ing the emergent variable model, which claims that emotions do not cause, but are
caused by their measured indicators. The model does not require any covariation among
those indicators, nor any central neural circuit. Referring to Figure 2.4, in particular,
the categorical emotion of ‘fear’ is the result of co-occurrence of multiple indicators
weighted by the b values assigned to each of them. Such indicators are: amygdala ac-
tivation, autonomic nervous system (ANS), freezing behaviour (action) and subjective
experience, as well as other unmeasured indicators. The model error is represented by
a disturbance term (Dfear), which includes all the measurement errors.
Its counterpart model is the so called latent variable model of emotion (Fig. 2.5),
which assumes a central emotion circuit whose variation precedes activations in its
measured indicators (E). This corresponds to a strong covariation among indicators,
resulting in a relatively little need to measure multiple indicators.
How many emotions are there? Discrete, dimensional and componential approaches
In general, psychological theories mostly disagree on how we attribute emotions to
people, and also at the neurobiological level there is some debate about this. The main
answers to these issues can be summarised as follows.
Discrete theories These theories consider the emotions as a small set of discrete states.
The assumption of this approach is that these fundamental, discrete emotions are bio-
logically determined, and associated with a distinct patterns of behavioural expression
that is shared across people and cultures. Indeed, since Darwin (1872), researchers
have attempted to bring this subjective experience, how can be an emotion, to universal
patterns. Tomkins (1962) proposed that there is a limited number of pan-cultural basic
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Figure 2.4: The emergent variable model of fear expressed adopting structural equation model.
In this representation, latent variables are drawn as circles. Manifest or measured variables
are shown as squares. Residuals and variances are drawn as double headed arrows into an
object. (Figure from Barrett and Russell (2014)).
emotions, such as: surprise, interest, joy, rage, fear, disgust, shame, and anguish. Years
later, Ekman and Friesen (1971), after performing a series of cross-cultural studies,
came up with a shorter list, consisting of six basic emotions with universal facial ex-
pressions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. Because of its empha-
sis on discrete categories of states, this approach is also named ‘categorical approach’
(Panksepp, 2004).
Dimensional theories Dimensional theories arose from the biological critics to discrete
emotion categories. Indeed, they claim that there is no brain region or circuit that is
unique to a single emotion category. These theories, instead, argue that an affective
state should be rather expressed in terms of a point coordinate in a continuous two (or
three) dimensional space. The axes of such space, when declined in two dimensions,
typically are valence and arousal (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974; Russell, 2003). The
former corresponds to a positive or negative affective state (e.g. happiness/sadness),
while the latter is proportional to the intensity of the emotional state. A low arousal
value is associated with low intensity (e.g. sadness), while high arousal with more
energy (e.g. anger). Anyway, even this approach hides some drawbacks. Emotional
states as anger and fear would share the same position in a 2D space (high arousal, low
valence). For this reason, a third dimension, named ‘dominance’, is often added. The
resulting space is then referred to as the PAD space, consisting of: Pleasure (valence),
Arousal and Dominance (Mehrabian, 1980). The representational semantic primitives
within this theoretical perspective are thus these 2 or 3 dimensions.
Componential theories The third view is that related to “appraisal theory” previously
introduced (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). All such theories involve a large amount of
appraisal variables (Ortony et al., 1988), checks (Scherer, 2001), or dimensions (Rose-
man, 2001) (depending on the considered theory) from which a large set of emotions
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Figure 2.5: The latent variable model of fear. (Figure from Barrett and Russell (2014)).
can be derived. These variables consider the relationship between the individual and the
environment in terms of meaning and consequences for the former. Scherer (2001), for
example, proposes four categories of variables: relevance, implications, coping poten-
tial and norms; going from stimuli-specific properties to increasingly complex cognitive
processes of the agent. Their evaluation consists in assigning a definite value to each of
the appraisal variables, resulting in a vector of assessments that corresponds to a point
in the n-dimensional space defined by the n appraisal variables. Each point is related
to a specific emotion or affective state, resulting in a wide range of emotions, including
states of varying intensity.
A summary of the presented theoretical perspectives is formalised in Table 2.1,
where for each theory it is shown the mapping of the considered input and output vari-
ables, declined in the application of emotion detection.
How do we attribute emotions? The Theory-Theory vs. Simulation Theory debate
Until this point we considered the emotions as the result of an internal processing of
(internal or external) emotional stimuli. In the course of our life, however, it is far from
unlikely that the considered external stimulus is represented by the emotional output
coming from another human being.
This scenario results in the interaction of two or more independent “emotional mod-
els”, where each part tries to understand and decode the visible cues coming from the
counterpart. This ability, known as “mindreading” (Goldman and Sripada, 2005), rep-
resents the capacity to identify the mental states of others, including emotional states.
Also in this case, two are the main schools of thought. Briefly:
1. the Theory-Theory (TT), posits that a mental-state attributer deploys a naive psy-
chological theory (innate or acquired) to infer mental states in others from their
behaviour;
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Table 2.1: Formalisation of three theoretical perspective, declined in the emotion detection
application. E: emotional event, X: affective abstraction, A: affective state.
Theoretical perspective Mapping Example
Discrete E→ X Dangerous event→
fear
Dimensional 1. E→ X
X ∈ {V,A}
or
X ∈ {P,A,D}
2. X→ A
Dangerous event→
P = low,
A = high,
D = low
→ fear
Componential 1. E→ X
X: n-tuples of appraisal
variable values
2. X→ A
Dangerous event→
novelty = high,
valence = low,
goal rel. = high,
...
coping = low
→ fear
2. the Simulation-Theory (ST), where the same mental-state attributer arrives at a
mental attribution by simulating, replicating, or reproducing in his own mind the
same state as the targets, or by attempting to do so.
For instance, as a whole, Damasio’s theory of emotions (Damasio, 2005, 1999,
2012) takes an ST stance.
In our specific case, we are considering the task of attributing emotion states to
others based on their facial expressions. This task is different from those usually studied
in the mindreading literature, in part because the attributed mental states differ from
the usual ones. The vast majority of the literature is devoted to propositional attitudes
such as desires and beliefs, almost entirely ignoring emotion states like fear, anger,
disgust, or happiness. There is no good reason to exclude these mental states, which
are routinely attributed to others in daily life. At the same time, it cannot be assumed
that the style of mindreading in this subdomain is the same as the style that characterises
other subdomains.
Let us further clarify and expound the two basic theoretical positions towards min-
dreading, which have loomed large in the literature (but see Goldman and Sripada, 2005
for an in-depth review and discussion). There are numerous ways of developing the TT
approach, but the main idea is that the mindreader selects a mental state for attribution
to a target based on inference from other information about the target. According to
one popular version of TT, such an inference is guided by folk psychological gener-
alizations concerning relationships or transitions between psychological states and/or
behaviour of the target (Goldman and Sripada, 2005). The fundamental feature of TT is
that it is an information-based approach. It says that attributors engage in mindreading
by deploying folk psychological information. What they don’t do, as a means to read-
ing a target’s mental state, is (try to) model or instantiate the very mental process that
the target herself undergoes. The core idea of ST is that the attributor selects a men-
tal state for attribution after reproducing or “enacting” within himself the very state in
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question, or a relevantly similar one. In other words, the attributor tries to replicate
a target’s mental state by undergoing the same or a similar mental process to one the
target undergoes. If, in his own case, the process yields mental state M as an output,
she attributes M to the target. For example, if the attributor wants to attribute a future
decision to a target, he might try to replicate the target’s decision-making process in
his own mind and use the output of this process as the decision to assign to the target.
Alternatively, the attributor may test a hypothesised state by simulating it in his own
mind and seeing whether its upshots match those of the target. In either scenario, the
attributor must recognise his own state as being of type M in order to select M as the
state type occupied by the target. This presumably requires some sort of ‘information’
about states of type M , so simulation isn’t entirely information-free (Goldman and Sri-
pada, 2005). However, in contrast to TT, ST says that the relevant information about
M is applied to something like a token or facsimile of a mental state in attributor’s own
mind, not simply to information about the target from which he infers that the target
instantiates M . There is, of course, much more to be said about the TT/ST contrast,
but these points should suffice for present purposes and will be further discussed in the
next chapter.
Computational models of affect
Computational modelling of emotion refers to attempts to develop and validate compu-
tational models of human emotion mechanisms (Reisenzein et al., 2013).
The early studies of emotions have always been a prerogative of philosophers, psy-
chologists and neurobiologist. Indeed, although modern research on emotion dates
back to the nineteenth century with Charles Darwin, the adoption of computer tech-
nologies in such field is much more recent. In 1984, the American sociologist, psy-
chologist and technologist, Sherry Turkle, was the point of contact between the two
research areas. In her book The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Turkle,
1984), she started asking whether computers may have emotions and how our emo-
tional response to robots could lead to metaphysical and ethical issues. This has led the
way to a new field of research, formalised by Rosalind Picard (1997), which takes the
name of Affective Computing (AC).
Picard’s definition of the field was quite broad:
I call “affective computing,” computing that relates to, arises from, or influ-
ences emotions.
In such perspective artificial agents might have the ability to
1. recognise emotion,
2. express emotion,
3. “have emotions”,
the latter point being the hard stuff.
Here, we present a summary of the main computational models adopted in Affective
Computing. These will mostly deal with Picard’s first two points. Nevertheless, the
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issue of modelling robots “having emotion” is starting to gain currency in the robotic
research programs.
It goes without saying, that the last two decades have seen a proliferation of interdis-
ciplinary works of competing and complementary computational models contributing
to a situation of potential confusion, worsened by the lack of a common lexicon be-
tween the psychological and computational worlds they derive from. As result, the
grouping of such models is not a simple task.
One straightforward possibility could be to categorise them with respect to the
considered modalities, such as: face, voice, text and physiological data (Calvo and
D’Mello, 2010). Such engineering-oriented view has some practical merit. However, in
a broader view it is more convenient to discuss such approaches in the framework of the
theoretical dimensions previously introduced (Hudlicka, 2011; Dubois and Adolphs,
2015).
In the following, we will distinguish between three slightly different field-dependent
perspectives or research programs, namely, machine learning-based approaches, robotic
approaches, and AI-based approaches (cfr. Figure 2.1).
Machine learning models
Most current research in affective computing deals with the recognition and the expres-
sion of emotions, with machine learning-based affect detection playing a prominent
role (the reader can refer to Calvo and D’Mello, 2010, for a broad survey). Somehow,
the field of affective computing has by and large narrowed its original broader view
within this perspective. As such, it can be considered as a sub-field of the recent and
growing field of social signal processing (SSP, see Vinciarelli et al., 2012 for a review).
SSP, in its most general form is an automatic approach for the analysis of social
signals which includes several steps. The first is data capture, performed in various
settings and using different equipments (from simple laptop webcams to smart meeting
rooms and wearable devices). The process of data capture results in signals (audio,
video, etc.) that portray more than one person. This makes it necessary to perform
person detection, that involves technologies like face detection, speaker segmentation,
tracking, etc. The data segments isolated during person detection carry information
about the behaviour of each interactant and it is from them that nonverbal behavioural
cues are extracted. This is the third step of the process (behavioural cues extraction) and
requires technologies like facial expression analysis, prosody extraction, gesture and
posture recognition. At the end of the process, the automatically extracted behavioural
cues are used in the last step (social interaction interpretation) to infer social signals.
Engineers and computer scientists typically adopt machine learning approaches for
automatic emotion classification. These rely on the analysis of video, audio, text
and physiological data bringing the problem back to a classical pattern recognition
“pipeline”: namely, feature extraction/reduction followed by classification (discrete
emotion recognition) or regression (continuous affect detection). Indeed, as stated by
D’Mello and Kory (2015), “Affect detection is an important pattern recognition prob-
lem”. This approach is even more evident in the specific case of facial expression
analysis as clearly stated in the recent review by Sariyanidi et al. (2015) (see Figure
2.6).
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Figure 2.6: The facial affect detection pipeline. The input is a single image (It) for spatial
representations or a set of frames (Iwt ) within a temporal window w for spatio-temporal
representations. The system output Yt is discrete if it is obtained through classification or
continuous if obtained through regression. The recognition process can incorporate pre-
vious (Yt−1, · · ·Yt−n) and/or subsequent (Yt+1, · · ·Yt+m) system output(s). (Scheme from
Sariyanidi et al. (2015)).
Overall, this approach assumes that an internal affective latent state “causes” exter-
nal (facial) behaviour. Internal affect state can be either discrete or continuous. Discrete
representations have been mostly adopted, especially for facial expression analysis,
though continuous approaches are gaining currency as reviewed by Gunes and Schuller
(2013). Also it basically relies on a Theory-Theory perspective and internal simulation
is always neglected.
Adopting the discrete/dimensional/componential taxonomy previously introduced,
Figure 2.7 shows at a glance how classic ML algorithms have been exploited in com-
putational models of emotions.
By and large, machine learning approaches cover a wide range of different algo-
rithms, and include the processing of single or multiple modalities combined together.
To provide some examples, in the discrete emotion perspective, McDaniel et al.
(2007) adopted discriminant analysis to classify, in terms of five affective states, the fa-
cial expressions of people recorded during a tutoring session in a learning environment.
Devillers and Vidrascu (2006), instead, focused on the paralinguistic features of spoken
dialogues from a medical emergency call centre. In particular, they used a Support Vec-
tor Machine to classify prosodic and lexical cues against four discrete categories. More
recently, AlZoubi et al. (2009) presented a performance comparison of Nearest Neigh-
bour (NN), Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Naive Bayes (NB) on classification
of EEG signals for affect recognition. Deriu et al. (2016), instead, proposed a classifier
for predicting message-level sentiments of English micro-blog messages from Twitter
recurring to a 2-layer convolutional neural networks whose predictions are combined
using a random forest (RF) classifier.
Many other works focus, instead, on the dimensional perspective. These include
Haag et al. (2004), who used a neural network to estimate the valence and arousal
values from multiple physiological signals, while Heraz and Frasson (2007) adopted
the PAD model to predict from EEG data via a multiple regression (MR) algorithm. A
novelty in this field is given by Mollahosseini et al. (2017) who propose a database of
1M facial images annotated in continuous dimensional space, and used two different
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Figure 2.7: Machine Learning (ML) approaches adopted in computational models of emotions.
DA: Discriminant Analysis, k-/NN: k-/Nearest Neighbour, NB: Naive Bayes, SVM: Support
Vector Machine, RF: Random Forest, SR/MR: Simple/Multiple Regression.
DNNs to extract highly discriminative features from the data samples, followed by a
simple regressor (SR) for each of the two dimensional values.
Finally, the componential perspective, as shown in Figure 2.7, is usually accounted
for via classification or regression techniques. Meuleman and Scherer (2013) proposed
a comprehensive comparison of machine learning approaches applied to the appraisal
theoretical perspective.
D’Mello and Kory (2015), in their comprehensive and in-depth meta-analysis of 90
multimodal (MM) affect detection systems, reported that the state of the art mainly con-
sists of person-dependent models (62.2% of systems) that fuse audio and visual (55.6%)
information to detect acted (52.2%) expressions of basic emotions and simple dimen-
sions of arousal and valence (64.5%) with feature- (38.9%) and decision-level (35.6%)
fusion techniques. However, there were also person-independent systems that consid-
ered additional modalities to detect nonbasic emotions and complex dimensions using
model-level fusion techniques. The meta-analysis revealed that MM systems were con-
sistently (85% of systems) more accurate than their best unimodal counterparts, with an
average improvement of 9.83% (median of 6.60%). However, improvements were three
times lower when systems were trained on natural (4.59%) versus acted data (12.7%).
Importantly, MM accuracy could be accurately predicted (cross-validated R2 of 0.803)
from unimodal accuracies and two system-level factors.
But coming to the specific case study of this thesis, automatic analysis of facial
affect has indeed fostered a wealth of techniques. For an in-depth and recent review,
the reader should refer to Sariyanidi et al. (2015).
By and large, these techniques share the assumption that understanding affective
states from facial expressions can be accomplished through the computer vision and
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pattern recognition “pipeline” (Sariyanidi et al., 2015).
The (often concealed) rationale behind such attitude grounds in early inferential/ap-
praisal theories of emotion (Goldman and Sripada, 2005): visual perception of emo-
tional stimuli is followed by cognitive or appraisal/interpretative processing of the stim-
ulus, which in turn triggers affective responses and feelings (Chakrabarti et al., 2006).
Spelling out such account for faces, when an expresser is observed displaying a partic-
ular facial expression, the observer utilises the rich body of visual features/properties
to infer and attribute an emotion state to the expresser (Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
Clearly, one must be aware that the performance of the data-driven pipeline heav-
ily depends on the amount of annotated facial behaviour (Zafeiriou et al., 2016). So
far most datasets have been collected in controlled recording conditions and typically
under restrictive scenarios; current efforts are thus devoted to collect and annotate spon-
taneous facial behaviour “in-the-wild”, much like it has happened for face detection and
facial landmark localisation (Kossaifi et al., 2017). However, in unrestricted environ-
ments not only the sampling of the data (Torralba and Efros, 2011), but annotation tech-
niques are far from being evident, specially if continuous dimensional affect analysis is
the goal (Kossaifi et al., 2017). Arguably, the introduction of deep learning techniques
in the pipeline, in particular deep Convolutional Neural Network, could further improve
performance on benchmarks, at least in principle, although this achievement is likely to
be attained at the price of addressing even larger, web-scale datasets (Masi et al., 2016).
Clearly, the machine learning research trend does not make justice of the full prob-
lem we are addressing here: human facial behaviour processing for affective analysis
is a complex problem and, most important a fairly different game from face detection
or landmark localisation. Facial behaviour conveyance of affect depends on the context
and on the person. Hence, pedantic following of the same research path that led to top
performance results on previous problems (e.g, object or face recognition), might be
questionable, and surely it is so when one moves to the field of social robotics.
Robotic models
Rapid progress in robotics calls for naturalistic interaction between humans and ma-
chines, where the emphasis is on collaboration, learning via imitation and socialising
(Billard et al., 2016; Natale et al., 2013). It goes without saying, these are quite differ-
ent scenarios with respect to the off-line learning / classification over billions of facial
pictures. In a sense, problems posed in such realms are better conceived in terms of
learning using few labelled examples (Yang et al., 2013; Lake et al., 2015).
For instance, in social robotics, an important challenge is to determine how to de-
sign robots that can perceive the user’s needs, feelings, and intentions, and adapt to
users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots were
able to adequately demonstrate these skills, humans would eventually accept them as
social companions. This approach requires understanding how humans interact with
each other, how they perform tasks together and how they develop feelings of social
connection over time, and using these insights to formulate design principles that make
social robots attuned to the workings of the human brain.
Wiese et al. (2017) argue that the likelihood of humanoid robots being perceived as
social companions can be increased by designing them in a way that they are perceived
as intentional agents that activate areas in the human brain involved in social-cognitive
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processing, and provide an in-depth and wide review of how neuroscientific methods
can contribute to make robots appear more social. Robots that are supposed to act as
social interaction partners in the future need to fit in human-attuned environments by
emulating human form and cognition. Indeed, psychological research has shown that
anthropomorphism, and specifically mind perception, are highly automatic processes
that activate social areas in the human brain (Wiese et al., 2017).
There is a tradition of robotic research that utilised neuroscience studies as a starting
point (Kawato, 1999; Scassellati, 2002; Demiris et al., 2014). These approaches led
to accurate models of muscular-skeletal systems, and in particular of facial features
appearance (Oh et al., 2006; Becker-Asano et al., 2010)
However, when talking about humanoid robot interaction, their social appearance
is concerned with both the “bodyware” or hardware of the machine, and the behaviour
concerning the observable results of the workings of its “mindware” or software (Wiese
et al., 2017). As to mindware, an important distinction needs to be made between neu-
rally accurate models, often proof of principles, and actual working implementations
on real hardware, with profound differences between computers and human brains, im-
peding accurate real-time neural simulations of large brain systems, such as those of
the social brain. Given the technological limitations associated with trying to repro-
duce large brain networks on actual bodyware, the goal needs to be the identification of
a minimal set of features that can reliably trigger mind perception in non-human agents.
First attempts to build socially competent robots can be traced back to the work
done at MIT Brook’s robotics lab, e.g., Cog (Brooks et al., 1999) and Kismet (Breazeal
and Scassellati, 1999; Breazeal, 2003b). With Kismet, Breazeal and Scassellati (1999)
studied how an expressive robot elicited appropriate social responses in humans by
displaying attention and turn-taking mechanisms. They also identify some of the re-
quirements of the visual system of such robots (Breazeal et al., 2001) as for example
the advantages of foveated vision, eye contact, and a number of sensorimotor control
loops (e.g., avoid and seek objects and people).
Interestingly, cognitive/social visual behaviour grounds in a motivation system which
consists of drives and emotions. The robot’s drives represent the basic needs of the
robot: to interact with people (the social drive); to be stimulated by toys and other ob-
jects (the stimulation drive); to rest (the fatigue drive). For each drive, there is a desired
operation point, and an acceptable bound of operations around that point (the homeo-
static regime). Unattended, drives drift toward an under-stimulated regime. Excessive
stimulation (too many stimuli or stimuli moving too quickly) push a drive toward an
over-stimulated regime. When the intensity level of the drive leaves the homeostatic
regime, the robot becomes motivated to act in ways that will restore the drives to the
homeostatic regime.
The robot’s emotions, in turn, are a result of its affective state. The affective state of
the robot is represented as a point along three dimensions: arousal (i.e. high, neutral,
or low), valence (i.e. positive, neutral, or negative), and stance (i.e. open, neutral, or
closed). This core affective state is thus continuous and is based on Jim Russel’s core
affect conjecture (Russell, 2003). Operatively, the affective state is computed by sum-
ming contributions from the drives and behaviours. Percepts may also indirectly con-
tribute to the affective state through the releasing mechanisms. Each releasing mecha-
nism has an associated somatic marker processes, which assigns arousal, valence and
23
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 24 — #44 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 2. What is an emotion? State-of-the-art of different accounts
stance tags to each releasing mechanism (a technique inspired by Bechara et al., 2000;
Bechara and Damasio, 2005). At the same time, this continuous state is partitioned
into a discrete set of emotion regions, which roughly correspond to Ekman’s discrete
emotions (Ekman, 1993).
In subsequent work Breazeal et al. (2006) have presented Leonardo, a robot that
can imitate humans’ facial expressions. They have shown how it is possible for the
robot to bootstrap from this imitative ability to infer the affective reaction of the human
with whom it interacts and then use this affective assessment to guide its subsequent
behaviour. Their approach is heavily influenced by the ways human infants learn to
communicate with their caregivers and come to understand the actions and expressive
behaviour of others in intentional and motivational terms. Specifically, the approach is
guided by the hypothesis that imitative interactions between infant and caregiver, start-
ing with facial mimicry, are a significant stepping-stone to develop appropriate social
behaviour, to predict other’s actions, and ultimately to understand people as social be-
ings. Leonardo learns the direct mapping between a person’s facial expression and its
expression by using a neural network. Scassellati (2002) went further and took some
first steps, in a Theory-Theory vein, toward implementing a theory of mind for the
robot Cog based on an established psychological model for mentalising developed by
Baron-Cohen (1997).
Since then, several empathic robots that consider the internal state of others for their
own expressions have been proposed. Hegel et al. (2006) presented an anthropomor-
phic robot called BARTHOC capable of recognising humans’ emotion from speech and
producing facial expressions corresponding to the six basic emotion. Though, the issue
of mimicry was addressed, emotion recognition from speech was classically performed
in the pattern recognition pipeline, i.e. feature extraction and classification. This was
performed with simple methods, and directly mapped to facial expressions, in order to
meet real-time recognition.
Adams and Robinson (2011) developed an android head robot that mimicked the
facial expressions of humans with the aim of social-emotional intervention for autistic
children. Their robot tracked facial feature points of subjects who expressed emotional
states and directly converted them into corresponding control points to modify its own
facial expression (direct mapping). Trovato et al. (2013) developed an emotional model
for a humanoid robot, KOBIAN, based on psychological studies. Their model repre-
sented KOBIAN’s internal state, which is modulated by external stimuli. It also had
prototypes of facial expressions grounded on specific emotional states and, via a form
of direct mapping, expressed facial patterns as combinations of these prototypes ac-
cording to Plutchik (2003).
Following the discovery of mirror neurons in non-human primates and their in-
volvement in action understanding (see, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016 for a general
introduction), neuroscientifically inspired approaches to robotics mainly focused on de-
veloping models for action recognition and imitation (Metta et al., 2006; Oztop et al.,
2013). As we will discuss in the next chapter, the mirror neuron system activates both
during the execution of their own actions and while observing the same actions per-
formed by others. In the context of emotional communication, this mechanism is as-
sumed to enable people to imagine the emotional state of others based on their own
experiences of expressing the corresponding emotion.
24
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 25 — #45 i
i
i
i
i
i
2.5. Computational models of affect
The key concept of shared sensorimotor representations, dating back to Liberman
and Mattingly (1985), guided a variety of implementations utilising, for example, re-
current neural networks (Tani et al., 2004) or various other machine-learning methods
that learn direct-inverse models from examples (but see, for a review, Oztop et al.,
2006, 2013). Among these attempts to implement a mirror neuron system into artificial
agents, some models were more neuroscientifically accurate than others.
Inspired by the mirror neuron systems, Lim and Okuno (2014) proposed multimodal
emotional intelligence (MEI), which utilises an integrated architecture to recognise the
emotional states of others and generate its own emotional facial expressions. The MEI
is composed of Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) to realize both recognition and gen-
eration in the same architecture. Recognition of the emotional states of others is repre-
sented as classification of input features by GMMs, whereas expressions of one’s own
emotional states are achieved by sampling features from selected Gaussian distributions
corresponding to the specific state. An important characteristic of their model is that it
computes four features (Speed, Intensity, irRegulation, and Extent, SIRE) assumed as
very common among modalities. Therefore, following training from speech using the
SIRE, the MEI was able to estimate categories of emotion from not only audio signals
but also gait signals. It can also generate the SIRE for the robot’s voice, gait, and ges-
ture. However, there are two limitations in their system: first, the SIRE is a heuristic
feature defined by a designer; each modality may include specific features to represent
emotion. Second, although they considered MNS (Lim and Okuno, 2015), they did not
examine the role of mental simulation for estimation of the other’s emotion.
Brain-inspired models have dominated the field for several years, but are being
replaced by the modern “brute force” data-driven approach of using deep networks,
in particular, convolutional neural networks (Goodfellow et al., 2016) and managing
the increased computational cost through specialised processors (e.g., GPUs), resulting
in an improvement in performance of orders of magnitude.
Yet, there are still efforts to reconcile these two perspectives. Barros and Wermter
(2016) have recently proposed a model that simulates the innate perception of audio-
visual emotion expressions with deep neural networks, that learns new expressions (via
a convolutional neural network) by categorising them into emotional clusters with a
self-organizing layer. This process implements the emotion perception stage where
the agent -the robot NICO, Neuro-Inspired COmpanion - observes the environment
consisting of human and other artificial agents expressing a particular emotion, for
example, a human smiling at the agent (Churamani et al., 2017). Then, in the emotion
synthesis step, the robot factors in its own goals and beliefs to estimate an emotional
state for itself; this is based on the inference engine of the agent so as to react to the
perceived input from the environment. Eventually, once the agent has received an input
from the environment, it then expresses its emotional state in the form of facial gestures,
synthetic speech etc. evoking another response from the environment (Churamani et al.,
2017). Clearly, here there is a sort of direct mapping (no internal simulation) from the
latent space of categorising in discrete form, affective expressions learnt in a bottom-up,
feed-forward sweep.
Kim et al. (2013) have rectified their MEI/SIR original proposal using deep neural
networks that learn to extract features for emotional categorisation from audio-visual
signals. In their system, deep belief networks (DBNs) comprising restricted Boltzmann
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machines (RBMs, see Goodfellow et al., 2016) were used as unsupervised learning
mechanisms. The RBM can abstract input signals and reconstruct the signals there-
from. In experiments, their model extracted emotion specific features from general
ones, which are not always important for the classification of emotion.
More recently, Horii et al. (2016) proposes a model that can estimate human emo-
tion and generate its own emotional expressions to imitate the human expressions based
on the estimation of his/her emotion in human-robot interaction. The model overcomes
two issues confronting the previous emotional model: constructing an emotional rep-
resentation of multimodal signals for estimation and generation for emotion instead of
using heuristic features, and actualising mental simulation to infer the emotion of others
from their ambiguous multimodal signals. In the same vein of Kim et al. (2013), they
employed RBMs to address these two issues as they are able to abstract input signals
and recall the signals there from. The abstraction capability of RBMs was exploited
to overcome the first limitation by reducing the dimensions of multimodal signals and
associating the multimodal signals. The model also carries out mental simulation by
exploiting the ability to generate sensorimotor signals. The mental simulation mech-
anism enables the model to estimate the emotional states of others from partial multi-
modal expressions based on its own experiences. Indeed, their proposal, as we will
discuss further on, is the most related to the work we present in this thesis.
We can conclude the robotic overview by noting that the construction of empathy
in robots is still a long way to go. The main problems and challenges have been lucidly
dissected by Asada (2015).
AI-oriented models
The aim of AI-oriented models of emotion is to the enhance the human-computer inter-
action, by controlling the behaviour of virtual agents to motivate and establish empathy
and bonding.
Appraisal and componential theories have been largely influential in this research
program. Computational models of emotion had early success exemplified by Scherer’s
GENESE expert system. GENESE was built on a knowledge base that mapped ap-
praisals to different emotions as predicted by Scherer’s heuristics and theory (Scherer,
1993). However, despite its value as a tool to test emotion theories, the system was
too limited for most real-world applications. It is too difficult, if not impossible, to
construct the significant knowledge base needed for complex realistic situations. More
recently, the OCC model by Ortony et al. (1990) has been widely adopted. For in-
stance, it has been used by Conati (2002) in her remarkable work on emotions during
learning. The model is used to combine evidence from situational appraisals that pro-
duce emotions (top-down) with bodily expressions associated with emotion expression
(bottom-up). In this fashion, both a predictive (from the OCC model) and a confirma-
tory (from bodily measures) analysis of emotional experience is feasible.
In general, the emotional displays can be divided in two categories: the visible,
behavioural and expressive manifestations, and the less visible, effects on the inter-
nal perceptual and cognitive processes. Therefore, a comprehensive model of emotion
should account for multiple modalities including the effects on non-observable physio-
logical components, visible physical manifestations and internal cognition. Figure 2.8
summarises a few well-known AI-oriented models with respect to the discrete/dimen-
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2.5. Computational models of affect
sional/componential taxonomy.
In Bui (2004) it is presented a computational implementation of emotions for an
embodied agent, named ParleE. Such model maps an emotion state vector expressed
in terms of six basic emotion labels to a contraction of 19 different facial muscles.
The specular implementation is represented by WASABI (Becker-Asano, 2008) which
maps regions of dimensional core affect into one of seven possible facial expressions,
and is implemented into the physical social robot EMYS. An hybrid approach resides
in ALMA (Gebhard, 2005) which represents, via an agent named ‘VirtualHuman’, both
discrete emotional states and a general mood expressed in a three-dimensional (PAD)
space. Other works adopt the componential derivation which identifies emotion labels
as the combination of several appraisal variables. This is the case of EMA (EMotion
and Adaption) (Marsella and Gratch, 2009) that implements checks posited by appraisal
theories based on a representation of the relationship between the agent and the envi-
ronment. Under the same category relies the computational model behind the ‘Prime
Climb’ educational game. Conati (2002) uses a probabilistic model, namely a Dynamic
Decision Network, in a dualistic way: top-down, as a predictive assessment of the stu-
dent traits, and bottom-up, as diagnostic assessment of bodily expressions associated
with emotional states.
A lucid and in-depth review of the relationships between computational modelling
of emotion and the general goals of AI , when these are restricted to the domain of
emotions, has been provided by Reisenzein et al. (2013)
Figure 2.8: Artificial Intelligence-oriented (AI) approaches adopted in computational models
of emotions.
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Summary
We have reviewed the main contributions to the field of computational models of affect,
with some particular reference to affective facial expressions. Among the plethora of
approaches and the different research programs, we also tried to identify some general
trends or dimension to more systematically frame the discussion. However, we cannot
elude the fact that on the one hand, yet, it is difficult to compare approaches that, ap-
parently seem to be driven by different levels of explanation (neural, behavioural, etc.).
On the other hand we have used the terms “theory” and “model” in a sort of a loose
definition, at least in a strict epistemological standpoint. Clearly, this is a cogent issue
when addressing the computational modelling of affect, namely via facial expression
analysis; thus the next chapter will provide first, a thorough and in-depth analysis of
this aspect.
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CHAPTER3
Rationales and working hypotheses
IN the previous chapter we have reviewed different contributions to the conundrumof affective modelling. By and large we have concluded that, in many cases, theplethora of approaches are hardly comparable with one another. Indeed there have
been cases in which comparisons have fostered academical disputes that, in the end,
were epistemologically undermined by the fact that different levels of explanations had
been actually confronted.
In a subject such as this, it is perhaps best to start by establishing models of an
apt generality, so to avoid ad hoc heuristics, while considering relevant and yet well
defined case studies, in order not to complicate an already difficult problem. As we
stated at the beginning, in this study we are addressing the construction of a multi-
modal affective space but focussing on the case of the perception of emotional facial
expressions along a dyadic interaction. Thus, in this chapter we first make clear the
methodological framework we have adopted (Section 3.1). This can be characterised
as a multilevel analysis framework, which aims at devising a theoretical model but in-
formed and constrained by knowledge that we have available both at the psychological
and at the neuroscience explanation levels.
Next, we provide the necessary neurobiological underpinning (Section 3.2) to the
subsequent modelling steps, while accounting for most recent results concerning motor-
based views of affect unfolding (Section 3.3). Eventually (Section 3.4), the distributed
neural architecture devised at this stage will be used as a blueprint for outlining, at
a more general and abstract level, a functional architecture to support the theoretical
model that will be formalised in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3. Rationales and working hypotheses
A methodological foreword
Computational models in the cognitive and behavioural sciences can be used either as
analytical tools for analysing empirical data or as instantiations of cognitive hypotheses
(Palminteri et al., 2017). The work described in this thesis falls in the second case.
Then, it is important to note that, as instantiations of cognitive theories, computational
models can target different levels of description.
A key distinction (Palminteri et al., 2017) is that between aggregate versus mecha-
nistic models: aggregate models describe average behaviours using a synthetic mathe-
matical model; mechanistic models explain how behaviours are generated.
Such distinction has been further developed by Marr (1982), who proposed three
levels of description/explanation (see Fig. 3.1, left):
1. the what/why level (computational theory, i.e. the individuation of a computable
function as a model of a given behavioural phenomenon),
2. the how level (algorithm),
3. the physical realisation level (implementation).
Marr’s multilevel approach has become a sort of paradigm in research work on
the theoretical foundations of cognitive science (Dennett, 1987), while nourishing a
vast philosophical debate. But more importantly for us, Marr’s account can be seen,
from a broader perspective, as the claim that the behaviour of a complex system, such
as a living organism, has to be explained at various levels of organization, including
psychological, neurological, cellular and biochemical levels.
Anderson (1991) remarkably synthesised the advantage of the distinction between
the computational and the algorithmic levels in particular:
The search for scientific explanation is easier in this approach. In a mecha-
nistic approach, we must consider any combination of mechanisms as basi-
cally equivalent to any other, and this creates an enormous search space of
possible mechanisms with no heuristics for searching it for an explanation
[...] There is a sense in which rational explanations are more satisfying than
mechanistic explanations. A mechanistic explanation treats the configura-
tion of mechanisms as arbitrary. The justification for the mechanisms is that
they fit the facts at hand. There is no explanation for why they have the form
they do rather than an alternative form. In contrast, a rational explanation
tells why the mind does what it does (p. 410)
A critical point here concerns the constraints assumed by computational theory (An-
derson’s“rational explanation”) when aiming to reduce the underdetermination and the
arbitrariness or ad-hocness or mimicry, as Marr put it, of cognitive models at the algo-
rithmic level (Anderson’s “mechanistic explanation”). In particular, the "heuristics for
searching an explanation" can be seen as a guide in the choice of a cognitively plausi-
ble mechanism, given that there are usually many mechanisms instantiating the same
performance. Briefly, this is the model underdetermination problem, which although
being a general problem in scientific explanation, has proven to be remarkably acute
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3.1. A methodological foreword
for cognitive explanation. In classical Cognitive Science, this issue was deeply dis-
cussed in depth by Pylyshyn (1984) in terms of the specific constraints the cognitive
scientist has to assume in order to guarantee the "psychological reality" or plausibility
of computational models. This issue is also dealt with by embodied cognitive science
too, this time introducing plausible constraints stemming from the environment and the
body. Further, this seems to be an issue raised at the time of Cybernetics and early
Artificial Intelligence (AI); all these topics have been pointed out by recent analyses:
see Cordeschi (2002).
Indeed, a hallmark of the present state of research in Cognitive Science, is that
one is generally ignorant of how exactly to cast the different levels into a grounded
relationship, and any proposal has its limitations (Boccignone and Cordeschi, 2015).
Marr himself contended with a persistent ambiguity in the role of the implementation
level with respect to the algorithmic one. On the one hand, the implementation level
was hypothesised as a rather independent level of explanation, never constraining the
algorithmic level from the bottom up. On the other hand, it has occasionally been
endowed with the role of arbitrating the selection of the most suitable algorithm, from
among those that consistently embodied constraints imposed by the computational level
(see Marr, 1982 , Chapter 3). For in such a case, an algorithm is preferred by virtue of
its apparent greater biological or neurological (thus, implementation level) plausibility.
However, within the Bayesian approach issues about constraints can be settled in a
way quite different from Marr’s, particularly in relation to his three-fold hierarchy of
levels of explanation.
In the light of the growing exploitation of Bayesian methods in the cognitive sci-
ences, it has been argued (Chater et al., 2006; Knill et al., 1996; Boccignone and Corde-
schi, 2007) that Marr’s three-fold hierarchy could be reorganised into two levels: the
computational theory level, which can be formalised precisely in terms of Bayesian
theory, and the implementation theory level, embedding both Marr’s algorithmic and
physical realisation levels (see Fig. 3.1, right).
Figure 3.1: The levels of explanation in cognitive/behavioural sciences. Left: Marr’s original
proposal (Marr, 1982). Right: Marr’s revision according to Yuille and Kersten (adapted
from Knill et al., 1996).
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Chapter 3. Rationales and working hypotheses
Note that both levels are denoted “theories” here and, differently from Marr, a close
interaction between the computational (here Bayesian) theory and the implementation
theory level is assumed. Further, hypotheses and constraints are somehow shared be-
tween the two levels (see broken-line box in Fig. 3.1).
In this thesis we do endorse this two-level view. Also, we use the term “model” to
qualify the two theory levels in Fig. 3.1: briefly, in what follows we will refer to such
levels as the theoretical model1and the implementation model. This well reflects the
fact that, at both levels, the cognitive scientist is devising models embodying constraints
related to a number of physical or biological laws and theoretical hypotheses that are
relevant to the explanation of a given phenomenon. This is a point regarding both
models explaining behavioural regularities (at the Bayesian theory level) and models
explaining neural regularities (at the implementation theory level).
The theoretical model
The computational theory level is the highest level of a cognitive theory. This is a
functional specification of cognition as “a mapping from one kind of information to
another” where “the abstract properties of this mapping are defined precisely (Marr,
1982). The details of how this mapping is implemented are left to lower levels. He gave
one example of a high-level theory from mathematics. The field axioms specify the
abstract properties of algebraic expressions, such as the commutativity of addition, but
are silent on low-level matters of implementation, such as how numbers are represented
(Roman numerals, base-10, base-2, etc.).
Marr’s computational theory can be specified in the Bayesian framework in terms of
the so called generative model: namely, the joint probability distribution P ({Xk}Kk=1)
of the random variables (RVs) of interest X1, · · · , XK factorised according to given
constraints. A representation of such generative model can be given in terms of a Prob-
abilistic Graphical Model (PGM) (Lauritzen, 1996; Jordan, 1998; Koller and Friedman,
2009), say G (see the appendix A for an introduction to PGM).
The graph G can be viewed in two very different ways:
• as a compact representation for a set of conditional independence assumptions
about a distribution;
• as a data structure that provides the skeleton for representing a joint distribution
compactly in a factorized way.
Example 3.1. Let the random vectors XhiddenI and YobsI denote the hidden affective
state and the observable facial expression of an agent I, respectively. Denote RVs E
and C an emotional event and the context or circumstances in which the event occurs,
respectively.
Define P (YobsI ,X
hidden
I ,E,C) the joint probability distribution over the RVs of in-
terest. By applying the product rule, one possible factorisation of the joint distribution
1In a sense, our use of the term theoretical model is close to that of the philosopher Ronald Giere, who reserved
the term “for a special class of abstract models, those constructed with the use of [...] theoretical principles":
Newton’s laws, Mendel’s or Darwin’s are different examples of such principles (Giere, 1999).
32
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 33 — #53 i
i
i
i
i
i
3.1. A methodological foreword
is
P (YobsI ,X
hidden
I ,E,C) =
P (YobsI | XhiddenI ,E,C)P (XhiddenI | E,C)P (E | C)P (C)
However, on the basis of psychological theories (e.g., Ekman and Rosenberg (1997))
we may assume that the affective state XhiddenI will be determined by both event E
and context C. In turn, the internal affective state XhiddenI will be responsible for the
generation of the visible expression YobsI . Such constraints can be encoded in the PGM
shown in Figure 3.2. The PGM is a DAG, thus Eq. A.1 holds so that the joint pdf
factorisation above simplifies to
P (YobsI ,X
hidden
I ,E,C) = P (Y
obs
I | XhiddenI )P (XhiddenI | E,C)P (E)P (C).
From the graphical representation G, it is straightforward to read the fundamental
conditional independence assumption:
(YobsI ⊥{E,C} | XhiddenI )
Figure 3.2: Capturing psychological theories in a PGM. Left: a schematic representation of the
assumption that event and context, together, trigger agent’s internal emotional state, which
is then externally displayed via facial expression. Right: the probabilistic directed acyclic
graph (Bayesian network) where nodes represent the RVs of interest and arrows encode
conditional dependencies between nodes.
Note that, in the example provided above, the constraints to shape G architecture
have been “top-down” derived by taking stock of common assumptions in the psycho-
logical literature. Nevertheless, a theoretical model related to the behavioural level, as
far as it can be identified in terms of the underlying neural architecture, can be “bottom-
up” constrained by the latter, thus mirroring the organization of groups of neurons or
of functional brain areas (depending on the grain of the analyses).
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Subtleties of the implementation model
The most straightforward implementation model to “put into work” the theoretical
model can be obtained by specifying the probability distributions defining the con-
ditional dependencies and by applying suitable PGM-based algorithms such as Belief
Propagation, Variational Bayes learning, etc. (but see Koller and Friedman (2009) for
an in-depth introduction). This can be seen as the coarsest-grain implementation model.
But it might be the case that an implementation model at a finer grain is needed to be
addressed.
Probabilistic models are also compositional in nature, a lower implementation level
can be devised by designing inference as a collection of local inference problems, de-
fined over sub-graphs of graph G. This indeed is the route we will follow to devise our
implementation model.
Clearly, there is a multiplicity of finer analysis levels downwards to the ultimate
neural level. If a neural grain of analysis is pursued, then it has been shown that the
PGM can be used as a blueprint for devising a neural implementation model (neural
architecture) and simulation can be performed at that level.
This raises the fundamental issue of what should be then considered as the neural
(implementation) level in cognitive science modelling. Clearly, paraphrasing Wiener
and Rosenblueth, the best material model of a brain is another, or preferably the same,
brain. Thus, in the end, if this ultimate level is addressed a rational / computational
theory explanation should confront with experimental data at this level (neurophysio-
logical, fMRI, etc.).
However, in the wild of the neural jungle, the gap between levels of explanations can
turn to be huge and a variety of sub-levels can be derived downward the hierarchy. In a
very elegant work (Abbott and Kepler, 1990), Abbott and Kepler have mathematically
derived from the Hogkin-Huxley model, via subsequent reductions and approximations,
the FitzHugh-Nagumo model, the integrate-and-fire model, and eventually the binary
Hopfield-type model. If one assumes tout court any of this “neural implementations”
as a proxy for the brain, one then must be aware of its explanatory limitations (which
could be enough, depending on the goal of the researcher). Note that levels can be
even explored further downward: Angela and Dayan (2005) have proposed that the
neuro-modulators acetylcholine and norepinephrine play a major role in the brain’s
implementation of Bayesian priors at the cognitive/behavioural level.
Thus, dealing with the implementation theory level, if neural simulation is ad-
dressed we must be ready to deal with a multiplicity of (sub) levels. Computations
can thus be carried out using classic artificial neurons, or at a lower level by using
membrane potential as the crucial variable, or further down, at a chemical level, by tak-
ing into account concentrations of calcium or other substances governed by reaction-
diffusion equations. As pointed out by Koch,
[...] the principal differences are the relevant spatial and temporal scales
dictated by the different physical parameters, as well as the dynamical range
of the [...] sets of parameters (Koch (1999), p. 279).
34
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 35 — #55 i
i
i
i
i
i
3.2. Neurobiological background
Putting all together: multilevel analysis
Multilevel analysis is a consistent way of dealing with the multiscale nature of cogni-
tive and behavioural processes. Behavioural and cognitive phenomena, and markedly
emotions, exists at multiple temporal and spatial scales.
The kind of explanatory pluralism that is involved by a Bayesian account of Marr’s
multilevel analysis, affords the scientist a method for developing fuller explanations of
relevant phenomena. To sum up the main features discussed above:
1. the notion of architecture becomes a central issue, since it embodies constraints
assumed by the cognitive scientist for his own purpose at the chosen level of
explanation;
2. the implementation level turns out to be a lower-level model, which is suitable to
be used for instantiating the computational theory level at different sub-levels;
3. Marr’s algorithmic level does not so far provide an autonomous level of expla-
nation, rather one encompassing simulations of different grains: from a coarse-
grained simulation of Bayesian inference and learning processes close to the be-
havioural/computational theory level, down to fine-grained simulation(s) at the
neural level.
Top-down constraining affords the cognitive scientist a basis for unifying multi-
ple levels of analysis by identifying longer-scaled levels as contextual constraints for
the smaller-scaled levels. Bottom-up scaffolding provides a framework for identifying
what can emerge from lower-level patterns (i.e., patterns existing at shorter time scales
or smaller spatial scales), and the dynamics and processes by which these patterns are
formed. It is the substrates of lower levels that allow higher-level phenomena to emerge.
As just mentioned, this is relevant in the study of affect, where underlying pro-
cesses compose in a complex way, to produce behavioural dynamics where, as lucidly
remarked by Pessoa (2008), no longer emotion and cognition can be eventually distin-
guished (see, Figure 2.3, Section 2).
As said, this is the route we are taking in the following where we will first exploit
the constraints and the functional architecture outlined here to devise, in Chapter 4 a
theoretical model in terms of a dynamic PGM and subsequently, at a lower level, a
compositional implementation model.
Neurobiological background
To set out, we need to define explicitly the term “emotion”, as it is used throughout this
dissertation. This is a controversial issue at large (see Ziemke and Lowe (2009) for a
thorough discussion). Here we assume Damasio’s cleavage between emotions and feel-
ings, the latter being the first person experience of the corresponding emotion (Dama-
sio, 1999). The term emotion should be rightfully used to designate a collection of
responses triggered from parts of the brain to the body, and from parts of the brain
to other parts of the brain, using both neural and humoral routes. The end result of
the collection of such responses is an emotional state, defined by changes within the
body-proper, e.g., viscera, internal milieu, and within certain sectors of the brain, e.g.,
somatosensory cortices; neuro-transmitter nuclei in brain stem (Damasio, 1999).
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In this perspective, an emotion is a neural object, that is a neural reaction to a cer-
tain stimulus, realised by a complex ensemble of neural activations in the brain (internal
emotional state). These often are preparations for muscular and visceral actions (facial
expressions, heart rate increase, etc.); as a consequence, the body will be modified into
an emotional body state. For our purposes, we reckon the latter to be “observable”,
either explicitly - vision, hearing -, or implicitly, e.g. via physiological sensor measure-
ments.
Such a disentanglement is a cautionary one: in these terms emotions are likely to
be amenable to third person description (observability and modelling), whilst feelings
would necessarily involve first person experience (opening to the conundrum of con-
sciousness (Damasio, 1999; Harnad and Scherzer, 2008), which is out of the scope of
this thesis). Also, we will use the term “affect” interchangeably with “emotion” in a
broad sense (Ziemke and Lowe, 2009).
Under these circumstances, how does affective neuroscience spell out the under-
standing of facial expression of emotions?
In a nutshell, according to Adolph’s model (Adolphs, 2002b), upon the onset of
an emotionally meaningful stimulus, namely the expresser’s facial action, observer’s
response undergoes the following stages:
1. fast early perceptual processing of highly salient stimuli (120 ms);
2. detailed perception and emotional reaction involving the body (170 ms);
3. retrieval of conceptual knowledge about the emotion signalled by the expresser’s
face (> 300 ms).
This deceptively simple account hides a number of cumbersome issues that in order
to be addressed call for a finer analysis of neurobiological underpinnings. In the fol-
lowing we summarise in some detail current knowledge concerning main brain areas
involved in the process and their structural/functional relationships.
A classic view of the “information flow” from early vision to the affective system,
with main areas involved is presented in Figure 3.3 Such complex network of brain
areas of specific interest for our work is briefly reviewed in the following.
Visual areas. A broad delineation of two major functional pathways is believed to
extend to the organization of the human brain.
The ventral pathway (the where pathway) projecting from V1 (striate cortex) through
areas V2 and V4 (prestriate cortex) to the inferior temporal (IT) cortex and to the ante-
rior section of superior temporal sulcus (STS) is primarily concerned with the recogni-
tion of objects.
The dorsal pathway (the what pathway) projecting from V1 through areas V2 and
V3 to the middle temporal area (V5/MT) and thence to the superior temporal and pari-
etal cortex is concerned with the perception of spatial information and with the visual
guidance of actions towards objects. These two pathways are not completely separate;
indeed, a polysensory area in the STS receives inputs both from the ventral and dorsal
pathways where form and motion can interact.
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Figure 3.3: A classic outline of some of the pathway from perception to emotion, in a lat-
eral view of the brain of the macaque monkey. Connections are shown in the ventral visual
system from V1 to V2, V4, the inferior temporal visual cortex, etc., with some connections
reaching the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, as, arcuate sulcus; cal, calcarine sulcus;
cs, central sulcus; lf, lateral (or Sylvian) fissure; lun, lunate sulcus; ps, principal sulcus;
io, inferior occipital sulcus; ip, intraparietal sulcus (which has been opened to reveal some
of the areas it contains); sts, superior temporal sulcus (which has been opened to reveal
some of the areas it contains). AIT, anterior inferior temporal cortex; FST, visual motion
processing area; LIP, lateral intraparietal area; MST, visual motion processing area; MT,
visual motion processing area (also called V5); PIT, posterior inferior temporal cortex; STP,
superior temporal plane; TA, architectonic area including auditory association cortex; TE,
architectonic area including high-order visual association cortex, and some of its sub-areas
TEa and TEm; TG, architectonic area in the temporal pole; V1-V4, visual areas 1-4; VIP,
ventral intraparietal area; TEO, architectonic area including posterior visual association
cortex. The numerals refer to architectonic areas, and have the following approximate func-
tional equivalence: 1,2,3, somatosensory cortex (posterior to the central sulcus); 4, motor
cortex; 5, superior parietal lobule; 7a, inferior parietal lobule, visual part; 7b, inferior pari-
etal lobule, somatosensory part; 6, lateral premotor cortex; 8, frontal eye field; 12, part of
orbitofrontal cortex; 46, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
Milner and Goodale (1993) substantially reinterpreted these functions and postu-
lated that both streams process information about object features and their spatial local-
isation, but that the visual information is used differentially by each stream. The ventral
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pathway is implicated in the recognition, categorisation and high-level significance of
objects. In contrast, processes supported by the dorsal pathway concern on-line infor-
mation about the spatial location of objects that is used for the programming and visual
control of skilled movements. In this scheme, the primary role of the ventral stream is
object recognition whereas the primary role of the dorsal stream is to locate stimuli rel-
ative to the observer for the purpose of on-line actions, thus it codes in viewer-centred
coordinates. To summarise, the nature of the perception (or action) determines the na-
ture of the processing engaged. This functional dissociation emphasises the output side
of visual analysis rather than the input side.
Jeannerod (1994) has proposed a more general distinction between these two streams
that relates to pragmatic and semantic representations of action. The former refers to
rapid transformation of sensory input into motor commands, whereas the latter refers to
the use of cognitive cues for generating actions. The proposed pragmatic representation
might depend on cooperation across distributed areas in the parietal lobe and premotor
cortex.
A key area, for what concerns the subject of this thesis, is the superior temporal
sulcus. This latter region of caudal superior temporal cortex encompasses areas such
as the medial superior temporal area (MST), the middle temporal area (MT) and the
fundal superior temporal area (FST). Desimone and Ungerleider in a number of sem-
inal studies (Desimone and Ungerleider, 1986; Ungerleider and Desimone, 1986a,b)
explored the sequence of visual information processing along the pathway from V1,
through MT, into the parietal lobe. They sought to establish the relationships among
MT, the heavily myelinated zone of the STS, and the V1 and V2 projection fields in the
STS. They concluded that MT in the macaque supplies inputs to a large cortical region
surrounding it within the caudal superior temporal sulcus. MT may be the source of
inputs to a hierarchical system for motion analysis that includes several different vi-
sual areas. More rostral parts of the STS cannot be assigned to either the dorsal or the
ventral stream of visual processing, they are located at the transition between the two
pathways. The properties of neurons in the rostral parts of the STS, namely those within
a large portion of the upper bank and fundus of the rostral STS comprise large receptive
fields, which always include the centre of gaze and usually extend well into both visual
hemifields. These neurons typically show sensitivity to movement, have polymodal
responsiveness to visual, somatosensory and/or auditory input, and are insensitive to
stimulus form (Karnath, 2001).
Most important, research on the STS has shown that it responds more to facial ex-
pressions than to neutral faces. Said et al. (2010) using targeted high-resolution fMRI
measurements of the lateral cortex and multivoxel pattern analysis, have provided ev-
idence that the response to seven categories of dynamic facial expressions can be de-
coded in both the posterior STS (pSTS) and anterior STS (aSTS). They were also able
to decode patterns corresponding to these expressions in the frontal operculum (FO),
a structure that has also been shown to respond to facial expressions. The response
in FO reflects activation of the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons are especially
concentrated in monkey area F5, which is believed to be homologous to area FO in
humans (Said et al., 2010). It is likely that the activity in FO related to specific facial
expressions is due to mirror neurons, which fire upon the perception of expressions and
which might also drive microexpression production in response.
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Amygdala. A great deal of sensory input reaches the amygdala, a key structure for
many of the visceral and behavioral expressions of emotion. Its circuitry and function
has been well-conserved across evolution although species differences do exist. Even
non-mammalian species such as reptiles, birds and fish have an amygdala-like brain
region with similar circuits and functions to the amygdala in mammals: conservation
of amygdala circuitry allows findings from one species to inform our appreciation of
amygdala functioning in others Janak and Tye (2015)
As to the perception and response to emotional signals, it has been classically linked
to fear processing. However, more recent findings have extended its functions to recog-
nition of other emotions or to multiple processes beyond emotion perception, including
memory formation, reward processing or social cognition (Diano et al., 2017). Diano
et al. (2017) investigated whether facial expressions of different basic emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and emotional neutrality) and modulate the functional
connectivity of the amygdala with the rest of the brain. They have shown that amygdala
communications change dynamically depending on perception of various emotional ex-
pressions to recruit different brain networks, compared to the functional interactions it
entertains during perception of neutral expressions. Besides these differences, all emo-
tions enhanced amygdala functional integration with premotor cortices compared to
neutral faces
The amygdala is a complex collection of about a dozen nuclei lying beneath the
uncus of the limbic lobe, at the anterior end of the hippocampus and the inferior horn of
the lateral ventricle. It merges with the periamygdaloid cortex, which forms part of the
surface of the uncus, and with the parahippocampal gyrus. The nuclei are subdivided
into a medial, central, and basolateral group, each of which plays a different role in
amygdalar function.
Sensory input is of two general types. Much of it is the familiar type about sights,
sounds, touches, smells, and tastes. Olfactory information arrives at the medial nu-
clei, abut the periamygdaloid cortex, both directly from the olfactory bulb and from
olfactory cortex. Medial nuclei are relatively small in humans. The rest reaches the
basolateral nuclei (by far the largest part of the human amygdala) from the thalamus
and from unimodal visual, auditory, somato-sensory, and gustatory association areas.
The basolateral nuclei, by far the largest part of the human amygdala, are in some
ways like a cortex without layers; they contain pyramidal neurons, are continuous with
parahippocampal cortex, and are extensively interconnected with other cortical areas.
A second kind of sensory input, dealing in a more general sense with levels of phys-
ical and emotional comfort and discomfort, also reaches the basolateral nuclei from
orbital and anterior cingulate cortex and especially the insula.
Finally, visceral sensory inputs reach the central nuclei. The central nuclei are also
small, but their interconnections with the hypothalamus and related brainstem nuclei
(e.g., periaqueductal gray, PAG) underlie one aspect of the amygdala’s involvement
in emotional responses. Projections from the basolateral nuclei to the central nuclei
provide a key link between the experience of emotions and their expression.
In particular, the quantitative analysis of global brain connectivity shows that the
amygdala occupies a central position in the graphical representation (Fig. 3.4), sug-
gesting its role as a central hub linking multiple peripheral hubs, each linking regions
within separated functional clusters. In this way, the amygdala appears as a strong
39
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 40 — #60 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 3. Rationales and working hypotheses
candidate for the integration of cognitive and emotional information.
Figure 3.4: Quantitative analysis of brain connectivity reveals several clusters of highly inter-
connected regions (represented by different colours). In this analysis, the amygdala (Amyg,
centre of figure) was connected to all but 8 cortical areas. Figure from Sporns et al. (2004)
Orbitofrontal cortex. An additional key structure in emotion processing, with which
the amygdala is intimately connected, is the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Adolphs, 2002a,b)
Damage to the orbitofrontal cortex, especially on the right, can result in impaired recog-
nition of emotions from the face and the voice. These findings are consistent with the
activation found in right orbitofrontal cortex when comparing presentations of fearful
and neutral faces. In contrast to the amygdala’s activation in response to passive view-
ing of emotional faces or gender judgements, prefrontal regions may be activated when
subjects are engaged in a cognitive task requiring explicit identification of the emotion
(Adolphs, 2002a,b)
The OFC is the portion of prefrontal cortex that sits just above the orbits of the eyes
and extends posteriorly several centimetres to form the frontal “base” of the brain. It is
considered anatomically synonymous with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).
Therefore, the region is distinguished due to the distinct neural connections and the dis-
tinct functions it performs. It is defined as the part of the prefrontal cortex that receives
projections from the magnocellular, medial nucleus of the mediodorsal thalamus, and
is thought to represent emotion and reward in decision making (Bechara et al., 2000).
Descriptively, locations within anterior prefrontal cortex can be expressed in terms
of medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Öngür et al., 2003). A better way to view
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this cortex is based on its connectivity pattern, which reveals orbital and medial net-
works. The orbital network receives wide-ranging sensory information and appears to
integrate it, particularly in relation to the assessment of food and reward. The medial
network is distinctively and heavily connected with regions of the medial wall of the
brain, including those of cingulate cortex and surrounding areas. In contrast to the or-
bital network, the medial network receives few sensory inputs. Importantly, the medial
OFC projects to the hypothalamus and other visceral-control areas suggesting that it
is involved in the visceral modulation of emotion Öngür et al. (2003). Indeed, via the
hypothalamus, descending medial orbitofrontal influence appears to extend as far as
autonomic centers in the spinal cord. In contrast, there are relatively few projections
to the hypothalamus from the orbital network. Therefore, at least through its medial
network, the orbitofrontal cortex interfaces with autonomic brain regions. Notably, the
same network is strongly interconnected with cingulate cortex.
Destruction of the OFC through acquired brain injury typically leads to a pattern of
disinhibited behaviour. Examples include swearing excessively, hypersexuality, poor
social interaction, compulsive gambling, drug use (including alcohol and tobacco), and
poor empathising ability. Disinhibited behaviour by patients with some forms of fron-
totemporal dementia is thought to be caused by degeneration of the OFC(Bechara et al.,
2000).
Bechara et al. (2000) posit the OFC as the basis of the “somatic marker hypothesis”
(SMH). According to the latter, over time, emotions and their corresponding bodily
changes ( the “somatic markers”), become associated with particular situations and
their past outcomes. When making subsequent decisions, these somatic markers and
their evoked emotions are consciously or unconsciously associated with their past out-
comes, and influence decision-making in favor of some behaviors instead of others. For
instance, when a somatic marker associated with a positive outcome is perceived, the
person may feel happy and thereby motivated to pursue that behavior. When a somatic
marker associated with the negative outcome is perceived, the person may feel sad,
which acts as an internal alarm to warn the individual to avoid that course of action.
These situation-specific somatic states based on, and reinforced by, past experiences
help to guide behaviour in favour of more advantageous choices, and therefore are
adaptive. The amygdala and VMPFC are essential components of this hypothesised
mechanism, and therefore damage to either structure will disrupt decision-making.
Insula. Besides the amygdala, OFC is closely associated with the anterior insula. The
insular cortex lies buried in the depths of the lateral sulcus (also called the Sylvian
fissure) between the frontal and temporal lobes; it is concealed from view by portions
of the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes. It overlies the site where the telencephalon
and diencephalon fuse during embryological development and it can be revealed by
prying open the lateral sulcus or by removing the overlying portions of other lobes.
The portion of a given lobe overlying the insula is called an operculum (Latin for “lid”);
there are frontal, parietal, and temporal opercula. The circular sulcus outlines the insula
and marks its borders with the opercular areas of cortex.
The insular cortex is the primary interoceptive cortex and integrates visceral, pain,
and temperature sensations (Craig, 2003). The dorsal insula has a viscerotropic organi-
zation and receives topographically organised inputs from gustatory, visceral, muscle,
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and skin receptors via the thalamus. The dorsal insula projects to the right anterior in-
sula, which conveys the conscious experience of bodily sensation by integrating these
interoceptive inputs with inputs from cortical areas involved in perceptive, emotional,
and cognitive processing (Craig, 2003). For example, functional magnetic resonance
(fMRI) studies showed increased activity of the anterior insula during tasks in which
subjects attended to the timing of their heartbeats (Craig, 2003). The insula is also a
visceromotor area controlling both the sympathetic and parasympathetic outputs, pri-
marily via a relay in the lateral hypothalamus.
The pattern of activation observed in many functional imaging studies suggests a
posterior-to-anterior processing gradient in the human insular cortex (Craig and Craig,
2009), and it has been proposed that subjective feelings are based directly on repre-
sentations of homeostatic sensory integration in the anterior insula, consistent with the
James-Lange theory of emotion and Damasio’s “somatic marker” hypothesis (Craig,
2003).
To sum up, insula cortex appears to be particularly important in the cortical repre-
sentation of internal state, with right anterior insula subserving interoceptive awareness
and its expression as emotional feeling states and the interaction of interoceptive in-
formation with the conscious appraisal of other information (Craig, 2003; Cauda et al.,
2012)
Hypothalamus. The human hypothalamus is a pearl-sized structure containing a num-
ber of nuclei. As its name implies, it is located just below the thalamus and thus just
above the brainstem. The importance of the hypothalamus in certain aspects of emo-
tion is well known, as highlighted by the early work of Philip Bard and Walter Cannon,
who showed in their decortication experiments that coordinated emotional expressions
were abolished when the hypothalamus was excised, but not when only cortex was
compromised
The hypothalamus and the adjacent preoptic area have a central role in integrated
autonomic and endocrine responses necessary for homeostasis and adaptation. These
include regulation of the circadian rhythms and sleep-wake cycle, thermoregulation,
glucoregulation, osmoregulation, responses to stress, and immunomodu- lation (Saper,
2002). The hypothalamus acts as a visceromotor pattern generator that initiates spe-
cific patterns of autonomic responses according to the stimulus, such as hypoglycemia,
changes in blood temperature or osmolarity, or external stressors.
Our knowledge of hypothalamic connectivity has considerably expanded, too. The
traditional view of the hypothalamus emphasised its descending functions. However
important the hypothalamus may be for descending control, though, a significant recent
insight is that mammalian cerebral cortex and the hypothalamus share massive bidirec-
tional connections. Recent findings have made it clear that, through extensive ascending
projections, the hypothalamus provides direct input to the entire cortical mantle with
the potential to influence both perception and cognition (Pessoa, 2008) .
In sum, whereas the hypothalamus is involved in a host of basic control functions,
it is part of an extensive bidirectional connective system with cortex and many other
subcortical structures in a manner that allows for integration of wide-ranging signals.
Critically, the hypothalamus is linked to other structures that have themselves broad
connectivity, including the basal forebrain and the amygdala, further expanding its po-
42
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 43 — #63 i
i
i
i
i
i
3.2. Neurobiological background
tential for influencing information processing.
Brainstem. The spinal and brainstem levels of the hierarchical homeostatic network
are present in all mammals, but in humans there is a high-resolution representation
of the condition of the body in primary interoceptive cortex in the posterior insula,
which generates an energy- efficient map of all brain activity in the anterior insula
that underpins the subjective “material me”. Thus, there is a fundamental relationship
between the physiological condition of the body and subjective feelings of all kinds,
just as William James hypothesised (Craig and Craig, 2009).
The brainstem contains several structures that are likely of critical importance in the
generation and experience of emotion (see Venkatraman et al., 2017; Holstege, 2016
for a review). The brainstem areas controlling the sympathetic and parasympathetic
outputs include the periaqueductal gray matter of the midbrain (PAG), the parabrachial
nucleus (PBN) and adjacent areas of the pons, several medullary regions, including the
nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS), ventrolateral reticular formation of the medulla, and
medullary raphe.
The PAG is the interface between the forebrain and the lower brainstem and has a
major role in integrated autonomic and somatic responses to stress, pain modulation,
and other adaptive functions. The PAG participates in cardiovascular responses asso-
ciated with pain modulation, thermoregulation, coordination of the micturition reflex
and respiratory rhythm and airway resistance. Experimental studies also indicate that
the PAG may have an important role in mechanisms of arousal and regulation of REM
sleep. These multiple functions depend on extensive PAG interconnections with the
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, hypothalamus, and brainstem auto-
nomic, motor, and pain modulatory areas.
The parabrachial complex PBN is a major relay and coordinating center. It receives
converging visceral, nociceptive, and thermo- receptive inputs from the spinal cord and
conveys this information to the hypothalamus, amygdala, and thalamus. The PBN also
contains separate sub-nuclei that participate in the control of respiratory, cardiovascular,
and gastrointestinal reflexes.
The nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS), is the first relay station of taste and visceral
afferent information and includes several subnuclei with a viscerotropic organization.
The rostral portion of the NTS receives taste inputs; the intermediate portion receives
gastrointestinal afferents; and the caudal portion receives afferents from baroreceptors,
cardiac receptors, chemoreceptors, and pulmonary receptors. The different subnuclei
of the NTS relay this information, either directly or via the PBN, to the PAG, hy-
pothalamus, amygdala and to ventral thalamic nuclei projecting to the insular cortex
. The second major function of the NTS is to serve as the first central relay for all
afferents that trigger medullary reflexes controlling cardiovascular function, including
the baroreflex and cardiac reflexes, respiration, including the carotid chemoreflex and
pulmonary mechanoreflexes and gastrointestinal motility, particularly that of the esoph-
agus and stomach.
The rostral ventrolateral medulla (RVLM), including the C1 group of epinephrine-
containing neurons, is a key area for regulation of arterial blood pressure. Glutamater-
gic neurons of the RVLM project directly to sympathetic preganglionic neurons con-
trolling cardiac output and blood flow to the skeletal muscle and visceral organs. The
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sympathoexcitatory RVLM neurons receive and integrate a large variety of inputs from
the brainstem and forebrain. Other medullary inputs to the RVLM contribute to car-
diac, vestibular, exercise, and nociceptive sympathoexcitatory reflexes, as well as sym-
pathoexcitatory responses to hypoxia The RVLM also receives several inputs from the
hypothalamus, including the PVN, which trigger sympathoexcitatory responses to in-
ternal or external stimuli
The caudal ventrolateral medulla contains GABAergic neurons that maintain a tonic
inhibitory control on the RVLM and relay the inhibitory inputs from barosensitive
neurons of the NTS, thus mediating the sympathoinhibitory component of the arte-
rial baroreflex. The medullary reticular formation also contains the ventral respiratory
column, which consists of several groups of inspiratory or expiratory neurons organized
into different rostrocaudal groups and involved in respiratory rhythmogenesis.
For what specifically concerns emotional facial expressions, an overall synthetic
account of how such perception and affective systems interact in the case of basic,
discrete emotion display, has been proposed by Haxby et al. (2000). At its simplest,
the model proposes a core visual system for face perception. This constitutes the in-
ferior occipital gyrus (IOG, for low- level facial feature analysis), the lateral fusiform
gyrus (LFG, for higher-order invariant aspects of faces such as identity) and the STS
(for variable aspects of faces such as lip movement and speech comprehension). This
then interacts with an extended system, which involves different structures for different
emotions (Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5: Haxby et al. (2000) model of the distributed human neural system for face percep-
tion. The model is divided into a core system, consisting of three regions of occipitotemporal
visual extrastriate cortex (IOG, LFG, STS) and an extended system, consisting of regions that
are also parts of neural systems for other cognitive functions. Among them, there are the
structures involved in the emotional response. Interactions between these representations in
the core system and regions in the extended system mediate processing of the spatial focus
of expresser’s attention, speech-related mouth movements, facial expression and identity.
Abbreviations: IOG, inferior occipital gyrus; LFG, lateral fusiform gyrus; STS, superior
temporal sulcus. Adapted from (Haxby et al., 2000)
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Facial expressions in dyadic interactions: a fresh view
Figure 3.6: Time course of facial expression perception and recognition according to Adolphs
(2002a,b). The figure begins on the left with the onset of the stimulus, a facial expression of
emotion, and progresses through perception to final recognition of the emotion on the right.
Certain brain structures are preferentially engaged in processing structural information of
the stimulus (early perception), whereas others participate more in retrieving conceptual
knowledge or linking the per- ceptual representation to the modulation of other cognitive
processes or to the elicitation of physiological states (e.g., an emotional somatic reaction to
a stimulus). Attempts to localise the perception/recognition of the stimulus in space or in
time have trade-offs: spatial localisation permits us to tie aspects of the processing to par-
ticular brain structures but suffers from the fact that the same brain structure participates
in different components of processing at different points in time. Temporal localisation that
treats the brain as a dynamical system has the benefit of describing the evolution of percep-
tion and recognition more accurately in time, although this will usually encompass a large
set of different structures. A full account will need to describe both the spatial and temporal
aspects of processing, a description that is becoming possible by combining techniques with
high spatial resolution, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, with techniques
with high temporal resolution, such as event-related potentials. Note that the figure omits
many structures and connections to provide a schematic overview. Adapted from Adolphs
(2002a,b)
Beyond the classic “visual pipeline view” on the perception and recognition of fa-
cial emotion expressions along a dyadic interaction, the simulation-based account, as
discussed in Chapter 2, offers a perspective that is more deeply grounded in what we
currently know about the neurobiological underpinnings of such processes. Adolph’s
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proposal, briefly summarised at the beginning of this section, is one such account
(Adolphs, 2002a,b) and it is synthetically outlined in Figure 3.6.
Upon presentation of an emotionally meaningful stimulus deployed by an expresser,
a feed-forward sweep of information processing proceeds along occipital and temporal
neocortices and extracts perceptual information from expresser’s faces so that after
100 ms in humans, would coarsely categorise the stimulus as displaying an emotion
or not. Amygdala and orbitofrontal cortices are likely to participate in at least three
distinct ways. First, they may modulate perceptual representations via feedback. This
mechanism can contribute, in particular, to fine-tuning the categorisation of the facial
expression and to the allocation of attention to certain of its features.
Second, the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortices may trigger associated knowledge,
via projections to other regions of neocortex and to the hippocampal formation. This
mechanism enables retrieval of conceptual knowledge about the emotion, necessary for
final expression recognition.
Third, and most important here, they generate an emotional response in the subject,
via connections to the motor structures, hypothalamus, and brainstem nuclei, where
components of an emotional response to the facial expression can be activated. This
mechanism contributes to the elicitation of knowledge about the expresser’s emotional
state, via the process of internal simulation, and would draw on the insula and so-
matosensory related cortices (right hemisphere) for representing the emotional changes
in the observer. However, it may be probable that the observer’s simulation of ex-
presser’s emotion proceeds via the generation of a somatosensory image of the asso-
ciated body state, even in the absence of actual motor mimicry, namely the “as if”
mechanism that has been conjectured by Bechara and Damasio (2005), though details
are matter of debate (Adolphs, 2002b; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2016; Wood et al.,
2016).
It is worth noticing, that Adolph’s scheme, together with a large body of knowledge
that we have tried to summarise above, point at the OFC, the amygdala and the insula,
three highly interconnected areas, as the key “central” structures for the development
of an emotional episode along affective interaction. Interestingly, it has been argued
(Salzman and Fusi, 2010) that functional interactions between the amygdala and pre-
frontal cortex form a potential neural substrate for the encoding of the psychological
dimensions of valence and arousal, the core affect postulated by Russell (1980)), at the
psychological theory level. A similar role is also played by the insula (Craig and Craig,
2009; Craig, 2003) The valence and arousal dimensions, originally formulated at the
psychological explanation level, can be thought of as “emotion primitives” supporting
at the neurobiological level a central continuous emotion space. Cogently, it has been
surmised that such evolutionary building blocks are shared across emotions and across
phylogeny (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014).
However, Adolph’s account, besides the merits of clearly providing a neurobiolog-
ical framework for a simulation-based grounding of expresser/observer affective inter-
action, partially overlooks or, at least, does not provide further details about the explicit
involvement of motor mechanisms in the process, albeit these being acknowledged
(Adolphs, 2002b). This is not a minor issue. For instance, while investigating whether
facial expressions of different basic emotions modulate the functional connectivity of
the amygdala with the rest of the brain, Diano et al. (2017) have shown that all queried
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emotions enhanced the amygdala functional integration with premotor cortices. The
coupling of amygdala with motor areas outlines the influence of different emotions in
fostering action preparation and planning, as well as motor resonance. Observing emo-
tional stimuli increases motor excitability relative to neutral images, which may reflect
approach and avoidance preparation, motor mimicry and emotional contagion. Such
functional interaction is consistent with the anatomical evidence indicating white mat-
ter connectivity between the amygdala and the motor regions in nonhuman primates
and humans.
Indeed, if one dismisses the traditional cognitive view that facial action understand-
ing is grounded on serial inferential processing from early to higher order sensory
elaboration, a viable path is explicitly taking into account the observer’s “inner mo-
tor knowledge”.
Motor aspects of mirroring other’s emotion
Facial expressions are facial actions and it has been posited that a “resonance behav-
ior” is one such mechanism where an individual repeats overtly a movement made by
another individual. A striking example is provided by either human or rhesus monkey
newborns imitating adult facial gestures, (Tramacere and Ferrari, 2016; Ferrari et al.,
2006). At the neurobiological level the resonance or mirroring behaviour has been
initially explained in terms of mirror neuron (MN) activity.
MNs have been first localised in monkeys’ ventral premotor (PMv) area F5 and
then in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL). These visuomotor neurons activate when the
monkey executes a hand or mouth goal-directed motor act (e.g., grasping, biting or
manipulating an object) and when the monkey observes the same, or a similar, act
performed by the experimenter or by a conspecific. Subsequently, other areas have
been endowed with mirroring capabilities, so that it is currently more appropriate to
address the properties of a MN system (MNS) or network (Bonini, 2017; Tramacere
and Ferrari, 2016).
Crucially, evidence has been given that also the human brain is provided with mir-
roring capabilities, and internal simulation has been related to coding the intentions
of actions performed by others (Fogassi and Ferrari, 2011). In recent years, evidence
has accumulated for the existence of a MNS. The initial studies on the neurobiology
of imitation in humans suggested a core imitation circuitry composed of three major
neural systems (Iacoboni, 2005, 2009): the posterior part of the superior temporal sul-
cus (pSTS), the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule (rIPL), and the posterior part
of the inferior frontal gyrus and adjacent ventral premotor cortex (pIFG/vPMC com-
plex). The information processing flow between these neural systems that is relevant to
imitation is likely to occur as follows (Carr et al., 2003):
1. the posterior part of the STS provides a higher order visual processing of the
observed action by coding an early visual description of the action;
2. this information is sent to the other two neural systems (rIPL and pIFG/vPMC
complex), which are thought to form a parieto-frontal mirroring (both motor and
visual) system; this privileged flow of information is supported by the robust
anatomical connections between superior temporal and posterior parietal cortex,
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and becomes active during action observation, action execution, and also during
imitation;
3. the posterior parietal cortex codes the precise kinesthetic aspect of the movement
and sends this information to inferior frontal mirror neurons in the pIFG;
4. the inferior frontal cortex codes the goal of the action;
5. efferent copies of motor plans are sent from parietal and frontal mirror areas back
to the STS; here there would be a matching process between the visual description
of the observed action and the anticipated outcome of the planned imitative action;
6. if there is a good match, the action is executed; otherwise, a correction of the
motor plan is implemented.
Clear evidence has been provided by Nishitani and Hari (2002) who asked subjects to
imitate non-namable lip forms presented in still pictures. The brain activation, recorded
by magnetoencephalography (MEG) , showed increasingly longer latencies starting
from occipital visual areas, then STS, IPL, inferior frontal gyrus, and finally the pri-
mary motor cortex; the whole sequence took 250 ms. They have argued that such a
progression of activity could be related to visual recognition that starts by visual anal-
ysis and ends, via feed-forward connections, by recognition (and understanding) of the
actions.
Wolpert et al. (2003), while examining the extent to which motor commands acting
on the body can be equated with communicative signals acting on other people, have
mapped such information flow onto a theoretical framework. The latter, named MO-
SAIC, is defined in terms of paired forward and inverse internal models, and it has been
developed in the motor learning and control field (Wolpert et al., 2003). According to
MOSAIC, internal models are input/output functions that mimic experience-dependent
sensory-motor states. The inverse model is a controller that retrieves the motor plan
necessary to achieve a desired sensory state (or goal), whereas the forward model is
a predictor of the sensory consequences of a motor plan. Thus, the inverse model is
updated on the basis of the forward model.
In neural terms (see Figure 3.7), the input of the inverse model would be the STS
output that is sent to the frontoparietal mirror neuron system, and the output of the
inverse model would be the output of the frontoparietal MNS down-stream to motor
areas. Efference copies of motor commands originating from the frontoparietal MNS
would provide the input of the forward model, whereas its output would be the matching
process occurring in the STS (Iacoboni, 2005).
Such theoretical picture has also been endorsed by Hari and Kujala (2009) who
assumed the experimental activation sequence of the core system to be a kind of hi-
erarchical predictive processing, with reciprocal feedback connections between STS,
parietal MNs and frontal MNs. In line with Bayesian modelling of brain functions that
incorporates prior information (the context), the activation sequence is defined in terms
of predictive coding (Kilner et al., 2007). The assumption is that neuronal processing
at each stage both generates predictions of the input reaching the next phase and is sen-
sitive to the prediction error resulting from lower-level computations. The prediction
error (roughly, the difference between the real and predicted data) is then minimised.
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Figure 3.7: Neural mechanisms of imitative learning and social mirroring. Top: a representa-
tion of the core circuitry for imitation on the lateral wall of the right cerebral hemisphere, to-
gether with the internal models the circuitry implements during imitation. Bottom: imitative
learning is implemented by interactions among the core imitationcircuit, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (BA46) and a set of areas relevant to motor preparation (PMd, pre-SMA,
SPL), whereas social mirroring is implemented by the interactions among the core imitation
circuit, the insula and the limbic system. Abbreviations: MNS, mirror neuron system; STS,
superior temporal sulcus, BA46, Brodmann area 46; MNS, mirror neuron system; PMd,
dorsal premotor cortex; pre-SMA, pre-supplementary motor area; SPL, superior parietal
lobule. Adapted from Iacoboni (2005)
This scheme suggests that the core circuitry for imitation indeed interacts with the
limbic system (the neural system concerned with emotions) during social mirroring
(Iacoboni, 2005). fMRI studies of the observation and imitation of facial emotional
expressions have revealed a large-scale neural network that comprises the core circuitry
for imitation (the MNS and the STS), the insula and the limbic system (Carr et al.,
2003). Subsequent studies of the imitation or observation of emotions have supported
the idea that empathy has a sensory-motor, mirroring basis, e.g. the study on pain by
Avenanti et al. (2005).
It is worth noticing that in such scheme STS activity goes beyond its classical func-
tion of visual motion processing network. It provides visual input to the MNs so to
allow matching between sensory predictions of imitative motor plans and a visual de-
scription of observed actions. Molenberghs et al. (2010) have reported enhanced activ-
ity of the STS during imitation. Their results call for a role of the STS in registering
the congruence between one’s own actions and the actions of others, and perhaps en-
hancing the perceptual interpretation of others’ actions when they match the observer’s
own motor plans. This way, the STS provides an interface between observer’s own
actions and the actions he or she observes, a neural substrate for scaffolding various
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aspects of social cognition. More specifically, Lahnakoski et al. (2012), by using stim-
uli in the form of audiovisual movie clips depicting pre-selected social signals, have
shown that the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) responded to all social fea-
tures but not to any non-social features, and the anterior STS responded to all social
features except bodies and biological motion. Interestingly, they have identified four
partially segregated, extended networks for processing of specific social signals: (1) a
fronto-temporal network responding to multiple social categories, (2) a fronto-parietal
network preferentially activated to bodies, motion, and pain, (3) a temporo-amygdalar
network responding to faces, social interaction, and speech, and (4) a fronto-insular
network responding to pain, emotions, social interactions, and speech. Their results,
achieved under conditions that resemble the complexity of real life, highlight the role
of the pSTS in processing multiple aspects of social information.
In this perspective Chakrabarti et al. (2006), who considered the perception of dy-
namic facial expressions of emotion, have proposed that an intermediate module for
“action perception is involved, namely the MNS. Their proposal is outlined in Figure
3.8.
Figure 3.8: Chakrabarti et al. (2006) modification of Haxby et al. (2000) model of distributed
neural system for perception of dynamic facial expressions of emotion. The model incorpo-
rates a module for “action perception” based on the human MNs. Abbreviations: IOG, in-
ferior occipital gyrus; LFG, lateral fusiform gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus. Adapted
from (Chakrabarti et al., 2006)
In the framework of this thesis, Chakrabarti et al. (2006) scheme represents a start-
ing point to identify a somatomotor route for the perception and mirroring of dynamic
facial expressions of emotion.
Clearly, the interaction between affective structures and the motor pathway to ef-
fectively generate the facial actions, for example along mimicry, is more complex than
the scheme above suggests. Indeed one has to take into account the role played by
lower level brain areas such as the hypothalamus and the brainstem. A clear example
is provided by the amygdalo-motor pathways for the control of facial expressions (see
Figure 3.9). As discussed by Gothard (2014), it is evident the distributed nature of the
joint activation of multiple motor areas that initiate the production of a facial expres-
sion. Concomitantly multiple areas monitor ongoing overt behaviours (the expression
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Figure 3.9: Left: the classic motor pathway for controlling the facial expression. Right:
amygdalo-motor pathways. The lower half of the face is controlled by the coordinated activ-
ity of three motor areas: M1, primary motor cortex; PMCvl, premotor cortex ventrolateral
division; and M4, caudal face area of the midcingulate cortex. The upper half of the face is
controlled by the coordinated activity of two motor areas: SMA, supplementary motor area;
and M3, the anterior face area of the midcingulate cortex. The black arrows indicate direct
projections from the basal nucleus of the amygdala to PMCvl, M3, M4, and SMA, The first
segment of the orange and green lines indicate the corticobulbar tract. VII, pontine facial
nucleus that contain the motor neurons that synapse on the muscles of facial expressions.
The medial division of the facial nucleus contains the motor neurons that control muscles
in that upper half of the face (in green) while the lateral division contains the neurons that
control the muscles in the lower part of the face (in orange). Note that the amygdala re-
ceives multiple lines of viscerosensory input (red arrows, top) that are likely integrated in
the output directed at facial motor areas. Adapted from Gothard (2014)
itself) and the covert, autonomic responses that accompany emotional expressions. The
ventrolateral regions of the premotor cortex (PMCvl) initiates movements triggered by
external cues; the supplementary motor cortex (SMA) directly innervates motor neu-
rons in the medial segment of the facial nucleus. The anterior face area of the mid-
cingulate cortex, (designated as M3) gives rise to projections that target bilaterally the
medial segments of the facial nucleus harbouring the motor neurons that supply the
upper facial muscles; notably, projections originating from M3 also target the reticu-
lar formation of the brainstem that contains autonomic centers. These are likely to be
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activated during emotional states, coordinating both the overt (behavioural) and covert
(autonomic) expression of emotions. The caudal motor area, M4, (located at the border
between the anterior and posterior midcingulate) targets the lateral regions of the facial
nucleus, especially the motor neurons that supply the upper lip, and is mostly involved
in the emotional control of facial expressions. The amygdala forms a closed processing
loop with both the anterior cingulate cortex and with area M3, whilst M3 projects to the
basal and accessory basal nuclei of the amygdala and the basal nucleus of the amygdala
gives rise to feedback projections to all subdivisions of the cingulate cortex (Gothard,
2014).
The final control is provided by the facial motor nucleus in the brainstem (namely,
the caudal portion of the ventrolateral pontine tegmentum) a collection of lower mo-
tor neurons that innervate the muscles of facial expression (cranial nerve VII) and the
stapedius. It has a dorsal and ventral region, with neurons in the dorsal region innervat-
ing muscles of the upper face and neurons in the ventral region innervating muscles of
the lower face. Nucleus axons take an unusual course, traveling dorsally and looping
around the abducens nucleus, then traveling ventrally to exit the ventral pons medial
to the spinal trigeminal nucleus. These axons form the motor component of the facial
nerve, with parasympathetic and sensory components forming the intermediate nerve.
Like all lower motor neurons, cells of the facial motor nucleus receive cortical input
from the primary motor cortex in the frontal lobe of the brain. Upper motor neurons of
the cortex send axons that descend through the internal capsule and synapse on neurons
in the facial motor nucleus. Interestingly, the neurons in the dorsal aspect of the facial
motor nucleus receive inputs from both sides of the cortex, while those in the ventral
aspect mainly receive contralateral inputs (i.e. from the opposite side of the cortex).
The result is that both sides of the brain control the muscles of the upper face, while
the right side of the brain controls the lower left side of the face, and the left side of the
brain controls the lower right side of the face.
At the same time, the midcingulate and the amygdala receive signals from the vis-
cera via the nucleus of the solitary tract and parabrachial nuclei and via the insula,
which integrates interoceptive and exteroceptive signals. Interoceptive afferents, there-
fore, may modulate both the perception and the production of facial expressions. In-
deed, neurons in the amygdala and cingulate cortex discharge in phase with the cardiac
and respiratory cycle.
Since at least in the amygdala, neurons respond primarily after the onset of facial
activity, overall the mechanism we have described supports a mirror like emotion-to-
motor transformation (Gothard, 2014).
Integrating “cold” and “hot” actions
To sum up, a wealth of evidence supports the hypothesis that a mirror/simulation mech-
anism is instrumental in coordinating facial expressions within dyadic interactions and
more generally in social contexts.
Studies on the monkey and human MNs that by and large originally addressed
the so-called “cold” actions, without a specific emotional content, more recently have
prompted the idea that a mirror mechanism is also present in the cortical areas involved
in coding emotions (Gallese et al., 2004), and markedly along affective facial expres-
sion processing (Tramacere and Ferrari, 2016). Mirror neurons were found in the
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premotor cortex of the marmoset, a New World monkey, indicating that such mirroring
mechanism has been highly preserved in the course of evolution. Indeed, neuronal mir-
roring of observed behaviours has been shown in phylogenetically ancient structures,
such as the basal ganglia, and in subcortical regions related to visceromotor reactions,
such as the insular and cingulate cortices. It is possible that the involvement of such
brain structures during the direct experience and perception of others’ emotions has
been instrumental for sharing similar emotional experience and could represent the
building block of the emergence of empathic behaviours in several species of primates.
In brief, a mechanism similar to somatic motor action mirroring can be hypothesized
for internal “hot” actions which can act as a prelude to specific behavioural responses.
The difference from the former is that what is matched is not only a gesture (facial
expressions), but also internal states. Namely, motor knowledge required is grounded
in visceromotor actions, that is motor commands directed to visceral organs (Fogassi
and Ferrari, 2011). In both monkeys and humans, subcortical regions much involved in
this kind of output are the insular and cingulate cortices (Fogassi and Ferrari, 2011).
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that interoceptive experience may largely re-
flect limbic predictions about the expected state of the body that are constrained by
ascending visceral sensations (see, Barrett and Simmons, 2015, for an in-depth re-
view and discussion). They introduce the Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding
(EPIC) model, which integrates an anatomical model of corticocortical connections
with Bayesian active inference principles, to propose that agranular visceromotor cor-
tices contribute to interoception by issuing interoceptive predictions. In a nutshell,
visceromotor cortices generate autonomic, hormonal and immunological predictions
to adjust how the internal systems of the body deploy autonomic, metabolic and im-
munological resources to deal with the sensory world, not as it is right now, but as the
brain predicts it will be in a moment from now. These visceromotor predictions un-
derlie most of the body’s allostatic and anticipatory responses to moment-by-moment
physical movements and mental challenges.
At the same time as visceromotor predictions are issued to maintain homeostasis or
to enable allostasis, the deep layers of agranular visceromotor cortices send the same
information via connections to another part of the interoceptive system: the supragranu-
lar layers of the (granular) mid-to-posterior insular cortex, which serves as the primary
interoceptive cortex. Once there, these interoceptive predictions initiate a pattern of
activity that represents expected interoceptive sensations. Interoceptive signals that re-
sult from changes in the viscera, muscles and skin ascend via the lamina I pathway
and vagal afferents in the nucleus of the solitary tract, the parabrachial nucleus and
the thalamus, before arriving at the granular layer (layer IV) of the primary interocep-
tive cortex. Granular cortex in primary interoceptive sensory regions of the mid- and
posterior insula are architecturally well suited for computing and transmitting predic-
tion error and for propagating prediction-error signals back to visceromotor regions to
modify predictions (Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
The agranular visceromotor regions including the anterior insula (AI) are “rich-club
hubs” (Barrett and Simmons, 2015) that are part not only of the interoceptive system,
but also of the intrinsic control and attention networks. The AI is a key hub in olfactory
and gustatory networks, as well as in the brain’s multimodal network, which integrates
visual, auditory and somatosensory networks. Thus, in turn, agranular visceromotor
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cortices inform the rest of the brain of interoceptive changes by sending predictions to
these intrinsic networks that are based on anticipated visceromotor consequences.
An important issue to take into account in such proposal is that, at a lower level, as
viscerosensory signals undergo substantial signal conditioning in the brainstem (which
mediates the viscerosensory signals that are sent to the cortex), it is likely that brain-
stem and subcortical structures contribute directly to active inference, for instance, by
computing themselves a prediction error (Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
Indeed, lower lever brain areas involving hypothalamus and brainstem are likely
to play a more key role than usually surmised. The brainstem, including the mesen-
cephalon (midbrain), is a complete brain with somatosensory, auditory (inferior collicu-
lus), visual (superior colliculus), vestibular, and motor systems (Holstege, 2016). After
all, the cortex cerebri can be considered a copy of the brainstem - with somatosensory,
auditory, visual, vestibular and motor parts -, the major difference being that the cortex
contains a great many more neurons than the brainstem, which enable the various cor-
tical systems to function much more precisely with a much larger amount of memory.
Holstege (2016) has depicted an overall picture where the motor system is supported
by two components (both at the cortex and and brainstem level): the voluntary, somatic
motor system allows the individual to move its body parts voluntarily, whereas the emo-
tional motor system controls basic motor activities such as blood pressure, heart rate,
respiration (Figure 3.10.
Both subsystems consist of medial and lateral components either at the cortex level
and subcortex level. The affective motor subsystem cooperates with the somatic/volun-
tary one. For instance in speech production, at the cortex level, the Broca area controls
the mouth part of the motor cortex , which in turn signals, at the brainstem level, the
lateral tegmental field of medulla and caudal pons (premotor interneurons). The latter
controls different motor areas, e.g. the lateral part of the facial nucleus, which coordi-
nate muscles for mouth opening, tongue movements, etc.
On the emotional side, mouth movements are controlled in the context of emotional
expression. The amygdala and lateral hypothalamus control, at the brainstem level, the
periaqueductal grey (PAG), which in this case serves as a central pattern generation of
sound production. The PAG modulates the premotor neurons of nucleus ambiguous,
which in turn activates several brainstem motor neuron areas eventually controlling
the final vocalisation. Crucially, the amygdala and the PAG also have access to the
somatic pathway so to tune activities occurring in the lateral tegmental field, involved
in voluntary mouth control (Holstege, 2016). Again, in this example too, it is indeed
remarkable the manifold modulator role of the amygdala, which is recruited both on
the somatomotor side and on the visceromotor side.
All the issues touched in the above discussions can be synthetically subsumed un-
der the architecture of the distributed neural system for perception of dynamic facial
expressions of emotion outlined in Figure 3.11.
The scheme shows at a glance the three main routes contributing to affective fa-
cial expression processing: the visual route, the visuomotor route and the visceromotor
route. The affective core is provided by the close interactions occuring among the
amygdala, the insula and the orbitofrontal cortex. The visual input, namely, the ex-
presser’s facial action, is processed by early visual occipital cortices, and undergoes
a visuomotor mapping provided by STS and IPL. Such motor representation is suit-
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Figure 3.10: A motor perspective of somatic and affective control at the brainstem level. The
overall motor system consists of two subsystems, the voluntary and the emotional motor
systems. The voluntary motor system allows the individual to move its body parts voluntarily,
whereas the emotional motor system controls basic motor activities such as blood pressure,
heart rate, respiration. Both consist of medial and lateral components. These subsystems
have access to premotor interneurons and motoneurons. Adapted from Holstege (2016)
able to trigger the core affect system, which, in turn, activates visceromotor actions.
When both the visuomotor route and the visceromotor route are active, core affect struc-
tures can modulate perceptual representations via feedback connection; meanwhile, an
emotional response is generated in the subject, via connections to motor structures,
hypothalamus, and brainstem nuclei. On a short term the process of internal simula-
tion supports observer’s responses to expresser’s facial action. These can be shaped in
terms of observer’s overt or covert facial mimicry and physiological responses. On a
longer term the simulation of expresser’s emotion proceeds via the generation of a so-
matosensory image of the associated body state, which may contribute, in subsequent
processing stages to the elicitation of knowledge about the expresser’s emotional state
for expression recognition and/or to emotional contagion.
Moving towards the theoretical model: a functional architecture
The distributed neural architecture outlined in Figure 3.11 provides the necessary neu-
robiological underpinnings and constraints for devising a functional architecture to
frame the theoretical model (computational theory level) of an observer in dyadic inter-
action with an expresser.
At the most general level, we state that the different processes based on such archi-
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Figure 3.11: Architecture of a distributed neural system for perception of dynamic facial ex-
pressions of emotion. Two, reciprocal, heavy arrowheads indicate “forward” and “back-
ward” projections between areas (boxes). Light dotted projections indicate the possible sub-
cortical dual route from SC/Pulvinar to limbic areas (not included in the current model, but
discussed later). Only the main area of interest have been included. The architecture incor-
porates a module for “action perception” based on the human MNs, which mediates between
the external stimuli (expresser’s facial action), as processed along the visual route, and the
internal motor/action representation. The MNs provides the necessary input to activate the
core affect system, represented by the amygdala, the insula and the OFC. This system co-
ordinates the dynamics of the activities occurring along the visuomotor and visceromotor
loops, either by modulating perceptual representations via feedback, and by generating an
emotional response in the subject, via connections to motor structures, hypothalamus, and
brainstem nuclei, where components of an emotional response to the facial expression can
be activated. Moment-by-moment, the output can be in terms of observer’s overt or covert
facial mimicry and physiological responses
tecture can be best described as stochastic processes. The concepts of uncertainty and
noise are fundamental in probabilistic modelling. Computational constraints restrict
us to define probabilistic models that are only a crude simplification of the complex
reality. Therefore, uncertainty is introduced by our specific modelling assumptions.
Cogently, a person always has core affect, and at each point in time, a person’s emo-
tional state can be described in terms of how pleasant or unpleasant and how activated
the person is feeling. Across time, a person?s core affect describes a core affect trajec-
tory, reflecting the typical pattern of affective changes and fluctuations that characterise
an individual (Kuppens et al., 2010). Describing such trajectory as the realisation of
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a stochastic process, is a viable account for changes and fluctuations that people’s va-
lence/arousal levels undergo across time, as well as the observed individual differences
in core affect variability.
Thus, in order to account for observer’s visuomotor and visceromotor dynamics, we
make the following working assumptions:
Assumption 0 The core affect can be approached as resulting from a complex, open
system. It is embedded in a larger context and is therefore subject to stochastic
variability resulting from the many internal and external events that influence core
affect.
Assumption 1 The activity of the amygdala-OFC-insula network provides the core af-
fect dynamics, which can be summarised in terms of valence/arousal dimensions,
that is the emotional primitives of the system. Formally, such dynamics occurs in
a continuous stochastic core affect state-space. A trajectory in such state-space
represents a joint visuomotor/visceromotor action.
Assumption 2 Facial actions are represented as trajectories in a stochastic facial ac-
tion state-space; namely, a trajectory represents the continuous dynamics of a
suitable encoding of a finite set of facial motor control parameters. Analogously,
given a number NV of autonomic subsystems, autonomic actions can be encoded
as trajectories of action state control variable taking place in the corresponding
NV stochastic state-spaces.
Assumption 3 The internal, egocentric representation of the overall facial dynamics is
represented as a continuous stochastic trajectory in a suitable somatomotor state-
space; analogously, each stochastic trajectory evolving in a specific visceromotor
state-space, represents the evolution of one observer’s visceromotor sub-system.
Assumption 4 A perceptual state-space accounts for the overall facial action of the
expresser sensed by the observer; thus, a trajectory in such space is the evolution
of the observer’s perception of the expresser’s facial configuration, as inferred
via early perceptual modules. A suitable visuomotor mapping provides the nec-
essary transformation from the perceived expresser’s facial configuration to the
observer’s egocentric motor representation.
The different state-spaces exchange information according to the functional archi-
tecture outlined in Fig. 3.12, which summarises at a higher, coarser explanation level
the neural architecture presented in Figure 3.11
One-head arrows denote forward and backward interactions between state-spaces.
Each state-space is endowed with its own dynamics - specified in the above assumptions-
but the heart of the model is the “core affect→ action→ motor” hierarchy replicated
in the visuomotor and visceromotor routes. The simulation aspect of the model strictly
relates to such upward-downward cycle of information flow.
In this perspective, we assume that
Assumption 5 Any state-space can be conceived as a dynamic input-state-output model
(cfr., Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2 below)
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Figure 3.12: A functional architecture for face-based emotion understanding. Numbered mod-
ules are those considered in this study. In brief, the visual system for dynamic facial ex-
pression perception interacts with an extended system, which involves the emotion system
(dotted box) and high level cognitive/conceptual processes. Interaction is regulated by the
visuomotor mediation of a module for action perception. The latter transforms the sensory
information of observed facial actions into the observer’s own somatomotor representations.
The activation of the visuomotor route in turn triggers visceromotor reactions through the
mediation of the core affect state-space. From there on simulation-based dynamics involving
all components unfolds to support the whole process. Dashed grey lines distinguish between
the hierarchical levels of control
In forward mode, the input or control is provided top-down (TD) by an upper level
state-space and the output is an emission, or prediction to a lower-level state-space. In
backward mode, the input is a bottom-up (BU) observation or a prediction error, of the
lower-level state.
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we consider a discrete time system
with Markovian dynamics. The latter can be written as the stochastic difference equa-
tions
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), c(t+ 1), x(t+ 1)), (3.1)
xBU(t+ 1) = g(x(t+ 1), c(t+ 1), xBU(t+ 1)), (3.2)
Here, x(t) represents the state vector, and the emission xBU(t+ 1) will serve as the BU
measurement vector at the subsequent time step. f and g are two vector-valued func-
tions, which are potentially time-varying and nonlinear, while x and xBU denote the
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dynamics and measurement noise, respectively. The vector c(t) represents the system
control vector (also referred to as input). This can be shaped in many ways, for example
as a function of both TD and BU signals (e.g. to introduce feedback); A TD signal can
either be a suitable function of the measurement provided by an upper level state-space
or an exogenous input (e.g., a labelling sequence provided along a supervised learning
stage).
The dynamics can be simply described as a recursive predict step, where a state
transition x(t) → x(t + δt) is proposed, and a measure step, where the next state
x(t + 1) is obtained by updating x(t + δt) through the noisy observation xBU(t + 1).
In this view the state-space dynamics can be represented as the dynamic Probabilistic
Graphical Model (PGM) shown in Fig. 3.13, where the predict step and recursion, are
explicitly shown.
Figure 3.13: State-space dynamics. Predict step and recursion, are explicitly shown
Note that layers of the dynamic input-state-output models organised as in Figure
3.12, can be seen as form of hierarchical predictive coding (Wolpert et al., 2003).
More compactly, the state Eq.3.1 characterises the state transition probability P (x(t+
1) | x(t), c(t)) and thus the generative sampling
x˜(t+ 1) ∼ P (x(t+ 1) | x(t), c(t+ 1)) (3.3)
Analogously, the measurement Eq. 3.2 represents the sampling
x˜BU(t+ 1) ∼ P (xBU(t+ 1) | x˜(t+ 1), c(t+ 1)) (3.4)
where P (xBU(t + 1) | x˜(t + 1), c(t + 1)) is related to the measurement noise (e.g.,
by weighing the observation x̂BU estimated under prediction against xBU , the observed
one).
In a probabilistic formulation such dynamics allows, at any level, to clearly state
the inference of the hidden state at that level (inverse probabilistic model), and model
parameter learning.
The overall dynamics of the observer’s facial analysis is assumed to unfold as fol-
lows. At the onset (see the numbering sequence in Figure 3.12), visual facial cues are
inferred initialising the perceptual state-space (1); a visuomotor mapping is used to
couple visual cues to internal motor states of the somatomotor state-space (2); somato-
motor dynamics is controlled by facial motor parameters, and accounts for the facial
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gestures; the evolution of motor control parameters is generated within the facial ac-
tion state-space (3), where trajectories encode facial actions; facial actions activate the
core affect state-space (4), which mediates between the somatomotor and visceromo-
tor components; the latter, in turn, activates the autonomic state-space (5), encoding
visceromotor actions; the visceromotor actions govern the evolution of the visceromo-
tor state-space (6) that eventually can generate physiological responses. Analogously,
the evolution of the core affect can be propagated forward along the somatic route to
generate actual facial mimicry.
Thereafter, simulation-based dynamics unfolds to support the process, jointly in-
volving all the introduced components in the simulation loop, relying on forward pre-
diction/generation and backward inference.
It is worth remarking that in this thesis we will not consider the interaction between
high level cognitive and affective processes, notwithstanding we have represented a
cognitive state-space in Figure 3.12 for completeness sake. Yet, during primate phy-
logeny, neural circuits with mirror properties and other circuits involved in mentalising
might have been exapted to support more abstract cognitive functions, such as cogni-
tive empathy (Tramacere and Ferrari, 2016). Indeed, increased activity in the anterior
superior temporal gyrus and the medial prefrontal cortex are consistently reported in
studies that involve some kind of social judgements such as attributing mental states
and thinking about others. Thus, when watching an emotional face, observers not only
participate through synchronized mimicry, they might also understand the relevance of
the expresser’s mental state for social interaction (Tramacere and Ferrari, 2016).
Also we are not taking into account the feedforward subcortical route from SC/Pul-
vinar to limbic areas represented in Figure 3.11 as light dotted lines. This certainly is
an important issue and meanwhile controversial.
For instance, it is well known that visual attention can be non-consciously driven by
the affective significance of visual stimuli before full-fledged processing of the stim-
uli. Two kinds of models have been proposed to explain this phenomenon: models
involving sequential processing along the ventral visual stream, with secondary feed-
back from emotion-related structures or “two-stage models”; and models including
additional short-cut pathways directly reaching the emotion-related structures or“two-
pathway models” (Rudrauf et al., 2008).
The standard two-pathway (or dual route) models include a “retino-tectal” subcorti-
cal pathway from the retina to the amygdala, via the superior colliculus and the pulvinar
involved in the rapid processing of complex visual scenes and in the rapid modula-
tion of visual attention by emotion-related information (light dotted lines, cfr. Figure
3.11). Rudrauf et al. (2008) have tested, via simulation, which type of model would
best predict real magnetoencephalographic responses in subjects presented with arous-
ing visual stimuli, using realistic models of large-scale cerebral architecture and neural
biophysics, and the results strongly support a “two-pathway” hypothesis.
However, on the one hand, alternative models can be instantiated to account for the
dual route, for example long-range forward cortical-cortical pathways connecting the
early visual cortices (V1/V2) with the to the anterior affective system (Rudrauf et al.,
2008). The existence of these fasciculi in humans is supported by recent fiber tract
analyses based on diffusion tensor imaging.
On the other hand, Pessoa and Adolphs (2010) have reviewed anatomical and phys-
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3.4. Moving towards the theoretical model: a functional architecture
iological data and argued against the notion that such a pathway plays a prominent part
in processing affective visual stimuli in humans, since the visual processing of emotion
stimuli occurs no faster than visual processing in the cortex in general.
Actually, in a recent work (Ceruti et al., 2017) we have addressed the problem of
providing a fast, automatic, and coarse processing of the early mapping from emotional
facial expression stimuli to the basic continuous dimensions of the core affect. Differ-
ently from the vast majority of approaches in the field of affective facial expression
processing, we assumed and designed such a feedforward mechanism as a preliminary
step to provide a suitable probabilistic prior to the subsequent stochastic core affect
dynamics. However, such results have not been yet fully integrated in the model we are
presenting here.
Summary
Under the rationale of a multilevel framework, stemming from Marr’s analysis of com-
putational explanations in the cognitive and behavioural sciences (Marr, 1982), we have
devised an architecture of a distributed neural system for perception of dynamic facial
expressions of emotion. Such architecture can be seen as an extension, or a further
specification, of Adolph’s original proposal (Adolphs, 2002b), and it takes into ac-
count the large body of evidence from affective neuroscience concerning the role of
mirroring mechanisms along social interactions (Gallese et al., 2004; Tramacere and
Ferrari, 2016).
On such basis, under a number of assumptions, a hierarchical functional architec-
ture has been devised. In the following Chapter 4, the latter will be used to shape
and constrain the Probabilistic Graphical Model at the core of our explanation at the
computational theory level. Subsequently, we provide, at the implementation level of
explanation, a possible realisation of the different state-spaces, which relies on the com-
positionality of the probabilistic graph.
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The model
ASSUME a face-to-face interaction between two agents, an expresser (E) and anobserver (O), that share the common model underlying the state-spaces andrelated dynamics, as figured out in Fig. 3.12.
We are interested in reasoning about the state of the agents, in particular that of the
observer O, as it evolves over time, in terms of a system state whose value at time t
is a snapshot of its relevant attributes, hidden or observed, at that time. We can model
such setting in terms of a dynamic Probabilistic Graphical Model (PGM) (Section 4.1)
shaped on the basis of the functional architecture previously devised, which constrains
conditional independence assumptions between the graph nodes. Relying on such com-
positional representation, we can therefore devise an effective realisation (Section 4.2)
of each sub-graph corresponding to the main functional components. The implementa-
tion will reflect one by one all the random variables (RVs) and state-spaces introduced
in PGM formulation, going from the central affect level to the peripheral visuomo-
tor and visceromotor responses. Moreover, this will be done taking into account the
specificities of each module as well as the duality of the entire architecture, with the
backward/inferential and forward/generative information flow.
Theoretical model
Due to the stochastic nature of the system at hand, we represent the observer’s state at
time t as a collection of RVs XO(t) and we denote by XO(t1 : t2) the random process
{XO(t) : t ∈ [t1, t2]} indexed over the subset of reals [t1, t2].
An assignment of values to each RV of interest, collected in XO for each relevant
time t, correspond to a trajectory in our probability space.
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Chapter 4. The model
We then introduce two simplifying assumptions to make the problem more treatable
(see Section ?? for a remark on this).
The first simplification concerns the discretisation of the timeline into a set of time
slices, that is, we take measurements of the system state at intervals that are regularly
spaced with a predetermined time granularity ∆. Thus, we can restrict our set of RVs
to XO(0),XO(1), · · · , where XO(t) are the ground random variables that represent the
system state at time t · ∆. Without loss of generality, this assumption simplifies our
problem from representing distributions over a continuum of RVs to representing dis-
tributions over countably many RVs, sampled at discrete intervals.
Under such assumption, consider a distribution P (XO(0 : T )) over trajectories
sampled over a prefix of time t = 0, ..., T . We can reparametrise the distribution using
the chain rule for probabilities, in a direction consistent with time:
P (XO(0 : T )) = P (XO(0))
T−1∏
t=0
P (XO(t+ 1) | XO(0 : t)) (4.1)
Thus, the distribution over trajectories is the product of conditional distributions,
for the variables in each time slice given the preceding ones.
The second simplification entails the Markovianity of the process.
Definition 4.1 (Markov property). A dynamic system over the variable X satisfies the
Markov assumption if, ∀t ≥ 0,
(X (t+ 1)⊥X (t− 1) | X (t)).
Such systems are called Markovian.
The Markov assumption allows us to define a more compact representation of the
distribution in Eq. 4.1:
P (XO(0 : T )) = P (XO(0))
T−1∏
t=0
P (XO(t+ 1) | XO(t)). (4.2)
The conditional distribution P (XO(t + 1) | XO(t)) represents the dynamics of the
system and captures the Markov assumptions that the variables in XO(t + 1) cannot
depend directly on variables in XO(t′) for t′ < t.
Next, we need to specify the state of the observer XO. In our case, the actual inputs
to the system are provided by the facial display of the expresser, in the form of a time-
varying random variable (RV) IE(t), and a set of suitable control variables c(t), which
will be used in the learning stage to account for ground-truth valence/arousal pairs.
The outputs are the facial display or actual mimicry IO(t) of the observer and a set
of physiological responses UO(t) = {u(j)(t)}NVj=1, namely a number NV of measurable
physiological signals u(j)(t) originated along the observer’s autonomic activity.
Such measurable outputs are generated by the internal state of the observer that,
by taking into account the phenomenological model outlined in Section 3.4, can be
described by the following:
• e(t): the time-varying RV spanning the latent core affect state-space, at time t;
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4.1. Theoretical model
• SM(t): the collection of the time-varying RVs involved in the somatic visuomotor
simulation (concerning facial expression dynamics);
• SV (t): the collection of the time-varying RVs involved in the visceromotor simu-
lation (concerning autonomic activities).
More precisely, we can provide the following definitions:
Definition 4.2. The triple
X hiddenO = 〈e,SM ,SV 〉
represents the hidden or latent state variables of the observer.
Definition 4.3. The couple
X obsO = 〈IO,UO〉
represents the observable variables of the observer.
Remark. Note that in the actual dynamics as occurring, for example, along one exper-
imental setting, physiological signals U are not explicitly observable (in the sense of
visible) neither for the observer nor for the expresser. However, they are observable in
the sense of being measurable through suitable sensors.
Under such basic setup, the probabilistic model of the observer (and its dynamics)
is captured by the joint distribution
P (X hiddenO (0 : T ),X obsO (0 : T )) =
P (e(0 : T ),SM(0 : T ),SV (0 : T ), IO(0 : T ),UO(0 : T )). (4.3)
The factorisation of such distribution can be simplified by introducing a set of con-
ditional independence assertions associated with it.
The observable/hidden distinction allows to further refine the Markovian assump-
tion over the state variables XO, through the following conditional independence as-
sumptions:
Hyp. 4.1. The latent state variables evolve in a Markovian way
(X hiddenO (t+ 1)⊥X hiddenO (0 : t− 1) | X hiddenO (t)). (4.4)
Hyp. 4.2. The observation variables at time t are conditionally independent of the
entire hidden state sequence given the state variables at time t:
(X obsO (t+ 1)⊥X hiddenO (0 : t− 1),X hiddenO (t+ 1 :∞) | X hiddenO (t)). (4.5)
Remark. Hyp. 4.1 and Hyp. 4.2 allow to account for the affective dynamics of the
observer as a state-observation model. In a state-observation model, we view the system
as evolving naturally on its own, with observations of it occurring in a separate process
(Koller and Friedman, 2009).
Recalling the rationales discussed in Section 3.4, we can further assume that a tra-
jectory e(0 : t) in the core affect state space gives rise to independent trajectories
SM(0 : t),SV (0 : t) in the somatomotor and visceromotor state-spaces, respectively.
Thus,
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Chapter 4. The model
Hyp. 4.3 (Somatomotor and visceromotor independence).
(SM(t)⊥SV (t) | e(t)). (4.6)
Then, under the above assumptions the following independence properties also hold
by construction:
Prop. 4.4.
(IO(t)⊥SV (t) | SM(t)), (4.7)
(UO(t)⊥SM(t) | SV (t)). (4.8)
The latter property states that the somatomotor and visceromotor state-spaces inde-
pendently control the observable outputs IO(0 : t),UO(0 : t), respectively.
Then, we can provide the following:
Definition 4.4. Hyp. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 define the set I(P ) of conditional independence
assertions that hold in the joint distribution P (Eq. 4.3).
It is straightforward, at this point, to devise a probabilistic graph G, in the form
of a dynamic direct Graphical Model, which encodes the RVs of the joint distribution
P (Eq. 4.3) and the set I(P ) defined above. The graph G is shown in Fig. 4.1. For
simplicity, only the time slice (t, t+ 1) is outlined.
Figure 4.1: The relations among the core components of the model (cfr. Fig. 3.12) and
their generative dynamics represented as a dynamic Probabilistic Graphical Model (PGM).
Graph nodes denote RVs and directed arcs encode conditional dependencies between RVs.
By construction, G is an I-map (independency map, Def. A.3) for P , that is I`(G) ⊆
I(P ), I`(G) being the set of local independencies associated with G, (Koller and Fried-
man, 2009).
Eventually, the following holds:
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4.1. Theoretical model
Prop. 4.5. Given the set I(P ), the joint distribution P (Eq. 4.3) factorises as
P (X hO(0 : T ),X oO(0 : T )) = P (XO(0))
T−1∏
t=0
P (IO(t+ 1) | SM(t+ 1), IO(t))×
P (UO(t+ 1) | SV (t+ 1),UO(t))×
P (SM(t+ 1) | SM(t), e(t+ 1))×
P (SV (t+ 1) | SV (t), e(t+ 1))×
P (e(t+ 1) | e(t)) (4.9)
Proof. By applying probability chain rule, Markov property, and conditional indepen-
dence statements in set I(P ). More simply, since by construction the graph G is an
I-map for P , and also is a directed acyclic graph then P factorises according to G, from
Theorem A.1 (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
Equation 4.9 provides the core probabilistic model for the agent. To further spec-
ify the complete model note, we need to precisely define the RVs collected by the
time-varying state ensembles of the visuomotor and visceromotor routes SM and SV ,
respectively. Note that these are subgraphs of model G and recall that they are condi-
tionally independent given the current core affect state. As a consequence, if we define
each subgraph as a directed acyclic graph, then the procedure used before to define the
joint factorisation can be recursively applied at any level of the subgraph.
To such end, we use the following random variables related to the different state
spaces.
Action state-spaces:
• aM(t): the RV denoting the somatomotor action;
• a(j)V (t): the RV denoting the j-th visceromotor action.
Somatomotor state-space:
• m(t): the facial deformation due to muscle action “shared” between the two
agents;
• θ(t): the head pose parameters; in principle they need not to be shared between
the agents, thus θ(t) = {θO(t),θE(t)}, though here in practice we will use the
same set of pose parameters for both;
• w(t): the RV accounting for somatomotor state-space dynamics;
• sI : a set of static parameters encoding the biometric characteristics of each indi-
vidual I ∈ {E ,O}, namely {sE , sO}; expresser’s sE are inferred by the observer
at the onset of the interaction, while observer’s parameters are given;
• yE(t): the predicted visual facial cues of the expresser.
Visceromotor state-space:
• v(j)(t): the RV spanning the j-th visceromotor state space;
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Chapter 4. The model
Figure 4.2: The conditional dependencies among the core components of the model (cfr.
Fig. 3.12) and their generative dynamics represented as a dynamic PGM over the time slice
(t, t+ 1). Dashed grey lines emphasise the hierarchical levels of control of the dynamics of
the system.
• r(j)(t): the internal observation, or feature vector, of the j-th physiological re-
sponse u(j)(t).
The model builds on the backward/forward hierarchical control between levels out-
lined in Fig. 3.12 that governs the dynamics of the whole system (Fig. 4.2). At any
time t the somatomotor and visceromotor state-spaces, on the basis of their observa-
tions, provide back to the action state-spaces bottom-up inputs, namely the currently
estimated motor control parameters m̂(t) and autonomic states {v̂(j)(t)}NVj=1, respec-
tively. These are used to estimate current action states âM(t) and {â(j)V (t)}NVj=1 and,
in turn, the most likely core affect state ê(t). Based on this, a next-state prediction
ê(t) → e˜(t + 1) is obtained and, subsequently a˜M(t + 1) and {a˜(j)V (t + 1)}NVj=1 are
proposed. Then, m˜(t + 1) and {v˜(j)(t + 1)}NVj=1 are sampled to provide a top-down
control (filled arrows) for the somatomotor and visceromotor state-space dynamics, so
that next states w(t+1) and {v(j)(t+1)}NVj=1 can be actually predicted. From the latter,
facial mimicry and physiological responses can be eventually generated.
It may be an helpful insight, as suggested by Minka (1999), to view the graph
as a parallel machine where each state-node is a processor and links are communica-
tion paths. At each state-space level, information is propagated “horizontally” at that
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4.1. Theoretical model
level by standard forward-backward recursions; however, along the overall perception-
simulation cycle, information also flows upward-downward. As a result, the state-
spaces of the core affect and of the visuomotor and visceromotor routes will get shared
information of the observation-measurement sequence.
This is the model in a nutshell. The latent spaces of admissible visuomotor and
visceromotor actions, together with the core affect space are constructed at the learning
stage. Specifically the visuomotor space of the observer O is learned bottom-up by
observing an expresser E in the course of the affective interaction (a sort of mother and
child interaction), whilst the visceromotor dynamics can be learned provided that E’s
physiological data are available and measured throughout the face-to-face interaction.
As to the core affect space, this can be learned either in unsupervised mode or super-
vised. The latter requires that a continuous valence/arousal labelling of the interaction
has been performed. This, in turn, conditions top-down components at lower levels.
It is worth noting that affective interactions are possible in nature since the ob-
server and the expresser are individuals endowed with a similar brain-body system;
thus, they share the key components of such interaction, e.g. visceromotor reactions
along newborns’ mimicry to mother’s expressions mentioned before. Here, in the case
of artificial agents, the same assumption holds: both the expresser and the observer rely
on the same generative model. However, in this case, prewired representations and dy-
namics entailed by autonomic, visceromotor responses need to be learned via suitable
physiological data experimentally collected.
After learning, the interaction at test time only relies upon the visible facial dynam-
ics of a new expresser E as perceived by O, who is in a specific internal physiological
state. The goal is to enact within O a core affect dynamics similar to that of E .
Dynamics of affect enactment
The dynamics relies on a nested, double simulation loop. The outer loop is a perception-
action cycle based on the current observation of expresser’s facial display. The gener-
ative properties of the model are exploited to hierarchically predict core affect states
and in turn visuomotor and visceromotor states that will eventually determine facial
mimicry and physiological responses. To such end, the inner loop of measurements
and predictions within the central affect state-spaces implements a kind of “as if” inter-
nal simulation (see Goldman and Sripada (2005) for a discussion) to jointly optimise
variables m˜, v˜. At the end of such inner loop, optimal m˜∗, v˜∗ are provided as top-down
controls to motor and visceromotor state-spaces in the outer loop. Such dynamics, re-
lying on prediction and measurement steps, is outlined in Algorithm 1 and detailed in
the following.
The construction of the latent affect space model grounds in the probabilistic depen-
dencies that relate visuomotor and visceromotor components to the core affect, namely
e→ aM →m and e→ a(j)V → v(j), respectively.
Here the dynamics can be summarised as sampling a time dependent affect state
from the latent core affect space
e˜(t+ 1) ∼ P (e(t+ 1) | e(t), c(t+ 1)); (4.10)
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Algorithm 1 Simulation-based dynamics
Input: - Dynamic sequence of expresser’s facial display lE(t) at times denoted by t =
1, 2, 3, . . . and corresponding to multiple of frame interval ∆t
- suitable initialisation of state-space parameters obtained from the training step
Output: Predictions I˜O(t′)|t′>t and {u˜(j)(t′)|t′>t} (Eq. 4.23)
1: t← 1
2: while in interaction do
3: {Visuomotor mapping}
4: Given IE(t) measure l̂E(t), m̂(t), θ̂(t) (Eqs. 4.19, 4.20)
5: if t = 1 then
6: Measure sE and scale parameters
7: end if
8: k ← 0; τk ← t
9: {Internal ”as if” simulation}
10: repeat
11: {Backward / bottom-up measure step}
12: âM (τk) ∼ P (aM (τk) | m̂(τk))
13: {â(j)V (τk)} ∼ P ({a(j)V (τk)} | {v̂(j)(τk)});
14: ê(τk) ∼ P (e(τk) | âM (τk), {â(j)V (τ)})
15: {Forward / top-down core affect step}
16: c(τk)← ê(τk)
17: Predict e˜(τk+1) (Eq. 4.10)
18: {Forward / top-down visuomotor step}
19: Predict a˜M (τk+1), then m˜∗(τk+1) (Eqs. 4.11, 4.13);
20: {Forward / top-down visceromotor step}
21: Predict a˜V (τk+1), then {v˜(j),∗(τk+1)} (Eqs. 4.12, 4.21)
22: Save pred. m˜∗, v˜∗ as the current observed m̂, v̂
23: k ← k + 1; τk ← t+ kδt
24: until τk − t ≤ ∆t
25: Use predicted states as the current ones
26: {Forward / top-down visuomotor step}
27: Predict θ˜(t+ 1)
28: Predict w˜(t+ 1) (Eq. 4.15), then y˜E(t+ 1) (Eq. 4.16);
29: {Forward / top-down visceromotor step}
30: Use predicted {v˜(j),∗} as control parameters and predict actual {v˜(j)(t+ 1)} (Eq. 4.21)
31: Predict {r˜(j)(t+ 1)} (Eq. 4.22)
32: {Mimicry and physiological responses};
33: Predict I˜O(t+ 1)
34: Predict {u˜(j)(t+ 1)} (Eq. 4.23)
35: t← t+ 1;
36: end while
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then, due to local independency, sampling in parallel somatic and visceromotor actions
a˜M(t+ 1) ∼ P (aM(t+ 1) | aM(t), e˜(t+ 1)), (4.11)
a˜
(j)
V (t+ 1) ∼ P (a(j)V (t+ 1) | a(j)V (t), e˜(t+ 1)), (4.12)
where j = 1, . . . , NV . This way a core affect trajectory {e(t)}Tt=1 generates specific
action trajectories {aM(t)}Tt=1 and {a(j)V (t)}Tt=1 to be taken in the somatomotor and
visceromotor routes.
Note that the control variable c in Eq. 4.10 serves the purpose of accounting for
either exogenous inputs if given - e.g. valence/arousal pairs at the learning stage -, and
bottom-up feedbacks âM(t), {â(j)V (t)} that can be inferred by using posterior distribu-
tions P (aM(t) | m̂(t)), P ({a(j)V (t)} | {v̂(j)(t)}), respectively.
The somatic visuomotor route
A trajectory {aM(t)}Tt=1 in the latent space of facial actions is used to sample and con-
strain a sequence of facial motor control parameters m(t). These tune the facial action
unfolding in the motor state-space spanned by w(t), namely the observer’s internal rep-
resentation of the face. We instantiate w(t) as a 3D deformable shape model. Thus,
w(t) is a vector of vertices such that the evolution of the face model at time t is repre-
sented by the ensemble of vertex state vectors wi(t) = [Xi(t), Yi(t), Zi(t)]
T . In brief,
control parameters m(t),θ(t), sI , dynamically shape the egocentric motor representa-
tion of the agent’s face, namely, w(t) := w(m(t),θ(t), sI).
The biometric parameters sO are used for building the observer’s inner representa-
tion of his own face, whilst sE are adopted for predicting the evolution of expresser’s
facial action. The motor control parameters θ(t) and m(t), the head pose and the facial
deformation due to muscle action, respectively, are “shared” between the two agents.
Namely, they are inferred/perceived by O looking at E along the interaction, and used
as his own parameters, a process which we address as visuomotor mapping (Lopes and
Santos-Victor, 2005).
Assume that an estimate of global head motion and face deformation parameters
θ̂(t), m̂(t), respectively, are available at time t after the perceptual stage. The somato-
motor space will be characterised by the following dynamics. First, sample facial action
control parameters:
m˜(t+ 1) ∼ P (m(t+ 1) | m̂(t), a˜M(t+ 1)), (4.13)
θ˜(t+ 1) ∼ P (θ(t+ 1) | θˆ(t)). (4.14)
Then, by using sampled control parameters, set w(t + 1) := w(m˜(t + 1), θ˜(t +
1), sE), predict the facial configuration of E ,
w˜(t+ 1) ∼ P (w(t+ 1) | w(t), m˜(t+ 1), θ˜(t+ 1)), (4.15)
and sample a predicted observation of E’s facial cues (landmarks)
y˜E(t+ 1) ∼ P (yE(t+ 1) | T (w˜(t+ 1))), (4.16)
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where T (·) is a projection of the 3D model in the expresser’s 2D visual space.
Facial mimicry is obtained by setting w(t+ 1) := w(m˜(t+ 1), θ˜(t+ 1), sO), using
Eq. 4.15, and generating O’s facial expression:
I˜O(t+ 1) ∼ P (IO(t+ 1) | w(t+ 1), IO(t)). (4.17)
The observer’s perception of the expresser
The goal for O is to infer the expresser’s facial action visual cues that are then mapped
onto internal parameters (m̂(t), θ̂(t)). To such end we need to estimate:
1. E’s actual facial landmarks lE(t), conditioned on the set of facial patch feature
responses XE(t) computed on frame IE(t), and on the currently predicted facial
shape state w˜E(t) (in the action stage);
2. the hidden motor control parameters θ(t) (facial pose) and m(t) (facial deforma-
tion) that most likely modulate the visible facial configuration of the expresser.
Inference relies on the joint posterior
P (lE(t),θ(t),m(t) | y˜E(t),XE(t), IE(t)) =
P (θ(t),m(t) | lE(t), y˜E(t))× P (lE(t) | XE(t), IE(t)). (4.18)
The first factor on the r.h.s of Eq. 4.18 substantiates the visuomotor mapping; the second
factor supports the visual processing of facial landmarks. Hence, the perception stage
boils down to the following.
1. Computing the most likely configuration of actual landmarks:
l̂E(t) = arg maxP (lE(t) | XE(t), IE(t)); (4.19)
2. Backprojecting into the expresser’s image space the current predicted observer’s
facial state y˜E(t) = T (w(m˜(t), θ˜(t), sE)) for estimating control parameters that
best explain observed landmarks l̂E(t):
(m̂(t), θ̂(t)) = arg max
m,θ
P (̂lE(t) | y˜E(t)). (4.20)
The visceromotor route
In this case, we deal with a number NV of measurable physiological signals U(t)O =
{u(j)(t)}NVj=1. Typically, u(j)(·) are 1-D time-series, that can be assumed to be the real-
isation of NV independent stochastic processes. Prediction and observation steps can
be performed for the j = 1, · · · , NV spaces through the following steps:
1. predict the autonomic visceromotor state conditioned on the current action a˜(j)V
v˜(j)(t+ 1) ∼ P (v(j)(t+ 1) | v(j)(t), a˜(j)V (t+ 1)), (4.21)
2. predict the observation of physiological features
r˜(j)(t+ 1) ∼ P (r(j)(t+ 1) | v˜(j)(t+ 1)), (4.22)
3. sample a physiological response
u˜(j)(t+ 1) ∼ P (u(j)(t+ 1) | r˜(j)(t+ 1)). (4.23)
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Implementation model
The probabilistic formalisation provided in the previous section represents the foun-
dations of the model presented in this work. As shown, the whole architecture relies
upon a series of state-spaces that permits to realise the heart of the model, namely the
“core affect → action → motor” hierarchy. More precisely, the construction of the
latent affect space model grounds in the probabilistic dependencies that relate visuo-
motor and visceromotor components to the core affect, namely e → am → m and
e→ a(j)V → v(j), respectively.
The requirement of the construction of the core affect latent spaces and relative
dependencies is to devise an effective and efficient nonlinear mapping such that trajec-
tories of similar control parameters and, in turn, of actions, are placed nearby in the
core affect space whilst dissimilar trajectories are far away. To meet such requirement,
in current work we use a Deep Gaussian Process (deep GP) approach (Damianou and
Lawrence, 2013). A deep GP is a deep belief network (DBN) that aims at mapping a
potentially observed input to an observed output via a cascade of multiple hidden layers
of latent variables. To govern the aforementioned mapping between consecutive layers
it employs Gaussian Processes (GPs). Precisely, a single layer of the deep GP can be
either a standard GP or a Gaussian process latent variable model (GPLVM) (refer to the
Appendix C for a wider dissertation of the grounding models).
From a general point of view, the multivariate parent node Z(H) ∈ RN×Q(H) can
be unobserved leading to an unsupervised scenario or could be considered as an ob-
served input for a supervised learning. The intermediate hidden variables Z(h) ∈
RN×Q(h) , h = 1, . . . , H − 1 model the transformations between layers until reaching
the observed output Y ∈ RN×D, placed in the leaf nodes.
Each hidden layer can be treated as a GP-LVM by employing a product of Q(h)
independent GPs as prior for the latent mapping, from which the latent functions F(h) =
{f (h)q }Q(h)q=1 , with f (h)nq = f (h)q (z(h)n ), are sampled. Thus, f (h)q ∼ GP(0, k(h)(z(h)i , z(h)j )),
where k(h)(z(h)i , z
(h)
j ) is the kernel function. For the down-most layer, F
(1) = {f (1)d }Dd=1,
with f (1)nd = f
(1)
d (z
(1)
n ).
The generative process from the upper-most to the down-most layer is given by the
following:
z(h−1)nq = f
(h)
q (z
(h)
n ) + 
(h)
nq , q = 1 · · ·Q(h) (4.24)
ynd = f1(z
(1)
n ) + 
(1)
nd , d = 1 · · ·D (4.25)
where (h)nq ∼ N (0, (σ(h)nq )2) and (1)nd ∼ N (0, (σ(1)nd )2).
Clearly, the size of each latent layer is crucial but does not need to be a priori
defined. It has been shown (Damianou and Lawrence, 2013) that it is possible to define
automatic relevance determination (ARD) covariance functions for the GPs
k(h)(z
(h)
i , z
(h)
j ) = σ
2
ARD exp
−1
2
Q(h)∑
q=1
w(h)q (z
(h)
i,q − z(h)j,q )2

such that a different weight w(h)q is assumed for each latent dimension. This can be
exploited at the training stage in order to prune irrelevant dimensions by driving their
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corresponding weight to zero thus helping towards automatically finding the structure
of complex models. In other terms an automatic Occam’s razor is obtained, while
ending up with significantly lower number of model parameters.
Figure 4.3: Visualisation of a Deep Gaussian Process Model with a cascade of H hidden
layers. The uppermost layer Z(H) is observed with a linear input and the kernel functions
adopted in each layer are the squared exponential (or RBF).
What is important for our work is that this deep structure can be naturally extended
“horizontally” by segmenting each layer into different partitions. Thus, the latent space
at level h is partitioned into pi(h) conditionally independent subsets, matching exactly
the conditional independence statements assumed from the beginning to design the
PGM representation provided in Fig. 4.2. Eventually, it allows to handle in a principled
and efficient way the multimodal nature of visual cues and of the different physiological
signals. This can be achieved at this point by defining the down-most layer of the deep
GP as a N ×D matrix Y = [m | v(1) | v(2) | · · · ], being N the dimension of the con-
sidered time series andD the sum of the dimensions of state/control parameters of each
modality. To achieve such requirement we adopted in the down-most layer the Mani-
fold Relevance Determination (MRD, Damianou et al., 2012), a latent variable model
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which incorporates observations from several views. The Bayesian training of these
layers automatically segments the latent space into private and shared parts among the
considered modalities (Damianou et al., 2012), relying on separate covariance functions
per view k(h)(j), with h indexing the layer, as usual, and j indexing the specific modality
(cfr. Fig. 4.4 for an example). The ARD kernel function, introduced above, therefore
requires a reformulation that takes in consideration the different view-dependent pa-
rameters to optimise, namely
(
σ
(h)(j)
ARD
)2
and the set of weights w(h)(j) = {w(h)(j)q }Q(h)q=1 .
Figure 4.4: Example of the ARD weights (vertical axis) as function of latent space dimensions
(horizontal axis) resulting after training a MRD layer over multimodal data. This includes
one modality obtained from facial actions (AU) and two different autonomic states, referring
to heart rate variability (HRV) and electrodermal activity (EDA). Considering a threshold of
0.25 (dashed line) it is possible to say that two of these modalities (HRV, EDA) share the sixth
dimension of the learnt latent space, while keeping private some other. This choice provides
a suitable implementation model of the close exchange of information (at the state-space
level) akin to the interactions occurring at the neural level between orbitofrontal cortex, the
amygdala and the anterior insula.
It is worth noting that the deep GP has the expressive power that indeed we need to
map the trajectories taking place in the core affect state-space, onto trajectories at the
motor state-space level. Because of the recursive warping of latent variables through the
hierarchy, it allows for modelling non-stationarities and cumbersome non-parametric
functional properties (Damianou and Lawrence, 2013).
In the supervised learning scenario, which is the one addressed here, the inputs
to the top hidden layer Z(H) are observed, namely they are the valence/arousal time
sequences or trajectories e(t) provided at learning stage.
When the latent space is set up, then new estimated controls m̂, {v̂(j)} can be
stochastically backprojected through the latent space layers up to the core affect state-
space, namely,
âM(t) ∼ P (aM(t) | m̂(t)),
{â(j)V (t)} ∼ P ({a(j)V (t)} | {v̂(j)(t)}),
ê(t) ∼ P (e(t) | âM(t), {â(j)V (t)}).
This is achieved by using variational posteriors available from the model learning stage
(Damianou et al., 2016), but using a bottom up sampling-like approach, in order not to
disregard the uncertainty predicted at each time.
As to pose evolution formalised in Eq. 4.14, we simply put
P (θ(t+ 1) | θˆ(t)) = δ(θ(t+ 1), θˆ(t))
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hence straightforwardly exploiting the inferred θˆ(t).
Somatic motor space and visuomotor mapping
To formalise the parametric face model w(t) := w(Θ(t)), being Θ(t) the vector of
all involved parameters, we exploit the 3D face model Candide-3 (Ahlberg, 2010) that
reasonably suits our needs. This is a 3D deformable wireframe model consisting of 113
vertices wi and 184 triangles (cfr. Fig. 4.7, top row), represented by w = [w1 · · ·wN ]
as a vector of vertices wi =
[
X i, Y i, Zi
]T
, where i indexes the i-th vertex of the
model. The face shape wI can be generated from the standard mean shape w which is
deformed by both individual biometric characteristics and the facial action (expression)
performed at time t. The evolution of the face model at time t is represented by the state
vector wi(t) = [Xi(t), Yi(t), Zi(t)]
T .
Denote dWSi and dW
M
i , biometric and facial action-based deformations. Pre-
cisely,
dWSi =
[
dwSi,1, · · · ,dwSi,Ns
]
,
dWMi =
[
dwMi,1, · · · ,dwMi,Nm
]
are constant 3 × Ns and 3 × Nm matrices, respectively, where each vector dwSi,j and
dwMi,k represents the single Shape Unit (SU) and Action Unit (AU) deformation at ver-
tex i, respectively. Here, Ns = 14 and Nm = 11. The columns of dWSi are vectors
of control point displacements due to biometric traits of the individual (mouth width,
eye distance, etc.) (details in Tab. 4.1). The columns of dWMi encode vectors of point
displacements, each vector corresponding to AUs related to Ekman’s FACS (Facial Ac-
tion Coding System (Ekman and Rosenberg, 1997)) (details in Tab. 4.2); these describe
the change in face geometry when the corresponding AU is enabled due to the motor
activation of facial muscles. The effect of the SUs and AUs is controlled via the shape
and motor/action parameter vectors sI = [s1, · · · , sNs ]T ,mI = [m1, · · · ,mNm ]T , re-
spectively.
Under the face-to-face interaction assumption, the shape model dynamics is that
of a deformable (i.e., not rigid) body (von Helmholtz, 1858) and by assuming small
rotations, it can be shown that at any time t, facial movements will locally move a 3D
vertex wi to position wi(t + δt) = wi(t) + dwi (for unitary time step δt = 1, without
loss of generality) according to the law:
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + R(t)wi(t) + dW
S
i sI + dW
M
i m(t) + t(t), (4.26)
where R and t represent the rotation matrix and the translation vector, respectively, that
is the global rigid motion constrained by cranial pose dynamics. For what concerns R,
a 3D rotation can be represented by vector ω = [ωx, ωy, ωz]
T . The exponential twist
representation (Gallego and Yezzi, 2015; Murray et al., 1994) considers the rotation as
the infinite limit of k rotations
R(ω) = lim
k→∞
(
I+
1
k
[ω]×
)k
= exp([ω]×), (4.27)
where [ω]× denotes the 3× 3 cross product (skew-symmetric) matrix
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Table 4.1: List of the Candide Shape Units as defined in Ahlberg (2010) and updated to version
Candide-3.1.6.
Shape Unit Vector Name Comment
0 Head height Does not influence eyes, mouth, ...
1 Eyebrows, vertical position
2 Eyes, vertical position
3 Eyes, width
4 Eyes, height
5 Eye separation distance
6 Cheeks z Z-extension of the cheek bone
7 Nose z-extension Z-extension of the nose
8 Nose vertical position
9 Nose, pointing up Vertical position of nose tip
10 Mouth vertical position
11 Mouth width
12 Eyes vertical difference
13 Chin width
Table 4.2: List of the numerical formalised Candide Action Unit Vectors and corresponding Ac-
tion Units from FACS (Ekman and Rosenberg, 1997) as defined in Ahlberg (2010), updated
to version Candide-3.1.6.
Action Unit Vector AU (FACS) Name
0 10 Upper lip raiser
2 20 Lip stretcher
3 4 Brow lowerer
5 2 Outer brow raiser
6 42 / 43 / 44 / 45 Eyes closed
7 7 Lid tightener
8 9 Nose wrinkler
9 23 / 24 Lip presser
10 5 Upper lid raiser
11 26 Jaw drop
14 13 / 15 Lip corner depressor
[ω]× =
 0 −ωz ωyωz 0 −ωx
−ωy ωx 0
 , (4.28)
such that [ω]× v = ω × v, v ∈ R3 being a vector to which rotation is applied, and
I is the 3× 3 identity matrix.
By expanding the matrix exponential as a Taylor series, exp([ω]×) = I + [ω]× +
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([ω]×)
2
2!
+· · · and using the first order approximation, we can write small incremental ro-
tations as R(ω) ≈ I+[ω]×. Note that, under such approximation one can conveniently
represent R as
R ≈ I+ ωxGx + ωyGy + ωzGz, (4.29)
where Gx,Gy,Gz are Lie algebra matrices or SO(3) generators.
Eq. 4.26, applied to all vertices i, represents the state of the 3D face model evolv-
ing in time, i.e. the forward model, which is used in the action stage (Eq. 4.15). Its
dynamic control parameters are the pose parameters θ(t) = (R(t), t(t)) and deforma-
tion parameters m(t). Individual biometric control parameters sI are considered fixed
along the interaction. More precisely, observer’s identity encoded by sO is given (prac-
tically, estimated offline), whilst expresser’s parameters sE must be inferred through the
perceptual process at the onset of the interaction.
As referred in robotics (Lopes and Santos-Victor, 2005), a visuomotor mapping
defines a correspondence between perception and action of the type VM : FV → FM ,
where FV ,FM denote visual and motor features, in our case the inferred landmarks
and the time-variant parameters controlling the internal motor state, respectively. Recall
that, in order to estimate parameters (m̂(t), θ̂(t)), given the computed landmarks ŷE(t),
the second step of the perceptual stage (Eq. 4.20) relies on projecting into the image
space the predicted facial configuration of the expresser, namely ŵE . The latter is
obtained by sampling in the action stage the current state of the face model w˜(m,θ),
and assigning expresser’s identity parameters, i.e. w˜E(t) := w(m˜(t), θ˜(t), sE). Then,
as to projection T (w˜E) of the 3D vertices on the 2D image coordinate system, a weak
perspective projection can be adopted given the small depth of the face (Orozco et al.,
2013), thus
y˜E,l = T (w˜E,l) = sΠw˜E,l = s
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
w˜E,l (4.30)
where s is the weak-perspective scale parameter, and l indexes the L vertices that
are in correspondence with extracted facial landmarks.
Denote Θ = s[1,ωT , sT ,mT , tT ]T the full parameter vector. Then, P (̂lE(t) |
y˜E(t),Θ) is used at this point to estimate parameters via maximum likelihood.
Under Gaussian noise assumption,
l̂E,l = y˜E,l + y˜ (4.31)
parameter estimation via Eq. 4.20 boils down to the negative log-likelihood min-
imisation problem,
(m̂(t), θ̂(t)) = arg min
Θ
1
2σ2yE
L∑
l=1
‖̂lE,l − y˜E,l‖2 + L log(2piσ2yE ), (4.32)
which can be easily solved in closed matrix form. Note that the full parameter vector
Θ needs to be estimated only at the onset of the interaction; in subsequent steps only
(m̂(t), θ̂(t)) are needed.
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To characterise the behaviour of the observer’s visuomotor simulation component
per se, in terms of its mimicking abilities we conceived an experimental setup where,
an “expert” evaluates the unfolding of the facial dynamics of the observer O while
mimicking a number of expressers E different from those exploited to learn the O’s
action space. In this perspective, a human expert (e.g., a FACS certified psychologist)
would compare AUs’ behaviour along the interaction between E and O.
To quantify AU signalling over time (Jack et al., 2014), we computed the activation
probability of each AU at frame t, P (AUk(t)) calculated across all expressers, and the
same for related observer’s responses. This was done for each of the six basic emotion
categories.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the results achieved in terms of time-varying AU activation
maps (each row denoting a single AU activation in time, brighter colour corresponding
to higher activation). It can be noted at a glance that observer’s patterns of activation, for
each expression, are similar to expresser’s pattern. There are however some differences
that are mostly due to a lack of exact correspondence between the set {AUk} used by
the detector, and the AU set dWM considered in the Candide model. For example,
AU12 (Lip Corner Puller) is not accounted for by our Candide implementation, thus
it is never activated for any expression. Interestingly enough, associated AUs can be
activated as surrogates, for instance AU14 (Dimpler, that forms in the cheeks when one
smiles) in place of AU12. This effect can be easily noticed for the “happy” expression.
Figure 4.5: AU activation maps for the expressers (left) and observer’s related mimicry over
time, for each of the six basic emotions (brighter colours for higher activations). Each
row represents the activation over time of a single AU. The white line denotes time-varying
Shannon’s entropy H(t).
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In the same vein of Jack et al. (2014), we also computed Shannon’s entropy,H(t) =
−∑k P (AUk(t)) logP (AUk(t)), to quantify the average uncertainty of AU signalling
over time. The rationale behind this choice is that signalling dynamics is an evolution-
ary pressure outcome to reliably transmit specific information to observers to support
a near-optimal system of signalling and decoding Jack et al. (2014). For each facial
expression, the H(t) curve is superimposed on the corresponding activation map for
both E and O (white lines in each panel of Fig. 4.5). It can be noted that H(t) follows
a common pattern over time (increase/decrease), but with a peculiar trend for each dis-
crete emotion expression, which is similar for both the expresser and the observer. One
notable exception is that represented by the “anger” case where the H(t) behaviour in
the observer looks different from the expresser.
Visual perception
To compute the ŷE(t) facial landmarks (cfr. Fig. 4.6), we adopt the Constrained Local
Neural Field (CLNF) undirected graphical model (see Baltrušaitis et al. (2013), for
details). The model uses the multivariate normal distribution to specify the landmark
prediction probability at L = 68 locations lE(t) = [`1, · · · `L] given patches XE(t) =
[x1(t), · · · ,xL(t)] selected at frame IE(t)
P (lE(t) | XE(t), IE(t)) = N (lE(t);µX,Σ) (4.33)
where
N (lE(t);µX,Σ) =
exp(Ψ(lE ,X))∫
exp(Ψ(yE ,X)
and Ψ(lE ,X) is the potential function used by the LNF patch expert, while the mean
vector µX captures the feature extractor responses on patches XE(t) after a face de-
tection step. A viable alternative is the method proposed by Zhu and Ramanan (2012)
(or its sparse variants, e.g. Cuculo et al. (2014)) which has the merit of jointly infer-
ring face and landmarks. However, in our experiments CLNF has proven to be more
effective and computationally efficient.
Visceromotor state-space
For what concerns physiological signals U(t)O = {u(j)(t)}NVj=1, in order to implement
the predict and update step of Eq. 4.21, 4.22, we use an input driven linear dynamical
system model (Beal et al., 2004)
v(j)(t+ 1) = Av(j)(t) + Bc(j)(t) + (j)v (t), (4.34)
r(j)(t+ 1) = Cv(j)(t+ 1) + Dc(j)(t) + (j)r (t+ 1), (4.35)
with (j)v (t) ∼ N (0,Σ(j)v ), (j)r (t) ∼ N (0,Σ(j)r ), and, assuming a k-dimensional state
vector v, A is the (k×k) state dynamics matrix, B (k×d) and D (p×d) are the input-
to-state and input-to-observation matrices, and C is the (p × k) observation matrix.
In current implementation, the p-dimensional feature vector r(j)(t) is obtained via the
wavelet transform of the physiological response u(j)(t) (further details in Experiments
chapter, Section 5.2).
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Figure 4.6: Example of the output obtained from the landmark inference process applied to a
single frame of a video sequence. It consists of L = 68 fiducial points.
The input driven model is able to incorporate a displacement for the hidden state
dynamics c(j)(t + 1) = (Av(j)(t + 1)− v˜(j)(t + 1)), where v˜(j)(t + 1) ∼ P (v(j)(t +
1) | a˜(j)V (t + 1)) is the current emission predicted by the sampled visceromotor action.
Learning of visceromotor parameters Θ(j)V = (A,B,C,D,Σ
(j)
v ,Σ
(j)
r ), is performed via
the variational Bayesian EM algorithm to optimize the lower bound of the log marginal
likelihood
lnP (r
(j)
1:T | c(j)1:T ) ≥ F(Q(v(j)0:T ), Q(Θ(j)V ), r(j)1:T ), (4.36)
with
F =
∫
dΘ
(j)
V dv
(j)
0:TQ(Θ
(j)
V )Q(v
(j)
0:T ) ln
P (Θ
(j)
V ,v
(j)
0:T , r
(j)
1:T | c(j)1:T )
Q(Θ
(j)
V )Q(v
(j)
0:T )
(4.37)
and Q(Θ(j)V ), Q(v
(j)) are the free distributions or variational priors (see Beal et al.
(2004), for details).
At any time t the estimates of the mean µ(j)v (t) and covariance Σ(j)v (t) of the hidden
state v(j) can be obtained via forward recursion (filtering),
P (v(j)(t) | r(j)1:t , c(j)(t)) ∝ P (r(j)(t) | v(j)(t))∫
dv(j)(t− 1)P (v(j)(t− 1) | r(j)1:t−1, c(j)(t− 1))
P (v(j)(t) | v(j)(t− 1), c(j)(t)) (4.38)
The mean µ(j)v (t) is provided at inference time in input to the j-th action state-space as
the observation of the current visceromotor state v(j)(t).
81
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 82 — #102 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 4. The model
Facial mimicry and physiological signal generation
The quality of facial mimicry animation is not a crucial concern in our current research
work, the model being agnostic to the adopted output. Here, for visualisation purposes,
Eq. 4.17 is intended to drive both a synthetic avatar and the simulator of the well known
iCub humanoid robot (see Fig. 4.7). In the first case, mimicry is obtained by simply
warping the observer’s facial image in frontal pose. Observer’s biometric parameters
sO and sampled m˜(t) are used to generate observer’s facial state wO(t) in a central
pose. In Fig. 4.8 is shown the incremental generation of a facial mimicry, starting
from the basic shape wi, applying the observer’s shape parameters sO, and adding the
observed motor ones m(t). The latter is projected into the image space and based on
the projected mesh, a piecewise affine transformation is applied to the observer’s face
(Dornaika and Davoine, 2008).
Figure 4.7: Examples of facial mimicry. The top row shows the motor state-space dynamics
wO(t) (Candide-3 model). Bottom row shows the corresponding image morphing and iCub
simulator evolution.
Figure 4.8: The main steps of a facial mimicry process: starting from the basic shape, applying
the observer’s shape parameters, adding the action component and finally realise an image
warping of the observer’s neutral face image.
As to the iCub Simulator, facial regions are modelled as subsystems handling pre-
cise face parts, named ports, corresponding to simulated LEDs. In particular, four
subsystems are conceived: left eyebrow, right eyebrow, mouth and eyelids. For each
of them an hexadecimal number defines the related port activation. Facial mimicry is
obtained by converting AUs to these subsystem handles.
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As to physiological sampling, by inverting the wavelet transform we reconstruct a
chunk of the physiological responses of length equal to that given as model input. In
this work we do not focus on the actual usage of such signals, so we simply plot their
dynamics, but they could potentially be used to simulate the autonomic behaviour of a
virtual agent or bio-inspired robot, as it happens in the ‘sweating humanoid’ Kengoro
(Kozuki et al., 2016).
Modelling assumptions
In our model, we rely on the Markov assumption for the underlying stochastic pro-
cesses and a discrete time approximation of their continuous dynamics. The Markov
assumption is a subtle issue. Quoting (Van Kampen, 1992), “When a physicist talks
about a process, he normally refers to a certain phenomenon involving time. Concern-
ing a process defined in this way it is meaningless to ask whether or not it is Markovian
unless one specifies the variables to be used for its description. The art of the physi-
cist is to find those variables that are needed to make the description (approximately)
Markovian.” More precisely, in our case we rely on the markovianity of the hidden
variables governing the core affect dynamics. Beyond the scope of limiting the com-
plexity of the model while dealing with nice mathematical properties, this choice has
been proven to be a reasonable representation of the process when modelling empirical
data. As remarkably shown by Kuppens et al. (2010), observable V/A trajectories from
a single subject can indeed be modelled via an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU, Uhlenbeck
and Ornstein (1930a)) state-space markovian diffusion process. Though, we will not
address this issue here, nothing prevents from extending the model, with a reasonable
effort even at the implementation level, in order to account for the dynamics of the
observable variables (physiological signals and the visible facial expression sequence)
in terms of higher order autoregressive dynamics; one recent example is provided by
Mattos et al. (2017).
As to discretisation, this certainly rise from the fact that, practically, we are dealing
with sampled signals (video frames, physiological time series). However it is important
to note that the discrete representation of the stochastic differential equations modelling
the stochastic process evolution has a deeper connection to the proper integration of
such equations. More formally (but see Mahnke et al. (2009)), given a stochastic pro-
cess X = {Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} under the assumption that it is a Markov process with an
infinitesimal generator, then its dynamics is specified in the form of the Itô SDE
dX(t) = f(X(t), t)dt+D(X(t), t)dW (t)
Such compact form should be more correctly interpreted in integral form as
X(t)−X(t0) =
∫ t
t0
f(X(τ), τ)dτ +
∫ t
t0
D(X(τ), τ)dW (τ)
Note that, whilst the first integral is a conventional Riemann integral or a Riemann-
Stieltjes integral if the function f(X(τ), τ) contains steps, the second integral is a
stochastic Stieltjes integral of the type
∫ t
t0
G(τ)dW (τ) whose evaluation requires some
caution. To such end, the integral is partitioned into n time subintervals, which are sep-
arated by the points ti with t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 · · · ≤ tn−1 ≤ t, and intermediate points τi are
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defined within each of the subintervals ti−1 ≤ τi ≤ ti and crucially the value of the inte-
gral depends on the position chosen for ti within the subintervals. Semimartingales and
in particular local martingales, are the most common stochastic processes that allow
for straightforward application of Itô’s formulation to stochastic calculus. Itô chooses
τi = ti−1 and this leads to
∫ t
t0
G(τ)dW (τ) = limn→∞
∑n
i=1 G(ti−1)(W (ti)−W (ti−1)),
where the limit is a mean square limit (the standard limit in Hilbert space theory). In
the Itô approach, the starting point is the general Itô difference equation
∆X(t) = f(X(t), t)∆t+D(X(t), t)∆W (t)
where ∆t and ∆W (t) are the time interval and the random increment, respectively.
Then, equal time intervals are chosen to have tk = k∆t + t0, with Xk = X(tk),
∆Xk−1 = Xk − Xk−1, ∆Wk−1 = Wk −Wk−1 for the integration to find the general
solution (Euler-Maruyama representation)
Xn = X0 +
n−1∑
k=0
f(Xk, tk)∆t+
n−1∑
k=0
D(Xk, tk)∆W (t)
in the limit n → ∞. In this sense the Euler-Maruyama approximation is not only a
discrete time form of the continuous SDE, but a proper representation of its correct
integral formulation. More practically, the choice of ∆t in our case is basically dictated
by the video frame sampling rate of the visible facial expression. The situation is quite
more cumbersome in the case of physiological signals where a suitable “window of
observation” must be chosen and synchronised with the video rate, and it may not
coincide with the physiological signal sampling rate (which, in turn, is independent
of the video sampling rate). These issues will be discussed more specifically in the
experimental Section 5.2.
Summary
In the current chapter we presented a computational model involved during a face-to-
face interaction, shared between an hypothetical expresser (E) and an observer (O).
The description, mainly focused on the state of the observer agent, went through the
definition of a series of random variables (RV) responsible of the perception and gen-
eration of facial expressions. This task has been first tackled in terms of Probabilistic
Graphical Model (PGM) and then directly derived in a possible implementation. The
latter is composed by different modules which are the results of so many implementa-
tion choices that are instrumental in our experiments, while not affecting the generality
of the model. All the considered parts will be be put together in Chapter 5 where two
sets of experiments will test their effectiveness.
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Experiments
THE focus of the experiments presented in this chapter is on assessing the hypoth-esis that the simulation-based mechanism together with the extra autonomic ac-tivity information available during learning can improve the analysis of facial
expressions when only visual information is available. The experiments will also eval-
uate the goodness of the implementation choices, by addressing the task of signal gen-
eration after an affective interaction (a sort of mother and child interaction) that realises
the learning stage. To sum up, two sets of experiments are taken into account:
1. the generation of both physiological signals and visible cues given a learnt core
affect state space;
2. the inference of valence/arousal in an observer, on the basis of his autonomic
activity information and the visual cues of an expresser.
Datasets
As outlined in Chapter 2, early research in affective computing was mostly focused on
facial expression recognition and, by and large, datasets were built on a single modality,
namely images or videos (Calvo and D’Mello, 2010; Sariyanidi et al., 2015). To truly
capture the multidimensionality of emotion, in the last fifteen years the number of pub-
lic repositories has grown larger, where behavioural data gathered in realistic and natu-
ral setting experiments have been recorded by multiple modalities (Picard et al., 2001;
Calvo and D’Mello, 2010; Nicolaou et al., 2011; Gunes and Schuller, 2013; D’Mello
and Kory, 2015; Poria et al., 2017).
To cope with the requirements introduced by the proposed model, the experiments
have been conducted referring to two public available datasets, namely RECOLA (Ringeval
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et al., 2013) and AMHUSE (Boccignone et al., 2017). In both these datasets, emotions
have been considered in terms of continuous time and continuous valued dimensional
affect, namely arousal and valence. Nowadays, indeed, research interest is moving
more and more towards a continuous emotional space (Fontaine et al., 2007) and the
measure of emotion is often shaped in terms of these two parameters, already intro-
duced in Section 2.4.2.
The Audio Visual Emotion Recognition Challenge (AVEC (Ringeval et al., 2015b))
has been proposed, focusing on affect analysis as a regression problem. The RECOLA
database, deployed for this challenge (Ringeval et al., 2013), addresses multimodal
data recordings in the context of spontaneous collaborative and affective interactions in
French. Participants were recorded in dyads during a video conference while complet-
ing a task requiring collaboration. The dataset includes multimodal data, i.e., audio,
video, ECG and EDA as well as the result of continous annotations performed by 6
French-speaking raters (3 males and 3 females). The two affective dimensions (arousal
and valence) were annotated separately and time-continuously, using a slider with val-
ues ranging from -1 to +1 and a step of 0.01. Results from the raw data show that the
internal consistency between annotators, measured in terms of Cronbach’s α (Cron-
bach, 1951), is acceptable for valence (α = 0.74) and good for arousal (α = 0.80).
In the same vein, we created the multimodal dataset AMHUSE (Boccignone et al.,
2017), conceived following such research trend, but focusing on the positive emotion of
amusement. AMHUSE dataset involved 36 subjects in order to record the reactions in
presence of 3 amusing and 1 neutral video stimuli. The participants were 9 females and
27 males, with an age varying from 18 to 54 years old (µ = 26.7 and σ = 8.8). Gath-
ered data include RGB video and depth sequences along with physiological responses:
electrodermal activity, blood volume pulse, temperature (cfr. Fig. 5.1). We also cope
with the labelling problem, by proposing and exploiting DANTE (Dimensional AN-
notation Tool for Emotions) to produce video annotations continuously and not on a
frame-by-frame basis. The goal was to provide a suitable tool for continuous affect
state modelling and benchmarking. The recorded videos were, therefore, annotated by
a team of four annotators (3 males and 1 female) in terms of valence and arousal con-
tinuous dimensions. The frequency of annotations is 25 Hz with values ranging from
-1 to 1 and a step of 0.001. Multiple analyses were performed on the annotations to as-
sess the agreement between annotators. Namely, the Cronbach’s α, the mean Pearson’s
correlation coefficient and the Concordance Correlation Coefficient (CCC) (Lawrence
and Lin, 1989). Results indicate a good inter-rater reliability for the valence, whilst, as
expected, a poorer value for arousal is observed. Indeed, it is well known that the level
of arousal is more difficult to distinguish than valence, resulting in a lower agreement
between the annotators. In particular, the valence’s value of Cronbach’s α is 0.84 and
falls in the range 0.8 ≤ α < 0.9, which is to be considered a good internal consistency,
while is equal to 0.33 for the arousal. The mean correlation coefficient, instead, is equal
to 0.31 for arousal and 0.74 for valence. The CCC reflects such trend, giving 0.09 for
the arousal and 0.51 for the valence. Both the dataset and the annotation tool are made
publicly available for research purposes.
Note that even if the context of this last dataset does not include the interaction
with other humans/agents, the data are still suitable for the experiments. Indeed, the
simulated interaction experiments as described later in Section 5.3 is done always fo-
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5.1. Datasets
cusing on the visual perception of a single side of the interaction. The generation of
an hypothetical ‘external response’, in fact, would require the modelling of the interac-
tion between high level cognitive and affective processes (precisely, Adolphs (2002b)’s
stage 3) that are out of the scope of this work.
However, since we are mostly dealing with a low level stage of perception emotion
understanding, we assume that such “inner kernel” of affect perception, mostly devel-
oped in early dyadic interaction (e.g., mother and infant interaction) is later adapted
and exploited to ground perception of emotions along triadic interactions (the observer
watching the expresser who, in turn, reacts to the perception of a third event).
Figure 5.1: Experimental setup (Left) and placement detail of the physiological sensors used
during the acquisition process of AMHUSE dataset (Right).
In Tables 5.1-5.2 a brief comparison of the considered dataset is reported. In par-
ticular, there are shown the corresponding subject cardinality, the recorded signals, the
extracted visual features as well as the provided emotional annotations.
Table 5.1: Recorded signals in each dataset. In brackets the number of complete data. ECG =
electrocardiogram, BVP = blood volume pulse, EDA = electrodermal activity, SKT = skin
temperature.
Dataset Subjects Audio RGB Depth ECG BVP EDA SKT
RECOLA 46(18) 3 3 - 3 - 3 -
AMHUSE 36 - 3 3 - 3 3 3
Table 5.2: (Left) Extracted visual features provided in each dataset. FP = Fiducial Points, Pose
= Head pose, AU = Action Units. (Right) Emotional annotations provided in each corpus. S
= Self report, E = External. In brackets the number of external annotators. C = Continuous,
VA = Valence, Arousal.
Dataset FP Pose AU
RECOLA - 3 3
AMHUSE 3 - 3
Annotator Type Emotion space
E(6) + S C VA + 5 tags
E(4) + S C VA
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Figure 5.2: Visualisation of the considered sampling windows for the electrodermal and elec-
trocardiogram data present in RECOLA dataset, as well as for continuous emotional anno-
tations.
Physiological signal processing
The physiological signals considered in the model vary according to the availability in
the dataset adopted in each experiment. The widest considered subset of such signals
u(j)(t) includes: electrodermal activity (EDA), the skin temperature and the heart rate
variability (HRV) derived from the ECG.
The processing of these signals starts with a step that aims at carving out additional
properties from raw data and suppressing the unwanted aspects (e.g. noise, external
trends, artefacts). Since these kind of signals are dynamic and exhibit time-varying
statistics in both the time and frequency domains, in all experiments we extract the fea-
tures r(j)(t) (Eq. 4.35) using discrete wavelet transform (DWT). This approach allows
for the analysis of non-stationary signals at multiple scales making use of an analysis
window to extract signal segments. The length of such moving windows strictly de-
pends on the nature of the signal and its fluctuations in the time domain, in order to
permit the extraction of a discriminative behaviour. As pointed by Levenson (1988);
Ringeval et al. (2015a), it does not exist yet in literature a prominent theory regarding
the best length of temporal window to choose for a specific signal and emotion. The
length of the analysis window can vary greatly according to the modality, and specif-
ically for the ones activated by the autonomic nervous system it should be noted that
they may remain activated for long time.
In Fig. 5.2 it is shown an example of the considered window for the EDA and ECG
data of the RECOLA dataset. It worth notice that the 50% overlap between windows
is commonly used to increase the number of windows and to mitigate the "loss" at the
edges of the window, which can provide a more accurate estimate of the fluctuation
function especially for the long-time-scale windows.
After pre-processing stage, including signal segmentation, we select empirically
a suitable level of Daubechies 3 (db3), namely the last level for which at least one
coefficient is correct, following
(Nw − 1) ∗ 2L < N
where Nw is the length of the decomposition filter associated with the chosen mother
wavelet, L is the chosen level and N is the signal length. The constraint above results
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Figure 5.3: The Daubechies 3 (Nw = 6) wavelet decomposition of a de-noised temperature
signal chunk (N = 160) from AMHUSE dataset. In this case Lmax = 5 and the considered
features r(j)(t) become cALmax .
in
Lmax = log2(N/(Nw − 1))
and, after extracting the coefficients, we retain only the approximate ones as feature
vector for the physiological data, such that r(j)(t) = cALmax (cfr. Fig. 5.3).
Electrodermal activity (EDA)
The electrodermal activity is a measure of the electrical skin resistance in presence
of sweat produced by the body. More precisely, when a high condition of sweating
occurs, the electrical skin resistance drops down. A dryer skin produces essentially
higher resistance. Emotions with a prominent presence of positive or negative arousal,
such as excitement, stress or fear can induce fluctuations of skin conductivity (Lang
et al., 1993; Nakasone et al., 2005). A typical signal of this nature presents two main
additive components: a slowly changing tonic part, referred as skin conductance level
(SCL) and a phasic skin conductance response (SCR) characterized by rapidly chang-
ing peaks associated with short-term stimulus. In order to quantify the SCR amplitude,
a decomposition process over the original EDA signal is needed. The adopted approach
relies on the assumption that SCRs are caused by discrete episodes of sudomotor bursts
that can be approximated by an appropriate impulse response function (IRF). In par-
ticular, its dynamic can be modelled by a two-compartment diffusion model, namely
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Figure 5.4: Visualisation of the Ledalab software used to preprocess the electrodermal signal
and to apply the Continuous Decomposition Analysis (CDA) for phasic skin conductance
extraction.
the ‘poral valve model’ (Edelberg, 1993) where the sweat is released to the first com-
partment (sweat duct), floats to the second compartment (corneum) and is eliminated
by evaporation from this. The Bateman bi-exponential function proposed by Alexander
et al. (2005) well describes the diffusion process, and is defined as:
b(t) = c
(
e
−t
τ1 − e−tτ2
)
, (5.1)
where τ1 measures the steepness of rise and τ2 its decay, while c is a constant term
for the gain. The deconvolution of original EDA signal with the IRF above permits
to extract the SCR components. A straightforward implementation of this process is
provided by Ledalab, shown in Figure 5.4, a specific software for the analysis of skin
conductance data. The implementation of this feature, in particular, relies on the work
introduced by Benedek and Kaernbach (2010) and known as Continuous Decompo-
sition Analysis (CDA). This is preceded by a classical signal preprocessing for noise
reduction, including a low-pass Butterworth filter and an adaptive Gaussian smoothing,
as well as an optimization step to evaluate the parameter values (τ1,2) that depend on
inter-individual differences in skin characteristics.
Skin temperature (SKT)
Skin temperature, present only in the AMHUSE dataset, is acquired via a body tem-
perature sensor placed on the little finger of the non-dominant hand, and recorded in
terms of degrees in Celsius scale (◦C). Although the studies in this regard are not
so many, it is proven that body temperature changes according to different emotional
states. Plutchik (1956) reports that “embarrassment, resentment, conflict, depression,
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anxiety, guilt, and “sudden elation” were all associated with drops of finger tempera-
ture ; erotic excitement without conflict, reassurance, and relaxation were associated
with rises of skin temperature”. Variations in the skin temperature are the main effects
of the changes in blood flow caused by ‘vascular resistance’. This is the resistance
that must be overcome to push blood through the circulatory system and create blood
flow. This is modulated by the effect of contraction of the muscles mediated by the
sympathetic nervous system. Thus, it is evident that the skin temperature variation di-
rectly reflects autonomic nervous system activity and is another effective indicator of
emotional status.
Electrocardiography (ECG)
Electrocardiography is the process of recording electrical activity of the heart, typically
involving electrodes displaced on the skin. Its tracing consists of a sequence of well
known patterns, including a P wave (atrial depolarization), a QRS complex (ventricular
depolarization) and a T wave (ventricular repolarization), the main components of a
single cardiac cycle, namely an heartbeat. The time distance between two successive R
peaks is referred as RR Interval (RRI). This feature, and in particular the observation
of the trend in the number of R peaks, represents the basis of most of the analysis
carried out on the electrocardiogram signal. Indeed, the amount of complete heartbeats
in a specific time window, referred as heart rate (HR), is closely related to emotional
arousal and linearly depends on the activity of the sympathetic and parasympathetic
nervous systems. Raw ECG tracing, anyway, requires standard preprocessing to filter
out noises and respiration trends. The first ones, as in the case of EDA, are typically
induced by power line interferences in the recording instrumentation, as well as loss of
contact between the electrodes and the skin or motion artefacts. The respiration, on the
other side, introduces a baseline wander in the signal that may causes problems in the
detection of peaks. Such wander are characterised by a low frequency trend, that can
be easily removed adopting an high pass filter or a median filtering. The main steps of
the ECG preprocessing can be, therefore, summarised in three main consecutive steps:
1. de-trend and de-noise the raw ECG signal;
2. detect subsequent RR peaks looking at local maxima;
3. measure the time distance between two consecutive R peaks.
This procedure is summarised in Figure 5.5, where a sample gathered from RECOLA
dataset is being processed. At the end of the aforementioned basic steps, the amplitude
of the sample is computed as the inverse of the time difference between consecutive R
peaks and is placed at the instant of the second R peak.
In the case of AMHUSE dataset, the recorded signal is the result of a blood volume
pulse (BVP) sensor placed on a finger. This is a non invasive mean to obtain an indirect
measure of the heart rate, via the arterial oxygen saturation of hemoglobin. This in-
formation, obtained via photoplethysmography (PPG), consists in sending two lights at
different wavelengths, namely 660nm (red light spectrum) and 940nm (infrared light
spectrum). The first wavelength is absorbed by deoxyhemoglobin (Hb) and the second
by hemoglobin (HbO2), which together affect the blood stream. By considering the
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Figure 5.5: Visualisation of the three main steps adopted for electrocardiographic (ECG) signal
from the RECOLA dataset. It consists of a de-trend and de-noise phase, followed by peaks
detection and calculation of RR distance for heart rate variability (HRV) extraction.
absorption levels it is possible to calculate the heart rate with alternating vasodilata-
tion and vasoconstriction. This signal is strictly correlated with the heart rate measured
via ECG and increases in presence of pleasant stimuli Selvaraj et al. (2008). The value
provided by PPG, indeed, corresponds to the so called “instantaneous heart-rate” (Elec-
trophysiology, 1996), namely the number of times the heart would beat in one minute if
the duration of successive cardiac cycles were constant. Heart rate values are provided
as the number of contractions of the heart per minute (BPM) and directly relates to
the RR distance, by following the basic formula from the textbooks of physiology and
medicine (Braunwald et al., 1998; Hall, 2010): RR[ms] = 60[sec] ∗ 1000/BPM .
Interaction experiments
Both the interaction experiments presented here do require a preliminary learning phase
of the model, one per each involved subject present in the two datasets. This stage,
thinking back to Section 4.2, corresponds to a supervised learning, where the facial
deformations m(t) and autonomic states v(j)(t), observed from a specific agent, are
placed in the down-most layer (h = 1) of a 3-layer deep GP model (cfr. Eqs. 4.24,4.25),
treated as different ‘modalities’. Such modalities share the same latent space while
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keeping private some of its dimensions, resulting at the h = 2 level in the aM(t) and
a
(j)
V (t) state-spaces, respectively. In this setting, the valence/arousal annotations, ob-
tained as the result of the Evaluator Weighted Estimator (Grimm and Kroschel, 2005)
of the multiple annotators, perform the role of control variables c(t) placed as inputs of
the top layer (h = 3). The dimensionality of such architectural setting depends upon
the considered dataset (see Tab. 5.3 for full specification). In case of AMHUSE dataset
it is the following: r(j), p = 14; v(j), k = d = 7; m, Nm = 11; m and v(j) are pre-
processed through a standard PPCA stage (Tipping and Bishop, 1999) so that the input
deep GP layer is partitioned in three subspaces, recurring to a Manifold Relevance De-
termination (Damianou et al., 2012), each having dimensionD = 4; action state-spaces
aM(t) and a
(j)
V (t) have dimension Q
(2) = 2 × 3, mirroring the Q(3) = 2 dimensional
core affect state-space. The latter is chosen akin to Russell’s core affect Russell (1980).
To make the point and have a pictorial idea of all the RVs and latent space involved
in this work, in Figure 5.6 it is shown a visualisation of the principal components and
their relation in a hierarchical manner.
Table 5.3: Dimensionality of the features considered in each state-space of the proposed
model for both the considered datasets: RECOLA with j = {1, 2} and AMHUSE with
j = {1, 2, 3}. Indices j of physiological values correspond to {EDA,HRV, SKT}. First
three rows represent the input/output values for each of the deep GP layers, indexed with h.
c 2 2 h = 3
e 6 6 h = 2
am 4 4 h = 1
a
(j)
V 4 4 4 4 4
m 11 11
v(j) 10 8 7 7 7
w 113 113
r(j) 20 15 14 14 14
y 68 68
u(j) 1000 8000 160 160 160
Dataset RECOLA AMHUSE
Prior to the following experiments, it is worth remarking that each adopted core
affect state space is learnt considering the physiological signals and visible cues of one
subject at a time.
Experiment I
The aim of the first experiment is to assess the generative capability of the system. To
such end, in Figure 5.7 we report the comparison between original multimodal data
and their generation via our system on one subject’s session randomly chosen. The
experiment starts from a known sequence of valence/arousal in the top layer, which is
generatively propagated to the bottom ones. For the sake of comparison, all the gen-
erated chunks of values v(j)(t) and m(t) are brought to their original 1-dimensional
representation and concatenated to each other to recreate the original signal. In the
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Figure 5.6: Visualisation of the model among each of its main components (cfr. Fig. 3.12). Note
that for clarity the r(j)(t) and w(t) are omitted and v(t) state-space shows only 3 of the k
dimensions.
former case, the feature vector r(j)(t) is obtained through Eq. 4.35 and, thanks to the
orthogonal property of the considered wavelet transformation, we are able to generate
back the physiological responses u(j)(t) via inverse discrete wavelet transform (IDWT).
In the latter case, generated facial deformation controls m(t) are simply reshaped ac-
cording to the AU cardinality, Nm = 11, and plotted against time as the corresponding
ground truth.
To give a quantitative evaluation of the system generative capability, we compute the
mean square error (µMSE) and mean Pearson’s correlation coefficient (µr), at the 0.05
significance level, between the ground truth and the predicted sequences for each of the
considered signals, obtained as the result of 10 sampling processes applied to all the
learned models. In Figure 5.7 we show the results obtained with a model learned on the
‘P19’ subject’s data, brought from RECOLA dataset. In particular, for the EDA signal
(Fig. 5.7a) we obtained a µ(1)MSE19 = 0.2462 and a µ
(1)
r19 = 0.8769 (p < 0.001). A similar
result is achieved also for the HRV (Fig. 5.7b), where µ(2)MSE19 = 0.2696 and µ
(2)
r19 =
0.8648 (p < 0.001). In both cases the correlation is statistically significant. Finally,
for the action units activation values (Fig. 5.7c), we obtained µmMSE19 = 1.2438 and
µmr19 = 0.3969 as a result of evaluation over the 11 considered AUs, where AUk, k ={2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 15, 20, 23, 26, 45}. The correlation coefficients were respectively rk =
{0.46, 0.22, 0.23, 0.07, 0.36, 0.41, 0.14, 0.27, 0.46, 0.88, 0.57}. In all cases the p-value
was under significance level (0.05), apart for AU7 and AU15 where p = 0.58, 0.24,
respectively.
A comparison of all the obtained results, considering RECOLA and AMHUSE
datasets, is reported in Table 5.4, where the best and the mean results gathered in both
cases are put in evidence, and the p-value was under significance level (0.05). Fig-
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(a) Reconstructed EDA signal. (b) Chunk of a reconstructed HRV signal.
(c) Reconstructed Action Unit activation values. From top-left to bottom-right: AUk , k =
{2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 15, 20, 23, 26, 45}.
Figure 5.7: Results of Experiment I. Generation of a session of physiological signals u(j)(t)
(a), (b) and facial actions m(t) (c) (red) compared to the ground truth (dashed blue). In
shaded light blue the 95% prediction confidence interval.
ure 5.8, instead, shows how the data nature impacts the obtained results. This could
happen because of the presence of noisy or corrupted data in a specific session, or even
a biased emotional annotation made by the annotators. This phenomenon can be miti-
gated by working on two fronts: the adoption of a larger dataset both intra- and inter-
subject (remember that each model is learnt relying solely on the data of one subject
at a time); and by the involvement of physiological experts. These could be engaged
to annotate the physiological data in terms of continuous emotional values, instead of
relying on the shown facial expression only.
Experiment II
The goal here is to evaluate the aptness of the multimodal simulation-based mechanism
to provide the observer a core affect dynamics, which mirrors that of novel expressers.
In this case, the observer can only rely on the visual information displayed by the
expresser, whilst autonomic activity is at this point “innate”, i.e. learnt previously from
an expresser different from the new ones.
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Table 5.4: Results of Experiment I, in terms of mean square error (mse) and Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient (cc). It shows the mean (µ), the standard deviation (σ), the minimum and
the maximum values for each of the considered physiological signal and both the adopted
datasets. In bold the best results achieved in each trial.
µ σ min max µ σ min max
EDA
mse 1.36 0.73 0.25 2.52 1.19 0.36 0.52 1.62
cc 0.32 0.36 -0.26 0.88 0.40 0.18 0.19 0.74
HRV
mse 0.66 0.20 0.27 0.90 0.71 0.72 0.05 2.35
cc 0.67 0.10 0.55 0.86 0.64 0.36 -0.17 0.97
SKT
mse - - - - 1.14 0.54 0.30 1.95
cc - - - - 0.43 0.27 0.02 0.85
RECOLA AMHUSE
This second experiment has been conducted adopting a one vs. all comparison. At
learning stage, a model for each subject of the considered datasets is learnt. At testing
stage, one learnt model is referred to as observer, while all the others are exploited as
expressers interacting with the chosen observer. The interaction process is driven on
the expresser’s side by random sampling of core affect trajectories (Gaussian random
walk with drift) from which via top-down forward sampling, visible and physiological
cues are generated. As in every face-to-face interaction in the real world, the observer
can only rely upon expresser’s visible cues inferred from the facial expression. Along
the interaction, observer’s affective dynamics unfolds as described in Algorithm 1.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the different visible and hidden cues in deter-
mining an observer core affect state (that is predictive of that of the expresser), four (or
five) different settings were adopted. In particular, we simulated the prediction process
by relying:
1. only on the observer’s somatomotor route (SM),
2. combining SM and the electrodermal route (VMEDA)
3. combining SM and heart-rate route (VMHRV),
4. considering SM and all available visceromotor routes VM(j),
and, only in case of the AMHUSE dataset, also
5. combining SM and the skin temperature route (VMSKT).
The results, shown in Figure 5.9, provide evidence of the importance of physiolog-
ical internal cues in the prediction of other’s internal core affect state. In particular,
for the RECOLA dataset (cfr. Fig. 5.9a) it is shown that for arousal, the root mean
square error (RMSE) value between expresser’s and observer’s trajectories improves
from 0.987 of the first setting to 0.73 of the last one. A similar behaviour can be no-
ticed also for the valence, from 1.276 for the first setting to 0.987 for the “complete”
setting. Adopting the AMHUSE dataset (cfr. Fig. 5.9b) the trend is confirmed, in par-
ticular it can be noticed how the adoption of the somatomotor-only route (SM) results
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(a) Physiological data reconstruction from RECOLA
dataset.
(b) Physiological data reconstruction from AMHUSE
dataset.
(c) Somatomotor data reconstruction from RECOLA
dataset.
(d) Somatomotor data reconstruction from AMHUSE
dataset.
Figure 5.8: Results of Experiment I. Distribution of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients (CC)
between the ground truth and the predicted value over each of the considered signals and
learned models. The CC value is represented as a coloured square, going from blue (low
correlation) to yellow (high correlation). On the x-axis of 5.8a and 5.8b are reported the
index of the learned models for both the datasets, while on the y-axis the considered physio-
logical data. On the x-axis of 5.8c and 5.8d are reported the considered Action Units (AU)
of the somatomotor state-space, while on the left y-axis the index of the learned models for
both the datasets. The white line (right y-axis) corresponds to the mean CC value for each
AU over all the learned models. This visualization highlights the variety and the dependence
from the data on the goodness of the results.
in a better value for the valence, rather than for the arousal. This result confirms the
importance of the facial expression in the valence emotional dimension. A result that
appears mitigated in the RECOLA dataset, because of the acquisition setting and the
subject’s pose which disadvantages the face recording.
Discussion
The experiments presented above have a twofold value: assess the adequacy of the
adopted implementation choices and evaluate, from an observer’s side, the contribution
of his internal autonomic information during a simulation-based mechanism.
The first point can be appraised relying on the Experiment I that, despite the good
results in the reconstruction process highlighted in Table 5.4, also shows the fragmen-
tation of its behaviour along the different learned models (cfr. Fig. 5.8). We should
recall, indeed, that each considered model shares the same architectural choices (cfr.
Tab. 5.3) and is trained over a single subject’s set of samples. The presence of noisy
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(a) RECOLA dataset.
SM SM-VMEDA SM-VMSKT SM-VMHRV All
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(b) AMHUSE dataset.
Figure 5.9: Results of Experiment II. Namely the root mean square error (RMSE) between the
expresser’s emotional value and the observer’s inference, for each of the considered set-
tings: only somatomotor route (SM), somatomotor and electrodermal routes (SM-VMEDA),
somatomotor and heart-rate routes (SM-VMHRV) and all somato- and viscero- motor routes.
Only for the AMHUSE dataset is present also the combination of somatomotor and skin tem-
perature routes (SM-VMSKT). The dashed line represents the mean RMSE of the combined
prediction (valence/arousal).
or corrupted data in such samples directly affects the model’s expressiveness and con-
sequently the results. Moreover, it should be noticed that the considered emotional
annotations provided as constraint in the top layer are the result of a manual annotation
done relying solely on the shown facial expression. This leaves some problems open.
When analysing the continuous dimensions of emotion, there is the necessity of con-
tinuous annotations, but as summarized in Sariyanidi et al. (2015): “Labelling data is
a challenging and laborious task, particularly for spontaneously displayed expressions
and emotions.” Moreover, combining multiple annotations is even harder (Metallinou
and Narayanan, 2013). In this respect, we tried to mitigate this problem developing
DANTE (Boccignone et al., 2017) that is friendly and intuitive and allow the user to
seamlessly annotate valence and arousal separately, during the video reproduction of
the subject’s recorded behaviour. Anyway this solution does not face the issue of the
annotation of non visible cues. The involvement of physiological experts, in fact, could
comprise the annotation of autonomic data in terms of continuous emotional values,
only looking at the recorded physiological traces and identifying behavioural patterns.
The second experiment confirms the proposed hypothesis, or rather the importance
98
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 99 — #119 i
i
i
i
i
i
5.4. Discussion
of physiological internal cues in the prediction of other’s internal core affect state. In
general, in Figure 5.9 it is shown how the involvement of all the observer’s somato- and
viscero- motor routes results in a lower RMSE of the inferred emotional couple state
(valence/arousal). Interestingly enough, looking at the detail of the single emotional
components of Figure 5.9b it can be noticed that, as expected, the setting that contem-
plates only the somatomotor route outperforms all the other evaluations of the valence
dimension, while presents a symmetric behaviour for the arousal. This result appears
weaker on the RECOLA dataset (Fig. 5.9a), where the dataset acquisition setting and
the pose assumed by the participants strongly affect the face visibility in the recorded
videos (cfr. Fig. 4.6).
As a final remark, we have adopted some implementation choices that are instru-
mental in our experiments, while not affecting the generality of the model. For instance
we have exploited the Candide-3D model Ahlberg (2010) to support the internal motor
state-space dynamics. Though developed for the purpose of model-based image coding
and facial animation, it exhibits many appealing features (such as the straightforward
representation of SUs and AUs). There are of course limitations, mostly due to a lack
of exact correspondence between the Action Units set used by the detector and the
ones considered in the Candide model. For example, AU12 (Lip Corner Puller) is not
accounted for by our Candide implementation, thus it is never activated for any expres-
sion. Interestingly enough, associated AUs can be activated as surrogates, for instance
AU14 (Dimpler, that forms in the cheeks when one smiles) in place of AU12. This effect
can be easily noticed for the “happy” expression.
In this concern, there are viable possibilities such as replacing Candide with detailed
3D facial muscle models Eskil and Benli (2014). The latter option could be somehow
mandatory, when precise and realistic visible mimicry is requested. Nevertheless, albeit
some simulationist approaches claim it as a necessary condition Goldman and Sripada
(2005), others retain internal, or as if simulation a more plausible mechanism Goldman
and Sripada (2005); Adolphs (2002b); Damasio (1999).
Summary
In this chapter we effectively realised the implementation choices described in Chap-
ter 4. This went through a first presentation of the considered datasets, highlighting
the main components for each of them. It followed with a description of the essential
steps adopted during the signal preprocessing phase, distinguishing between the pecu-
liar characteristics of each signal. In the last sections two experiments were presented
covering both the potentials of the model: inference and generation, along with a brief
discussion of the obtained results.
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CHAPTER6
Theoretical implications
IN this chapter we discuss the proposed model by elaborating on some key theoreticalaspects, and outline some connections with current research.For what concerns the theoretical model, we further expand on the view of the
theoretical model as a structured ensemble of stochastic processes.
As to implementation model, we discuss how, coping with the difficult inference
problems - arising from the complex entanglement of the processes involved -, brings
about the predictive coding account, under suitable optimisation choices (Variational
Bayes optimisation on the free energy of the system),
Predictive coding has a long history, originating with the insights of Von Helmholtz
(1867) and reaching recent prominence in the “Bayesian brain” hypothesis (Knill and
Pouget, 2004). The idea is that, in order to support adaptive responses, the brain must
discover information about the likely causes of sensory signals (in our case either due
to external and internal perception) without direct access to these causes, using only
information in the flux of sensory signals themselves. According to predictive coding,
this is accomplished via probabilistic inference on the causes of sensory signals, com-
puted according to Bayesian principles. Estimating the probable causes of data (the
posterior) given observed conditional probabilities (likelihoods) and prior beliefs about
probable causes entails, a predictive or generative model of the sensory data.
The generalisation to a hierarchical context implies that posteriors at one level form
the priors at one level lower, thus enabling priors to be induced from the data stream
itself (empirical Bayes).
Such discussion paves the way, together with the multilevel analysis framework, for
a comprehensive comparison of the proposal we have put forward in this dissertation
to other works addressing the computational modelling of affect.
101
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 102 — #122 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 6. Theoretical implications
The theoretical model as an entanglement of stochastic processes
Our basic assumption, Assumption 0 in Chapter 3, posits that the core affect dynamics
results from a complex, open system, and is therefore subject to stochastic variabil-
ity resulting from the many internal and external events that influence core affect. In
particular, Assumption 5 introduced the idea that a dynamic input-state-output model
could account for such dynamics.
Subsequent assumptions, aimed at identifying the interacting systems as those state-
spaces involved by the somatomotor and visceromotor routes; the theoretical model in-
troduced in Chapter 4 structurally shaped such interactions in the form of a Probabilistic
Graphical Model.
Indeed, all state-space denoting variables actually are stochastic processes, even
though, for notational simplicity and presentation convenience, we have treated them
as one realisation of the process. Let us now give a more precise shape to the stochastic
view of the theoretical model and to related implications.
On a measurable state-space (Ω,A,P) the following are given:
• a family of probability measuresM = {Pθ, θ ∈ Θ} depending on a parameter θ,
with density Pθ;
• a pair of stochastic processes X = {Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and Y = {Yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}
taking values in Rx and Ry, respectively.
Suppose X , under Pθ, is a Markov process with an infinitesimal generator, then we
can write the state-space equations of a dynamical stochastic system in the following
form of Itô SDE (to be interpreted as an Ito stochastic integral):
dXt = f(Xt, Ct)dt+D
1/2dWt, (6.1)
dYt = g(Xt, Ct)dt+R
1/2dVt, (6.2)
where W = {Wt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and V = {Vt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} are respectively independent
standard processes (e.g. Wiener), of the same dimension of X and Y respectively.
D,R are diffusion coefficients. The latter could be in general a function of the states,
i.e. D = D(Xt), R = R(Xt)
The variable C also is defined for wider generality as the stochastic processes C =
{Xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, though in specific cases can be deterministic, stochastic, or both.
It represents the system control, which is also variously referred to in the literature as
input, cause or source. This can be shaped in many ways, for example as a function of
both X and Y (e.g. to introduce feedback) or an exogenous input (e.g., the labelling
sequence provided along a supervised learning stage).
Also, we denote f and g the generic (vector or scalar valued) nonlinear, potentially
time-varying functions, i.e. mappings of the kind T × L2(Ω,A,P) 7→ L2(Ω,A, P )
to a (Lebegue square-integrable) Hilbert space L2(Ω,A, P ) with finite second-order
moments.
In fact, Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2 can be easily recognised as diffusion processes, f and g
being their respective drifts (Van Kampen, 2011).
We can think of this processes as the limit of the discrete-time processes
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6.1. The theoretical model as an entanglement of stochastic processes
Xt+∆t −Xt = f(Xt, Ct)∆t+D1/2
√
∆tXt , (6.3)
Yt+∆t − Yt = g(Xt, Ct)∆t+R1/2
√
∆tYt , (6.4)
Equations 6.3 and 6.4 are known as the Euler-Maruyama approximation of Eqs. 6.1
and 6.2.
Assume that Ω is the canonical state-space Γ([0, T ];Rx+y), in which case X and
Y are the canonical processes on Γ([0, T ];Rx) and Γ([0, T ];Ry), respectively, and Pθ
is the probability law of (X, Y ). In such case X is the state process, which is not
directly observed; rather, the information about its evolution is obtained through the
noisy observed process Y .
Then, Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2 define a generalised input-output state-space system (SSM)
where the states Xt mediate the influence of the input on the output and endow the sys-
tem with memory. The state and observation perturbations or fluctuations are provided
by noise terms X , Y , which can be defined via the stochastic integrals Wt =
∫ t
0
Xsds,
Vt =
∫ t
0
Ysds. In the case of W,V being Wiener processes, X , Y represent Gaussian
additive noise, and have the same dimension of X, Y , respectively. If errors are iid
Gaussian random variables, then the specific scaling of the white noise with ∆t gives
rise to the nondifferentiable trajectories of sample paths characteristic for a diffusion
process.
The classic input-output SSM can be recovered from Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2, under the
independence assumption (Yt⊥Yt−1 | Xt):
dXt = f(Xt, Ct)dt+D
1/2dWt, (6.5)
Yt = g(Xt, Ct) +R
1/2Ys , (6.6)
Obviously, considering Eqs. 6.3 and 6.4, under the conditional independence as-
sumption (Yt+∆t⊥Yt | Xt+∆t), then Yt only depends on Xt, Ct and we recover the
discrete time input-output SSM. In such case, the stochastic difference equations (3.1)
and (3.2) can be easily obtained.
Indeed, such stochastic model grounds, at the implementation modelling level, the
components realising the main sub-graphs of the PGM: Eqs. 4.24 and 4.25 used in
the hidden and visible layers of the Deep GP adopted in the implementation model
for instantiating the dynamics of the central affect state-spaces; Eqs. 4.26 and 4.31
governing the somatomotor state-space; eventually, Eqs. 4.34 and 4.35, that we have
adopted for instantiating the visceromotor state-space dynamics.
Equations 6.1 and 6.2 above formalise the generative process: when the dynamics
unfolds, the process Y generates a σ-algebra.
Denote Yt = Y0:t = {Y0, Y1, · · · , Yt} a filtration. We can define then an innovation
process E = {Et, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} or prediction error
Et = Yt −
∫ t
0
Eθ[g(Xs, Cs) | Y0:s, C0:s]ds (6.7)
which will be central when we want to invert the model.
The framework defined via Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2 ensures that the probability measures in
M are mutually absolutely continuous. Then, the connection of the stochastic process
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to the Bayesian setting can be made via the Radon-Nikodym Theorem (Stuart, 2010).
If we let θ0 be the reference set of parameter and write Pθ0 as P0 (prior measure, with
associated prior density P0), the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pθ with respect to P0
provides the complete data likelihood.
dPθ
dP0
=
Pθ(Yt | Ct)
Pθ(Y0:T | C0:T ) (6.8)
Let PYθ denote the restriction of Pθ to the σ algebra generated by process Y , then the
likelihood function for estimating the parameters θ on the basis of a given observation
path Y = {Yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} can be expressed as (Wang and Titterington, 2004)
L(θ | Y0:T ) = E0
[
dPYθ
dP0
| Y0:T , C0:T
]
. (6.9)
where E0 denotes the expectation under P0
This provides the necessary link to the Bayesian view of the dynamic stochastic
process, which is in turn instantiated in terms of a Probabilistic Graphical Model.
But before discussing this point, it is worth remarking that yet is intriguing to look at
the dynamics of the core affect as the dynamics of a stochastic process, which emerges
due to the entanglement, at a deeper level, of stochastic processes occurring in the
somatomotor and visceromotor routes.
Indeed, the study of affect or emotion dynamics entails investigating the patterns
and underlying processes that describe people’s fluctuations and changes in emotion
and its components across time, notwithstanding the fact that most emotion research
has focused on emotion or affect as a state and on identifying its antecedents and con-
sequences (Kuppens et al., 2010)
Oravecz et al. (2011) have developed a specific dynamic system model, namely
a model for temporal fluctuations in the core affect state over time, with individual
differences for the crucial parameters. The core of the model can be described in terms
of two equations. They focus on a particular case of the system described by Eqs. 6.1,
6.2, where state equation (6.1) is assumed to be the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process
(Uhlenbeck and Ornstein, 1930a).
dXt = β(C −Xt)dt+D1/2dWt, (6.10)
Yt = Xt +R
1/2Ys , (6.11)
where β > 0 and control C in the simplest case is assumed to be a constant, i.e.
C = const, or time-varying in the most general case. The instantaneous change in
Xt, that is, dXt, depends on how far the current state Xt is from the point C. This
control parameter is called a steady state or attractor: as a straightforward example in
the one dimensional case, if Xt is below C (i.e., C − Xt < 0), the first derivative is
positive, and consequently Xt will increase; the opposite holds when Xt is above. The
parameter β controls the magnitude of the “attraction” effect: if β is large ( β  1),
the difference between the actual state and C tends to be magnified; therefore a faster
change will occur in the direction ofC; with small β), the change becomes substantially
slower. Based on this property, the parameter is often called the dampening force or
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centralising tendency. The stochastic innovation term dWt incorporates the multiple
smaller and larger impacts that the core affect system undergoes at a given moment.
Interestingly, C acts as a set point that reflects the baseline functioning of the sys-
tem, an affective “home base”, which reflect the affective comfort zone of an individ-
ual, signalling that everything is normal. The attractor keeps the system in balance by
pulling core affect back to its home base, creating an emergent coherence around it. It
is surmised, the attractor strength reflects the regulatory processes that are installed to
keep a person’s core affect in check.
To sum up, these three key processes - affective home base, variability, and attractor
strength -are largely responsible for producing the myriad ways people can display
changes and fluctuations in their core affect throughout daily life (Kuppens et al., 2010).
The model has been empirically evaluated in two extensive experience-sampling
studies on people’s core affective experiences. The findings have shown that it is capa-
ble of adequately capturing the observed dynamics in core affect across both large and
shorter time scales and illuminate how the key processes are related to personality and
emotion dispositions. More precisely it was capable of replicating the shape of individ-
uals’ core affect trajectories, how often they are in particular feeling states across time,
and the dynamical forces that impinge on their feelings when in different feeling states.
In conclusion, the model accounts for individual differences in temporal patterns and
trajectories observed in people’s affective experiences (Kuppens et al., 2010).
The model by Kuppens et al. (2010) constitutes a theoretical model of the core
affect dynamics, under the assumption that such state-space results from a complex,
open system. In this perspective, the model proposed in this dissertation is an attempt
to make a step further in such direction, by grounding core affect dynamics as the result
of an open system interaction with visuomotor and visceromotor state-spaces. In turn,
each state-space within these routes undergoes a stochastic diffusion. Control variables
and outputs account for the information inflow/outflow between subsystems.
Clearly, the higher complexity of our setting calls for an implementation suitable to
support adequate inferential steps, which will be discussed in the following.
A hierarchical predictive view of the implementation model
Inverting the model, from a Bayesian standpoint, boils down to an inferential step.
When we want to make inference that can be either on hidden states or on parameters
θ, or both and relies upon computing the posterior P (X, θ | Y,C), from which P (θ |
Y,C) and P (X | Y,C) can be obtained via marginalisation (hereafter, we drop random
variable indexes from the density P for notational simplicity).
In fact, in the most general case, the joint posterior distribution, can be written
P (Xt, θt | Y0:t, C0:t) = P (Xt | θt, Y0:t, C0:t)P (θt | Y0:t, C0:t)
= P (θt | Xt, Y0:t, C0:t)P (Xt | Y0:t, C0:t) (6.12)
It is easy to show, by using Bayes’ rule under Markovian assumption, that the
Bayesian recursive estimation of P (θt | Y0:t, C0:t) boils down to
P (θt | Y0:t, C0:t) = P (Y0:t | θt, C0:t)P (θt | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1)
P (Yt | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1) , (6.13)
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with parameters prior given by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation
P (θt | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1) =
∫
P (θt | θt−1)P (θt−1 | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1)dθt−1. (6.14)
Substitution in Eq. 6.12 gives:
P (Xt, θt | Y0:t, C0:t) = P (Xt | θt, Y0:t, C0:t)P (θt | Y0:t, C0:t)
= P (Xt | θt, Y0:t, C0:t)P (Y0:t | θt, C0:t)
∫
P (θt | θt−1)P (θt−1 | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1)dθt−1
P (Yt | Y0:t−1, C0:t−1)
(6.15)
It is clear that this kind of problem entails a dual or triple estimation, depending on
whether the hyperparameters related to the distributions are known. In a full Bayesian
analysis is computationally complex because complicated multiple integrations are in-
volved. Involved integrals have no general analytic solution, particularly when the
generative model is nonlinear, thus some algorithmic approximation should be devised.
There are actually two roads that can be pursued: free-form, Monte Carlo based
approximation and variational, deterministic approximations. As to the first option,
Markov chain Monte Carlo for numerical integration helps to side-step this problem,
but it is clearly time-consuming, samples of parameter values are required to be stored
and there are risks to be run as to whether or not convergence has occurred. In en-
gineering and machine learning, free-form densities are usually approximated by the
sample density of a large number of “particles” that populate state-space. In statistics
the problem of Bayesian inference for both the state and parameters, within partially
observed, non-linear diffusion processes has been tackled using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) approaches based on data augmentation, Monte Carlo exact simulation
methods, or Langevin / hybrid Monte Carlo methods (Bishop, 2006a; MacKay, 2004).
Within the signal processing community solutions to the so called Zakai equation based
on particle filters, a variety of extensions to the Kalman filter/smoother and mean field
analysis of the SDE together with moment closure methods have also been proposed
(Archambeau et al., 2008).
More recently, a deterministic approximate approach to the intractable Bayesian
inference problem, the variational Bayesian approximation (VB), has been introduced
(see Beal and Ghahramani, 2003; MacKay, 2004 for an insightful discussion). Rather
than use sampling, the main idea behind variational inference is to use optimisation. In
a nutshell:
1. posit a family of approximate densities, namely a set of densities over the latent
variables (either states and/or parameters); then,
2. try to find the member of that family that minimises the distance to the exact
posterior.
Variational Bayes draws together variational ideas from the analysis of intractable latent
variable models and from Bayesian inference. This framework facilitates analytical cal-
culation of posterior distributions over the hidden variables, parameters and structures.
They are computed via an iterative algorithm, VBEM (Beal and Ghahramani, 2003).
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Variational approximations rely on bound approximation, by adopting approximating
posteriors. Further, if a fixed-form approximation is adopted, this choice allows one
to represent the density in terms of a small number of quantities, namely its sufficient
statistics.
As to the neural, realisation level plausibility (Marr, 1982) of each approach, this is
currently matter of debate.
Sanborn and Chater (2016) argue that sampling provides a natural and scalable im-
plementation of Bayesian models. In this view “Bayesian brains” need not represent
or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so. Instead, the
brain is a Bayesian sampler. Only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler con-
form to the laws of probability; with finite samples it systematically generates classic
probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the
conjunction fallacy. A key insight is that, although explicitly representing and working
with a probability distribution is hard, drawing samples from that distribution is rela-
tively easy. Sampling does not require knowledge of the whole distribution. It can work
merely with a local sense of relative posterior probabilities.
In a different vein, Friston (2008) suggests that free-form approximations and their
related sampling schemes are not really viable in a neuronal context. The dimension-
ality of the representational problems entailed by neuronal computations probably pre-
cludes particle-based (i.e., free-form) representations: face analysis, a paradigmatic ex-
ample in perceptual inference. Faces can be represented in a perceptual space of about
thirty dimensions (i.e., faces have about thirty discriminable attributes). To populate a
thirty-dimensional space we would need at least 230 particles, where each particle could
correspond to the activity of thirty neurons (note that the conditional mean can be en-
coded with a single particle). The brain has about 211 neurons at its disposal (Friston,
2008), hence a fixed-form assumption should be mandatory for the brain.
Indeed, in the implementation model we have opted for deterministic approxima-
tions of the different components that at the most general level can be described by the
variational approximation, which is based on the free energy theorem (cfr. Appendix B
for a detailed derivation).
Consider the joint distribution of all processes we are dealing with P (X0:t, θ0:t, Y0:t, C0:t).
In what follows, to simplify notation, we denote
• Z = {X0:t, θ0:t}: the set of hidden states and parameters;
• O = {I0:t, C0:t}: the set of observable measurements and controls;
Also, the upper case Roman characters such as, e.g., O will be used to denote random
variables (either scalar or vector belonging to O) while the lower case Roman charac-
ters ) will denote a single observation as is common in statistics literature.
The idea in variational Bayes (VB) approximation relies on the introduction of a
(simple) distribution, QZ(z), which is arbitrary (also with respect to the Lebegue mea-
sure), to approximate the complicated conditional distribution PZ|O. In general, the
well-known Kullback-Leibler divergence (see Cover and Thomas, 1991) gives us a suit-
able measure of the discrepancy between QZ and PZ|O. Note that the Kullback-Leibler
divergence is not symmetric, and thus a pseudo metric.
Thus, the goal is to find an approximationQZ ∈ Qwhich minimizes KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
)
.
This is more conveniently achieved by introducing the functional (see Def. B.1, Ap-
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pendix B)
F (QZ) :=
∫
Z
QZ(z) log
PO,Z(o, z)
QZ(z)
dz
= EQZ
[
log
PO,Z(O,Z)
QZ(Z)
]
,
which is called the free energy (MacKay, 2004) in analogy with statistical mechanics.
Then it can be shown that the following fundamental relationship holds
logPO(o) = F (QZ) + KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
)
. (6.16)
It is useful to note that, due to the fact that KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
) ≥ 0 almost everywhere
(a.e.), logPO(o) ≥ F (QZ), and thus eF(QZ) provides a lower bound for the marginal
density of O.
Note that the left hand side does not vary with z; moreover, we are considering an
experiment where we observe o, so the quantity is fixed. It is generally referred to as
the log marginal likelihood or the log evidence. Intuitively, since logPO(o) i does not
vary withQZ, it is clear that the functionals F andKL are inversely related. Therefore,
a minimization of KL amounts to a maximization of F , i.e., it is possible to determine
the optimal approximating distribution Q∗Z as
Q∗Z := arg min
QZ∈Q
KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
)
= arg max
QZ∈Q
F (QZ) , (6.17)
where Q denotes any set of valid probability densities (recall that the choice of QZ(z)
is entirely arbitrary so long as it is a probability density with respect to the Lebesgue
measure). We will refer to Q∗Z as the Q-VB approximation.
Finding Q∗Z ∈ Q when Q is any probability density is in general a difficult task. To
make our analysis more tractable we can impose an independence structure on Z; that
is, we will only consider QZ’s which come from the set
Q :=
{
QZ(z) : QZ(z) =
m∏
i=1
QZi(zi)
}
, (6.18)
where QZi(zi) is the probability density of Zi, the ith element of Z. This is also known
as the mean-field approximation. Sometimes even this task proves difficult and more
restrictions are imposed to make Q even smaller. Such techniques are referred to as
restricted variational Bayes (R-VB) techniques. For example, we could add the addi-
tional requirement that each QZi(zi) is in the exponential family. For the rest of this
discussion, we will take Q∗ as defined in Equation 6.17 for our Q defined in (6.18).
Under the mean-field approximation, the free energy theorem (cfr. Appendix B, for
a detailed proof) grants that the solution that holds for the distribution Q∗Zj - the jth
factor of Q∗Z is:
Q∗Zj(zj) ∝ exp {Uj(Zj)} , (6.19)
with Uj(Zj) = E∏mi=1
i6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)] being the expected internal energy of r.v.
Zj , and where in general Z = {Z1, . . . , Zj−1, zj, Zj+1, . . . , Zm}.
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6.2. A hierarchical predictive view of the implementation model
Taking stock of this result, the VBEM algorithm maximises the free energy F (QZ)
with respect to each factor QZj(zj), j = 1, · · · ,m by iteratively applying Equation
6.19, while holding other factors QZi(zi), i 6= j fixed (Beal and Ghahramani, 2003).
For the case we are discussing, Z = {X0:t, θ0:t}, thus QZ(Z) = QX(X0:t)Qθ(θ0:t).
Then, the VBEM algorithms boils down to iterate:
VB-E (expectation) step hold Q(`)θ (θ0:t) fixed, and infer Q
(`+1)
X (X0:t) via Eq. 6.19;
VB-M (maximisation) step holdQ(`+1)X (X0:t) fixed and inferQ
(`+1)
θ (θ0:t) via Eq. 6.19.
Readers familiar with the Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm by Dempster
et al. (1977) may note the similarity between this iterative algorithm and EM. This
relationship is described in detail in Beal and Ghahramani (2003).
One straightforward example of this procedure is Equation 4.37, related to the
inference in the visceromotor state-space, which is obtained by setting, in that case,
QZ = Q(v
(j)
0:T )Q(Θ
(j)
V ).
A key observation is that the optimisation of the free energy in dynamical systems
involves the optimisation of the prediction error or innovation (Eq. 6.7) entailed by the
optimisation of the expected internal energy Uj(Zj).
One interesting example has been provided by Daunizeau et al. (2009), for the case
of the classic input-output SSM. This as previously mentioned, can be recovered from
Eqs. 6.1 and 6.2, under the independence assumption (Yt⊥Yt−1 | Xt), rewritten more
compactly, with some abuse of notation:
X˙t = f(Xt, Ct) + Xt , (6.20)
Yt = g(Xt, Ct) + Yt , (6.21)
where the dot notation stands for the time derivative d/dt.
In this case, under Gaussian assumptions on the state and observation noises and un-
der the Euler-Maruyama discretisation scheme (Eqs. 6.3, 6.4), the discrete-time variant
of the state-space model, by setting unitary time step ∆t = 1 yields the Gaussian like-
lihood and transition densities
Xt+1 ∼ PX(Xt+1 | Xt, Ct, θX) = N (f(Xt, Ct), D−1), (6.22)
Yt ∼ PY (Yt | Xt, Ct, θY ) = N (g(Xt, Ct), R−1) (6.23)
When the free energy F is derived (see Kilner et al., 2007; Friston, 2008), it can be
shown that at its heart F optimisation relies on computing prediction errors on hidden
states dynamics X˙t, observations Yt and parameters θX , θY .
To sum up, and coming back to the general case of Equation 6.15, inference on the
joint posterior P (Xt, θt | Y0:t, C0:t), can be decomposed as the optimisation of the first
term with respect to X and the second with respect to Θ, which in turn involves optimi-
sation with respect to prediction errors either for hidden state inference and parameter
learning.
This is consistent with the idea that (Candy, 2016) in the general case of joint state/-
parameter inference, the joint sequential optimisation of Eq. 6.15 can be seen as made
of two distinct yet coupled processes: a parameter estimator and a state estimator. The
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parameter estimator provides estimates that are corrected by the corresponding predic-
tion error during each recursion. These estimates are then provided to the state estima-
tor in order to update the model parameters used in the estimator. After both state and
parameter estimates are calculated, a new measurement is processed and the procedure
continues1. The joint optimisation process can thus be represented as the dual process
outlined in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Simplified structure illustrating the coupling between parameter and state estima-
tion processes through the innovation and measurement sequences
Further, it has been shown that it is possible to generalise the input-output SSM
(Eqs., 6.20, 6.21) into a hierarchical form spanning on l = 1, · · · , L levels:
C˙
(L)
t = g(C
(L+1)
t ) + 
(L+1)
Ct
,
...
X˙
(l)
t = f(X
(l)
t , C
(l)
t ) + 
(l)
Xt
,
C˙
(l−1)
t = g(X
(l)
t , C
(l)
t ) + 
(l)
Ct
,
...
X˙
(1)
t = f(X
(1)
t , C
(1)
t ) + 
(1)
Xt
,
Y˙t = g(Xt, Ct) + Yt (6.24)
Note that in the hierarchical form the controls C(L)t , C
(L−1)
t , · · ·C(1)t are used to link
levels: C˙(l)t constrains as a top-down signal either C˙
(l−1)
t X˙
(l−1)
t ; at the same time C˙
(l−1)
t
accounts for the emission of X˙(l−1)t . The hidden states X
(L)
t , X
(L−1)
t , · · ·X(1)t provide
the necessary dynamics over time. This is in particular true when we assume time con-
ditional independencies between controls, i.e., (C(l)t ⊥C(l)t−1), and between observations,
(Yt⊥Yt−1 | Xt)
The conditional independence of the fluctuations at different hierarchical levels
means that the hierarchy has a Markov property over levels. Thus in probabilistic terms
1this dual process system can be considered to be a form of identifier, since system identification is typically
concerned with the estimation of a model and its associated parameters from noisy measurement data (Candy, 2016)
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we can write
Pθ(X˙t, C˙t) = Pθ(L)(C˙
(L)
t )
L−1∏
l=1
Pθ(l)(X˙
(l)
t , | C˙(l)t )Pθ(l)(C˙(l)t | X˙(l+1)t , C˙(l+1)t ) (6.25)
where the prior on controls PθL(C˙L) is restricted to the uppermost level L.
This provides substance to our opening surmise (cfr. Chapter 3) that the layers of
the dynamic input-state-output models organised as in Figure 3.12, can be seen as form
of hierarchical predictive coding (Wolpert et al., 2003).
Indeed, it has been suggested (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2008; Daunizeau
et al., 2009) that predictive coding may capture a general principle of cortical functional
organization. It fluently explains a broad range of evidence (though a key prediction,
that of distinct “state” and ”error” neurons in different cortical laminae, remains to be
established) and has attractive computational properties. For instance, the generalisa-
tions of forward/inverse models in motor control to imitation and social interactions
that have been put forward (Wolpert et al., 2003) are formally distinct from and more
complicated than predictive coding. In predictive coding there is no separate inverse
model or controller. A forward model is simply inverted by suppressing the prediction
error generated by the forward model.
The precision of prediction error signals plays a key role in these models on the
grounds that hierarchical models of perception require optimisation of the relative pre-
cision of top-down predictions and bottom-up evidence (Friston and Stephan, 2007;
Friston, 2008; Daunizeau et al., 2009).
Taking stock of the above discussion, the model we have presented in this Thesis -
namely the theoretical level together with the implementation level -, can be viewed in
the perspective of a hierarchical predictive scheme, as outlined in Figure 6.2
Figure 6.2: A hierarchical predictive view of the model
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Within this scheme the most likely cause (core affect state) of an observed affective
facial action can be inferred by minimising the prediction error at all levels of the hi-
erarchy that are engaged during action observation. This jointly entails the processes
involved in both the somatomotor and visceromotor routes.
Such perspective has been mostly applied to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision,
audition), and action. However it has been argued by Seth (2013) that subjective feel-
ing states arise from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of
interoceptive afferents. Such predictive, inferential account of interoception (the sense
of the internal physiological condition of the body) has been named “interoceptive in-
ference”.
Similar to what we have been surmising in setting up the model, Seth (2013) has
hypothesised that interoceptive predictive coding relies upon the engagement of an ex-
tended autonomic neural substrate with emphasis on the anterior insular cortex as a
comparator. Cogently, the AIC is ideally placed both to detect and to cause changes in
physiological condition, and to integrate interoceptive and exteroceptive signals. Func-
tionally, it instantiates interoceptive representations accessible to conscious awareness
and is associated with processes that involve visceral representation, interoception, and
emotional awareness relevant to selfhood (Seth, 2013).
According to (Seth, 2013), starting with a high-level, cognitive desired or inferred
physiological state (which is itself subject to update based on higher-level motivational
and goal-directed factors), generative models are engaged which predict interoceptive
and exteroceptive signals via corollary discharge. Applying active inference, predic-
tion errors are transcribed into actions via engagement of classical reflex arcs (motor
control) and autonomic reflexes (autonomic control). The resulting prediction error
signals are used to update the (functionally coupled) generative models and the in-
ferred/desired state of the organism. At high hierarchical levels these generative mod-
els merge into a single multimodal model. Interoceptive predictions are proposed to be
generated, compared, and updated within a salience network anchored on the anterior
insular and anterior cingulate cortices (the emotional, limbic motor areas that engage
brainstem regions as targets for visceromotor control and relays of afferent interocep-
tive signals.These areas together engage subcortical regions, such as the periaqueductal
gray matter and parabrachial nucleus, as targets for visceromotor control and relays
for viscerosensory afferents, as well as many other areas related to self and emotion,
including the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and orbitofrontal cortex.
Sympathetic and parasympathetic outflow from the anterior insula are in the form
of interoceptive predictions that enslave autonomic reflexes (e.g., heart/respiratory rate,
smooth muscle behaviour), just as proprioceptive predictions enslave classical motor
reflexes in predictive coding formulations of motor control. Eventually, subjective feel-
ing states (emotional experiences) arise from such active interoceptive inference.
Interestingly, the precision of prediction error of Seth’s proposal plays a key role
in these models on the grounds that hierarchical models of perception require optimi-
sation of the relative precision of top-down predictions and bottom-up evidence. This
process corresponds to modulating the gain of error units at each level, implemented
by neuromodulatory systems. While for exteroception this may involve cholingeric
neurotransmission via attention; for interoception, proprioception, and value-learning,
prediction error precision is suggested to be encoded by dopamine.
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Where are we now? A retrospective survey of the state-of-the-art
In a nutshell, to answer the Where are we now? question, we are standing in between
models that aim at explaining in full details, i.e., at the biological neural level, high level
cognitive functions, and theoretical models that bear no relations with the brain, trying
to bridge the gap. From an epistemological perspective perspective we are endorsing a
sort of “cautionary” realism.
As Sprevak (2016) put it, there are two options for interpreting Bayesian models
One option is instrumentalism, where Bayesian machinery should be understood, not
as referring to hidden neural entities and processes, but as a formal device (Sprevak,
2016) to describe human behavioural patterns concisely and to make predictions with-
out evidence that the mechanisms that generate that behaviour are Bayesian. The al-
ternative option is realism: Bayesian models are interpreted as picking out real entities
and processes in the human brain (the “Bayesian brain hypothesis”Knill and Pouget
(2004)). It is a controversial issue but is matter of current debate. Indeed, in the context
of influential overarching current theories of cognitive and brain function, a multi-level
approach, given its direct application to cognitive phenomena, can provide a potential
missing link in a “trinity of models” of the brain and behaviour from the lowest lev-
els of organisation (small-scale networks) all the way to its highest levels (cognition
and behaviour): Bayesian models, Friston’s theory of cortical responses based on the
free-energy principle, and attractor-basin dynamics Sanborn and Chater (2017).
Nonetheless, the theoretical insights previously discussed together with the multi-
level analysis we have set up, has paved the way for comparing our work with other
computational proposals, that we have touched in Chapter 2.
Machine learning-based approaches. As said before, for these approaches affect
detection basically is a pattern recognition problem (D’Mello and Kory, 2015). They
cover a wide range of different algorithms, include the processing of single or multiple
modalities combined together, they do address emotion from either a discrete and a
dimensional perspective. The meta-analysis by D’Mello and Kory (2015) provides
evidence for these merits. Remarkably, facial expression analysis recognition plays an
important role Sariyanidi et al., 2015; D’Mello and Kory, 2015; Vinciarelli et al., 2012;
Calvo and D’Mello, 2010.
However, the general assumption that understanding affective states from facial ex-
pressions can be accomplished through the computer vision and pattern recognition
“pipeline” (Sariyanidi et al., 2015) is at best questionable.
It is possible to state that the “pipeline” paradigm stems from early inferential/ap-
praisal theories of emotion, namely visual perception of emotional stimuli is followed
by cognitive or appraisal/interpretative processing of the stimulus, which in turn trig-
gers affective responses and feelings. However, it is anyway a loose link. Hardly, any
of the work presented in such realm makes a claim on psychological or neurobiological
plausibility of what is proposed. For instance, in facial expression analysis, Ekman’s
work is likely to be the most cited. This is rather instrumental: exploitation of the the
FACS code is “easily” amenable to the possibility of a straightforward computational
implementation; indeed, many of such works do not even attempt at going beyond the
AU detection stage (Sariyanidi et al., 2015; Calvo and D’Mello, 2010); AU detection
per se has become research goal.
This trend is likely to happen for historical reasons: many researchers now working
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on facial expression analysis share a background in face detection and recognition tech-
niques as developed in the computer vision community, and do not have indeed any real
interest in the actual problem of emotions. As a consequence, machine learning-based
processing of affect has inherited the current attitude that pervades computer vision,
namely, considering the vision problem as a “big data” issue.
The focus, in such perspective, is performance on benchmarks. Though sophisti-
cated from a computer science standpoint, models proposed for affective computing
bear no relation with the modelling idea that motivates our work. They are basically
machine learning models and as such are models devised for solving the classic ma-
chine learning problems: classification, regression, dimensionality reduction, cluster-
ing. More than often - this being true specially for the current deep learning wave - mod-
els that have been used for other purposes are simply re-trained on affective datasets.
If we go along with the definition that computational modelling of emotion refers to
attempts to develop and validate computational models of human emotion mechanisms
(Reisenzein et al., 2013), then, from the multilevel perspective,works in this realm do
neither address the computational theory of emotion nor the implementation modelling
issues.
AI-based approaches The state of affairs is different as to these approaches. In
this field, there are proposals that do address theoretical explanations. In the review
by Reisenzein et al. (2013), the authors claim that to realise its potential, the exchange
between the two disciplines, as well as the intradisciplinary coordination, should be
further improved. They make three proposals for how this could be achieved: 1) sys-
tematising and classifying the assumptions of psychological emotion theories; 2) for-
malising emotion theories in implementation-independent formal languages (set theory,
agent logics); and 3) modelling emotions using general cognitive architectures (such as
Soar and ACT-R), general agent architectures (such as the BDI architecture) or general-
purpose affective agent architectures.
This is a claim which involves both the theoretical modelling and the implementa-
tion modelling explanation level. They review current work considering two alterna-
tives:
1. formalising emotion theories in a precise but implementation-independent formal
language; and
2. implementing emotion theories in a (comparatively) general-purpose cognitive or
agent architecture.
As to choice 1), they provide an in-depth review of papers that exploit set theory
as a language for formalising psychological emotion theories. Set-theoretical formal-
ism is well suited to represent computational theories (as well as psychological theories
interpreted as information-processing theories), because a common way of describing
computational processes is as mathematical functions that map input to output infor-
mation. Clearly, different from the Simulation-theory perspective assumed in the work
presented in this thesis, the Theory-theory approach is the paradigm, supported by an
appraisal framework. One clear example is the work by Broekens et al. (2008) who
breaks up the emotion generation process assumed by cognitive appraisal theories into
three linked functions: first, perceptual processes map external objects into percepts
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(or mental objects); second, appraisal processes map mental objects into different ap-
praisal dimension values; third, mediating processes map appraisals into components
of emotional reactions (e.g., feelings, expressions, actions). In such perspective,
the set-theoretical formalisation of emotion theories [...] ties in naturally
with a still more rigorous set-theoretical formalism for theory reconstruc-
tion, developed as part of the so-called structuralist program in the phi-
losophy of science [...] Essentially, this formalism consists of set theory
(including whatever parts of mathematics are needed) enriched with a set of
precisely defined special concepts that describe common, recurring compo-
nents of empirical theories. According to structuralism, empirical theories
are best viewed, from the systematic perspective, as set-theoretic structures
composed of so-called theory-elements (Reisenzein et al., 2013).
One particularly interesting alternative for formalising emotion theories (intentional-
level, cognitive emotion theories) - is to represent them in a logic language. Most of
these so-called agent logics belong to the class of belief-desire-intention (BDI) logics,
that describe autonomous agents on the intentional level in terms of beliefs, desires
(goals), intentions (roughly, the goals that the agent has committed to) and possibly
other related attitudes, such as capabilities.
Clearly, developing emotion theories in BDI logics is a fairly different approach
from the one pursued here. Logical BDI models are formalised theories of qualitative
rational decision making. The rationality assumptions incorporated in the usual axioms
for belief, desire and intention imply that the logical BDI models can only be regarded
as strong idealisations of human belief-formation and decision making. This is clearly
in contrast with the view we endorse here, which fundamentally stems from Damasio’s
radical critique to such a Cartesian stance (Damasio, 2005).
Nevertheless, probabilistic approaches such as that by Conati (2002) share with us
at least the effort in devising a theoretical model which is well grounded in probabilistic
structures informed by psychological theoretical constraints.
As an alternative, the use of (suitably extended) general-purpose cognitive and agent
architectures to model emotion theories, are suitable models of the basic design-level
structure of cognitive systems or agents, respectively. These are concerned with the de-
scription of their domain-independent, basic computational structures (e.g., memories,
representational systems) and processes (e.g., a repeated sense-think/ decide-act cycle):
“ an architecture appears as the hardwired part of an agent that cannot be changed (at
least not easily)” (Reisenzein et al., 2013).
All these proposals do address the implementation model explanation, though, dif-
ferent from us, the ultimate neural realisation level is seldom considered.
Interestingly, the role of architectures in computational modelling extends beyond
these practical benefits: architectures can also play important theoretical roles. Slo-
man (1992) even argues that an understanding of emotions can only be attained by
considering the role of emotions in cognitive architectures: “A proper analysis of the
concept of an affective state or process must be based on a more general theory of the
coarse-grained architecture of mind”
In other terms, this is equivalent to state that the implementation model actually is
the model. This view is akin to some argument that has raised a fierce debate in the phi-
losophy of science (see the discussion by Frigg and Reiss, 2009). Philosophy of science
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has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem
of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. The argument is
that many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical
models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable (Winsberg, 1999). The
study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underly-
ing physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order
to learn about the behaviour of these systems. In many instances, these computer sim-
ulations are not to be considered simple number-crunching techniques. They involve
a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into spe-
cific concrete knowledge of physical systems (Winsberg, 1999). It is beyond the scope
of this dissertation to further weigh up this controversy, but clearly this is a different
perspective from ours.
For instance, BDI logical explanation ad the theoretical level make no assumptions
about how beliefs, desires and intentions, and the mental operations performed with
them, are computationally implemented. BDI architectures, in contrast, address these
questions. As Reisenzein et al. (2013) put it: “They are pieces of software that imple-
ment the abstract principles of BDI agents”.
They basically execute a fixed perception-deliberation-action: 1) perception of events;
2) updating of the belief and desire (goal) base (adding new beliefs and desires, drop-
ping false beliefs and satisfied or impossible desires); 3) generating options (plans)
(deliberating); 4. choosing the most suitable plan (generating an intention); and 5)
executing intentions (acting) (Reisenzein et al., 2013). In this respect, affective agent
architectures such as FAtiMA (Hudlicka, 2004) and MAMID Hudlicka (2008) owe
credits to the EMA model (Marsella and Gratch, 2009) - deeply rooted in symbolic rea-
soning - , and, in turn, to classic appraisal theory. Indeed, the valence and intensity of
emotions are computed in MAMID as linear combinations of several eliciting factors,
a paradigmatic example of an emergent model (see Figure 2.4, Chapter 2, and related
discussion).
As a final comment, the AI-oriented approaches - either when they address the the-
oretical modelling level or the computational/realisation modelling level -, overlook by
and large the issue of embodiment and the neurobiological basis of affect construction.
To sum up, all the above issues entailed by the AI-oriented research program, make our
model to stand apart.
Robotic models Roboticists’ view is the closest one to our perspective and motiva-
tions (Asada, 2015; Wiese et al., 2017). They do address embodiment and enactment,
though the “bodyware” puts severe constraints (degree of freedom, real-time, etc.) and
limitations. Resulting actual working implementations on real hardware, show pro-
found differences between simulators and human brains/bodies (Wiese et al., 2017).
Results so far achieved are often provided in terms of software/hardware architec-
tures, hence implementation models, often lacking of a clear theoretical model guiding
the design.
Even when loosely inspired by neuroscience, more than often models boil down to
implementation models, that beside specific details, are just fable variations over the
same leitmotiv. For instance, Lim and Okuno (2015) propose a cross-modal associative
a long-term memory for encoding feelings, formalised in the shape of a Gaussian Mix-
ture Model (GMM) representation, whose parameters are learned via the expectation-
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maximization algorithm. Barros and Wermter (2016) address the same issue but the
associative module is provided in the form of a self-organising layer, namely a Self-
Organizing Map (SOM) to learn emotion concepts. SOMs are neural networks trained
in an unsupervised fashion to create a topological grid that represents the input stimuli
(each neuron is trained to be a prototype of the input stimuli). So, after training, each
neuron will have a strong emotion representation and neurons which are neighbours are
related to similar expressions.
These two solutions might seem, prima facie, very different. However, their com-
parison is strictly related to the level we are considering. At the computational theory
level they basically involve the same model: emotion associative memory is conceived
as a discrete latent variable model representation solving an (unsupervised) clustering
problem. Indeed, it has been mathematically shown by Heskes (2001) that SOMs are
nothing but regularised Mixture Models. This result also shows that the difference at
the implementation level is minimal, apart from the regularisation term.
In other cases (Barros and Wermter, 2016; Churamani et al., 2017) the direct map-
ping (via deep neural networks ) from the latent space of affective expressions learnt in
a bottom-up, feed-forward sweep to facial gestures, synthetic speech etc., is very much
reminiscent of the pipeline adopted by machine learning approaches
Indeed the use of deep architectures, can lead to efficient implementation models
capable to handle the multimodal nature of emotion (Kim et al., 2013), though, for the
reasons we have discussed, these can be hardly assumed as models tout court.
The same drawback holds even in cases where deep generative architectures have
been proposed (Horii et al., 2016) to actualise mental simulation for inferring the emo-
tion of others from ambiguous multimodal signals. Indeed, Horii et al. (2016) proposal
is the most related to the work we have presented in this Thesis, at least at the imple-
mentation modelling level. Their theoretical model basically boils down to the gener-
ative description of the RBM machine. Having said that, they rely on an acted dataset
(IEMOCAP) where facial expressions and hand movements have been recorded with a
motion-capture system, thus avoiding cumbersome issues related to actual processing
of visual cues. Also, physiological signals, a fundamental aspect of emotional unfold-
ing, are not taken into account.
In other proposals, such as that by Vitale et al. (2014) there is a clear attempt to
address the computational theory level so to frame a simulationist approach. However
in that case there is no actual account for constraints from neuroscience. As to the
implementation level a shallow GP-LVM latent space is used to design a latent affect
space. Motor representation is not explicitly addressed and the latent space is assumed
as the affective space tout court. Only static images are considered as perceptual input
so that visual processing is severely limited. Visuomotor mapping is instantiated as a
projection to the GP-LVM latent space, which is achieved through a simple variant of
PCA.
Notwithstanding such limitations, the work described in (Vitale et al., 2014) has
provided early insights for the work we have developed here.
117
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 118 — #138 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 6. Theoretical implications
Summary
In this chapter we have discussed some key issues at the heart of the proposed model,
both at the theoretical and at the implementation modelling level. These provide a
broader perspective on our work, while altogether laying out a scaffolding for a retro-
spective consideration of work in the field of computational modelling of affect. Even-
tually, they are likely to pave the way for future research work.
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Conclusions
THE presented work concerned with the understanding of affective signals fromothers, both in human-human and human-agent interactions. In particular, weproposed and formalised a novel, probabilistic model for dynamic affective fa-
cial expression processing relying on a mechanism, which involves both facial gesture
and autonomic, physiological simulation. This has been done approaching the large
body of evidence from affective neuroscience showing that when we observe emotional
facial expressions, we react with congruent facial mimicry. The work went through the
definition of a multilevel analysis framework, which aimed at devising a computational
model informed and constrained by knowledge that we have available both at the psy-
chological and at the neuroscience explanation levels. The work sees its realisation in
two interaction experiments that allowed to test the goodness of modelling choices.
This chapter briefly summarises the main contributions and the results obtained in
this dissertation.
Summary of Contributions
The thesis is widely multidisciplinary and can be ideally divided into two main parts:
the first one, more theoretically, presented the context of the problem and the main
psychological, neurobiological and computational models of affect; the second part
detailed the mathematical and probabilistic foundations behind the proposed model,
along with the signal processing techniques adopted and the results obtained in interac-
tion experiments. These relied also on datasets collected along experiments with human
subjects. In summary, the main contributions are the following:
• Chapter 2 provides a broad review of the different contributions to the conundrum
of affective modelling. The attempt here was to devise some general guidelines
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Chapter 7. Conclusions
to better frame the subsequent work, with a particular focus on affective facial
expression analysis.
• Chapter 3, a novel multilevel modelling framework is defined, starting from Marr’s
analysis of levels of explanation in cognitive science, which is revised at the light
of current research on Bayesian methods; this identifies the theoretical model and
the implementation model as the two different but intertwined levels of explana-
tion that constitute a computational model; the theoretical model is shaped in the
form of a Probabilistic Graphical Model.
• In the same chapter, motivated by a large body of work in affective neuroscience,
we outlined the architecture of a distributed neural system for the perception of
dynamic facial expressions of emotion. This relies upon the interaction of vis-
ceromotor and somatomotor routes as mediated by a core affect component. It
can be seen as an extension of Adolph’s original neurobiological model, which
embeds current insights on the existence of mirroring mechanisms in both the vis-
ceromotor and somatomotor activities for the enactment of an emotional response
in the perceiver, via internal simulation.
• On such basis, we abstracted a novel functional architecture of an agent perceiv-
ing affective facial expressions when engaged in a dyadic social interaction with
another agent; at the most general level, under suitable assumption, this can be
considered as a hierarchical, structured entanglement of stochastic processes.
• Chapter 4 presents the main result: a novel computational model for the percep-
tion of affective facial expressions via simulation. In the multilevel framework,
the model articulates in a theoretical model and an implementation model. The
first is formalised as a Bayesian generative model shaped in the form of a Prob-
abilistic Graphical Model, where the graph structure is constrained by the func-
tional architecture posited in Chapter 3. The implementation model is designed
by exploiting the representational compositionality of the probabilistic graph, so
to address the most suitable instantiation of each sub-graph/component.
• In particular, the central affect components have been instantiated in terms of a
Deep Gaussian Process model; this choice has shown to provide a suitable im-
plementation of the close exchange of information that at the neural level occurs
between orbitofrontal cortex, the amygdala and the anterior insula.
• A novel algorithm for simulation-based perception of affective expressions has
been proposed: the implementation model of the PGM, when put into work, relies
on forward (generative) and backward (inferential) dynamics; this endows the
model with internal simulation capability, that is exploited both for core affect
construction (learning stage) and enactment (perceptual/mimicry stage).
• Chapter 5, instead, presents an effective realisation of the implementation model
and experiments. To such end, a novel multimodal affective dataset, AMHUSE,
experimentally acquired by us (and now publicly available for the research com-
munity) is put in comparison with another well-known, public multimodal dataset.
The chapter follows with a description of the essential steps adopted during data
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7.1. Summary of Contributions
processing and the construction of the models adopted in two different interaction
experiments.
• Chapter 6 discusses, in a broader perspective, the theoretical implications of our
work and, accordingly, frames the proposed model within current research.
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APPENDIXA
Probabilistic Graphical Models
In this appendix we briefly recall the so called probabilistic graphical models which
allow to enormously simplify complex joint distributions using conditional indepen-
dence property in order to achieve factorizations directly by inspection of the graph,
and without having to perform any analytical manipulations.
First of all, let recall that conditional independence properties play an important role
in using probabilistic models for pattern recognition by simplifying both the structure
of a model and the computations needed to perform inference and learning under that
model. Furthermore, it is more frequent the case in which two events are independent
given an additional event with respect to the case where events are independent tout
court.
Focusing on random variables, let X , Y and Z be three variables such that the
conditional distribution of X given Y and Z does not depend on the values of Y . We
say that X is conditionally independent of Y given Z if
P (X|Y, Z) = P (X|Z).
The same can be expressed by considering the joint distribution ofX and Y conditioned
on Z, i.e.
P (X, Y |Z) = P (X|Y, Z)P (Y |Z) = P (X|Z)P (Y |Z).
The definition of conditional independence requires that the above factorization holds
for all possible values of Z; to denote this property, we use the shorthand notation
(X⊥Y | Z).
Note that this property can be easily extended to sets of random variables X,Y and Z,
in this case we say that X is conditionally independent of Y given Z in a distribution
P if the latter satisfies (X⊥Y | Z).
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Appendix A. Probabilistic Graphical Models
A probabilistic graphical models is a pair G = 〈V , E〉 of sets called nodes and
edges, respectively. The nodes denote random variables V = {X1, . . . , Xn}, while the
edge set collects directed edgeXi → Xj between pair of nodesXi, Xj ∈ V . We denote
by Xpa(i) the parents of node Xi in the graph, and by Xpred(i) the variables in the graph
that are not descendants of Xi. We say that X1, . . . , Xk form a path if Xi → Xi+1,
for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1. A cycle in G is a directed path X1, . . . , Xk where X1 = Xk.
A graph is acyclic if it contains no cycles. Naturally, to avoid cycles in our graph we
cannot have both Xi → Xj and Xj → Xi.
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a key concept to define a coherent probabilistic
model, as DAGs are the basic graphical representation that underlies Bayesian net-
works. A formal definition of the semantics of a Bayesian network structure is given in
the following.
Definition A.1. A Bayesian network (BN) structure G = 〈V , E〉 is a DAG encoding for
each node Xi the conditional independence assumptions of its nondescendants given
its parents:
∀Xi ∈ V : (Xi⊥{Xpred(i)\pa(i)} | Xpa(i)).
In other words, G encodes a set of conditional independence assumptions, called
the local independence, and denoted by Il(G).
However, a BN graph could be defined also in terms of a joint distribution P rep-
resentable as a set of conditional probability distributions (CPDs) associated with the
graph G. Specifically,
Definition A.2. Let P be a distribution over X . We define I(P ) to be the set of inde-
pendence assertions of the form (X⊥Y | Z) that holds in P .
Given this definition, we can derive that Il(G) ⊆ I(P ), and we say that G is a I-map
(independency map) for P . More broadly:
Definition A.3. Let K be any graph object associated with a set of independencies
I(K). We say that K is an I-map for a set of independencies I if I(K) ⊆ I.
We can now say that G is an I-map for P if G is an I-map for I(P ). Let note that,
the direction of the inclusion requires that any independence that G asserts must also
holds in P , but not the vice versa, that is P could have independencies not reflected in
G.
These key concepts allow the compact factorized representation, fundamental for
the BN manipulation. Precisely,
Definition A.4. Let G be a BN graph over the variables X1, . . . , Xn. We say that a
distribution P over the same space factorises according to G if P can be expressed as a
product:
P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi | Xpa(i)). (A.1)
The individual factors P (Xi | Xpa(i)) are the CPDs or local probabilistic models,
and the whole equation is called the chain rule for BNs.
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Definition A.5. A BN is a pair B = (G, P ) where P factorizes over G, and where P
is specified as a set of CPDs associated with G’s nodes. The distribution P is often
annotated as PB.
The conditional independence assumptions implied by a BN structure G allow us
to factorize a distribution P for which G is an I-map into small CPDs as stated in the
following theorem (see Koller and Friedman (2009) for the demonstration).
Theorem A.1. Let G be a BN structure over a set of RVs X , and let P be a joint
distribution over the same space. If G is an I-map for P , then P factorizes according
to G.
Theorem A.1 proves the factorization of P according to G, but also the converse
holds: factorization according to G implies the associated conditional independencies.
Theorem A.2. Let G be a BN structure over a set of random variables X and let P be
a joint distribution over the same space. If P factorizes according to G, then G is an
I-map for P .
We now move to understand when we can guarantee that an independence (X⊥Y |
Z) holds in a distribution associated with a BN structure G.
Definition A.6. Let G be a BN structure, and X1  · · ·  Xn a trail in G. Let Z be a
subset of observed variables. The trail X1  · · · Xn is active given Z if
• Whenever we have a v-structure Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1, then Xi or one of its
descendants are in Z;
• no other node along the trail is in Z.
Graphs where there are more than one trail between two nodes, give rise to the no-
tion of d-separation, standing for directed separation, which provides us with a notion
of separation between nodes in a directed graph:
Definition A.7. Let X,Y,Z be three sets of nodes in G. We say that X and Y are
d-separated given Z, denoted d-sepG(X; Y | Z), if there is no active trail between any
node X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y given Z. We use I(G) to denote the set of independencies
that correspond to d-separation: I(G) = {(X⊥Y | Z) : d-sepG(X; Y | Z)}.
This set is also called the set of global Markov independencies.
A first property we want to ensure for d-separation as a method for determining
independence is soundness: if we find that two nodes X and Y are d-separated given
some Z, then we are guaranteed that they are, in fact, conditionally independent given
Z. To prove this it holds
Theorem A.3. If a distribution P factorizes according to G, then I(G) ⊆ I(P ).
In other words, any independence reported by d-separation is satisfied by the un-
derlying distribution. Also the complementary property, the completeness, is desirable.
This holds if d-separation detects all possible independencies, that is, given two vari-
ables X and Y independents given Z, then they are d-separated. To formalize this
property, we first introduce the notion of faithful distribution:
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Appendix A. Probabilistic Graphical Models
Definition A.8. A distribution P is faithful to G if, whenever (X⊥Y | Z) ∈ I(P ), then
d-sepG(X; Y | Z).
In other words, any independence in P is reflected in the d-separation properties of
the graph. We can now introduce this result:
Theorem A.4. For almost all distributions P that factorize over G, that is, for all
distributions except for a set of measure zero in the space of CPD parametrizations, we
have that I(P ) = I(G).
This shows that there exists a single distribution that is faithful to the graph, that is,
where all of the dependencies in the graph hold simultaneously. Second, not only does
this property hold for a single distribution, but it also holds for almost all distributions
that factorize over G.
These results state that for almost all parametrizations P of the graph G (that is, for
almost all possible choices of CPDs for the variables), the d-separation test precisely
characterizes the independencies that hold for P .
Aiming at finding a graph G that precisely captures the independencies in a given
distribution P , we define the perfect map:
Definition A.9. We say that a graphK is a perfect map (P-map) for a set of independen-
cies I if we have that I(K) = I. We say thatK is a perfect map for P if I(K) = I(P ).
In many domains, we wish to represent distributions over systems whose state
changes over time. In these cases, we wish to construct a single, compact model that
captures the properties of the system dynamics, and produces distributions over differ-
ent trajectories.
Our focus is on modelling dynamic settings, where we reason about how the state
of the world evolves over time. We can model such settings in terms of a system state
whose value at time t is a snapshot of the relevant attributes (hidden or observed) of
the system at that time. We assume that the system state is represented, as usual, as
an assignment of values to some set of random variables X . We use X(t)i to represent
the instantiation of the variable Xi at time t. For a set of variables X ⊆ X , we use
X(t1:t2), (t1 < t2) to denote the set of variables X(t) : t ∈ [t1, t2]. An assignment
of values to each variable X(t)i for each relevant time t correspond to a trajectory in
our probability space. Our goal therefore is to represent a joint distribution over such
trajectories. Clearly, the space of possible trajectories is a very complex probability
space, so representing such a distribution can be very difficult. We therefore make a
series of simplifying assumptions that help make this representational problem more
tractable.
The first simplification concerns the discretization of the timeline into a set of time
slices: measurements of the system state taken at intervals that are regularly spaced
with a predetermined time granularity ∆. Thus, we can now restrict our set of random
variables to X (0),X (1), ..., where X (t) are the ground random variables that represent
the system state at time t ·∆. This assumption simplifies our problem from representing
distributions over a continuum of random variables to representing distributions over
countably many random variables, sampled at discrete intervals.
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Let consider a distribution over trajectories sampled over a prefix of time t =
1, ..., T , P (X (0),X (1), ...X (T )), abbreviated as P (X (0:T )). We can reparametrize the
distribution using the chain rule for probabilities, in a direction consistent with time:
P (X (0:T )) = P (X (0))
T−1∏
t=0
P (X (t+1) | X (0:t)). (A.2)
A considerably simplification of this formulation is obtained adopting the Markov as-
sumption, that is that the future is conditionally independent of the past given the
present:
Definition A.10. We say that a dynamic system over the template variables X satisfies
the Markov assumption if, for t ≥ 0,
(X (t+1)⊥X 0:(t−1) | X (t)).
Such system is called Markovian.
The Markov assumption allows to simplify the distribution in Eq. A.2 as:
P (X (0:T )) = P (X (0))
T−1∏
t=0
P (X (t+1) | X t).
A last simplification assumption concerns the system stationarity:
Definition A.11. We say that a Markovian dynamic system is stationary (also called
time invariant or homogeneous) if P (X (t+1) | P (X t)) is the same at all t. In this case
we can represent the process using a transition model P (X ′ | X ), so that, for any t ≥ 0,
P (X (t+1) = ξ′ | X t = ξ) = P (X ′ = ξ′ | X = ξ).
Definition A.12. A 2-time-slice Bayesian network (2-TBN) for a process over X is a
conditional Bayesian network over X ′ given XI , where XI ⊆ X is a set of interface
variables.
Remembering that, in a conditional Bayesian network, only the variables X ′ have
parents or CPDs. The interface variables XI are those variables whose values at time t
have a direct effect on the variables at time t+ 1. Thus, only the variables in XI can be
parents of variables in X ′. Overall, the 2-TBN represents the conditional distribution:
P (X ′ | X ) = P (X ′ | XI) =
n∏
i=1
P (X ′i | X ′pa(i)).
Definition A.13. A dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is a pair 〈B0,B→〉, where B0 is a
Bayesian network over X (0), representing the initial distribution over states, and B→ is
a 2-TBN for the process. For any desired time span T ≥ 0, the distribution over X (0:T )
is defined as a unrolled Bayesian network, where, for any i = 1, ..., n:
• the structure and CPDs of X (0)i are the same as those for Xi in B0,
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Appendix A. Probabilistic Graphical Models
• the structure and CPD of X (t)i for t > 0 are the same as those for X ′i B→.
Thus, we can view a DBN as a compact representation from which we can generate
an infinite set of Bayesian networks (one for every T > 0).
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APPENDIXB
The Free Energy Theorem
Use
• O = {O1, . . . , Oj−1, Oj, Oj+1, . . . , Om}, a collection of observable random vari-
ables;
• Z = {Z1, . . . , Zj−1, Zj, Zj+1, . . . , Zn}, a collection of hidden or latent random
variables
Let PO,Z(o, z) be the joint distribution of {O,Z} andQZ(z) an arbitrary probability
distribution or density with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Definition B.1 (Free energy).
F (QZ) :=
∫
Z
QZ(z) log
PO,Z(o, z)
QZ(z)
dz
:= EQZ
[
log
PO,Z(O,Z)
QZ(Z)
]
= EQZ [logPO,Z(O,Z)]− EQZ [logQZ(Z)]
:= U(O) +H(Z)
where U(Z) is the internal energy and H(Z) the Shannon or canonical entropy of the
collection of r.v. Z.
The following fundamental relation concerning the log evidence of observations,
namely, logPO(o) and F (QZ) holds:
Prop. B.1.
logPO(o) = F (QZ) + KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
)
, (B.1)
129
i
i
“main” — 2018/1/30 — 11:47 — page 130 — #150 i
i
i
i
i
i
Appendix B. The Free Energy Theorem
where KL
(
QZ‖PZ|O
)
=
∫
Z
QZ(z) log
QZ(z)
PZ|O(z|o) dz is the relative entropy or Kullback-
Leibler divergence (Cover and Thomas, 1991) between QZ and the posterior distribu-
tion PZ|O.
Proof. Using the conditional probability definition and taking logs,
logPO,Z(o, z) = logPZ|O(z|o) + logPO(o) (B.2)
which rearranges to
logPO(o) = logPO,Z(o, z)− logPZ|O(z|o). (B.3)
Then Equation B.3 grants that
logPO(o) = log
PO,Z(o, z)
QZ(z)
− log PZ|O(z|o)
QZ(z)
, (B.4)
and multiplying both sides by QZ(z) we obtain
QZ(z) logPO(o) = QZ(z) log
PO,Z(o, z)
QZ(z)
−QZ(z) log PZ|O(z|o)
QZ(z)
. (B.5)
By integrating with respect to z:∫
Z
QZ(z) logPO(o) dz =
∫
Z
QZ(z) log
PO,Z(o, z)
QZ(z)
dz−
∫
Z
QZ(z) log
PZ|O(z|o)
QZ(z)
dz.
(B.6)
QZ(z) is an arbitrary, but normalised distribution, i.e.,
∫
z
QZ(z)dz = 1, and using
Def.B.1, we obtain (B.1)
Recall that the basic property of the relative entropy is stated by the following
(Cover and Thomas, 1991, Theorem 8.6.1)
Theorem B.2 (Cover and Thomas, 1991, Theorem 8.6.1).
KL(Q‖P ) ≥ 0 (B.7)
with equality iff Q = P almost everywhere (a.e.)
Then, the free energy F (QZ) is a lower bound on the log evidence of observations
logPO(o):
Prop. B.3.
logPO(o) ≥ F (QZ) (B.8)
Proof. Follows directly from Eqs. B.1 and B.7.
Definition B.2 (Mean field approximation). Let QZi(zi) be the probability distribution
of Zi, the ith element of Z. Then
Q :=
{
QZ(z) : QZ(z) =
m∏
i=1
QZi(zi)
}
, (B.9)
is called the mean-field approximation of distribution Q.
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Remark. Clearly, the following trivially holds:
EQZ [Z] =
m∏
i=1
EQZi [Zi] . (B.10)
Lemma B.4. Under the assumption that Q is factorised according to the mean-field
approximation Q (Def. B.2), then
F (QZ) = −KL
(
QZj‖ exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
})
−
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
(B.11)
Proof.
F (QZ) = EQZ
[
log
PO,Z(O,Z)
QZ(Z)
]
= EQZ [logPO,Z(O,Z)− logQZ(Z)]
= EQZ
[
logPO,Z(O,Z)− log
m∏
k=1
QZk(Zk)
]
= EQZ [logPO,Z(O,Z)]−
m∑
k=1
EQZ [logQZk(Zk)]
= EQZj
[
E∏m
i=1
i6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
]
−
m∑
k=1
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
= EQZj
[
E∏m
i=1
i6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
]
− EQZj
[
logQZj(Zj)
]− m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)] .
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Using the log-exp transformation:
= EQZj
[
log
(
exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
})]
− EQZj
[
logQZj(Zj)
]
−
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
= EQZj
[
log
(
exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
})
− logQZj(Zj)
]
−
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
= EQZj
log exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
}
QZj(Zj)
− m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
= −EQZj
log QZj(Zj)
exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
}
− m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]
= −KL
(
QZj‖ exp
{
E∏m
i=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)]
})
−
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)] .
Definition B.3.
Uj(Zj) = E∏mi=1
i 6=j
QZi
[logPO,Z(O,Z)] (B.12)
is the expected internal energy of r.v. Zj
Theorem B.5 (Free energy theorem). The free-energy is maximised with respect to
Q∗Zj(zj) when
Q∗Zj(zj) ∝ exp {Uj(Zj)} (B.13)
Proof. We want to find the optimal approximating distribution
Q∗Zj(zj) = arg maxQZj∈Q
F (QZ)
Use Eq. B.11 to write:
max
QZj∈Q
F (QZ) = max
QZj∈Q
−KL (QZj‖ exp {Uj(Zj)})−
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)]

(B.14)
The term −∑mk=1
k 6=j
EQZk [logQZk(Zk)] does not depend on QZj , further, Eq. B.7 grants
that KL
(
QZj‖ exp {Uj(Zj)}
) ≥ 0.
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Thus, to maximizeF (QZ) we need to minimize the KL term. Up to constant terms:
max
QZj∈Q
F (QZ) ∝ min
QZj∈Q
{
KL
(
QZj‖ exp {Uj(Zj)}
)}
(B.15)
The KL term in the last equation is minimised precisely when the two terms are
equivalent a.e., thus the optimal distribution for whichQ∗Zj(zj) = arg maxQZj∈QF (QZ)
is
Q∗Zj(zj) = exp {Uj(Zj)}+ const = arg maxQZj∈Q
F (QZ) (B.16)
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APPENDIXC
Gaussian Processes
In traditional supervised learning, we are given a training dataset of n observations
D = {(xi, yi) | i = 1, . . . , n} which collects input-output pairs (xi, yi) where the input
xi ∈ Rq and the output yi denotes a scalar output. For sake of notation, the column
vector inputs are stacked in a q×nmatrixX , and the outputs are collected in the vector
y, thus writing D = (X, y). The goal is to learn input-output mappings f between
empirical data, such that
yi = f(xi). (C.1)
In this perspective Gaussian Processes (GPs) can be adopted as a non-parametric
approach, in that it finds a distribution over all the possible functions f that are con-
sistent with the observed data.The idea is to define a prior over functions which can
be converted into a posterior once we have seen some data. Since it seems difficult to
define such a distribution, what we effectively need is to define a distribution over the
function’s values at the finite set of points {xi}ni=1.
Definition C.1 (Gaussian Process). A Gaussian process is a collection of random vari-
ables, any finite number of which have a joint Gaussian distribution.
Formally, a GP assumes that [f(x1), . . . , f(xn)]T are jointly Gaussian with mean
function µ(x) and covariance function Σ(x) given by Σij = k(xi, xj), (with k positive
definite kernel function), i.e.
f(x1)
...
f(xn)
 ∼ N


µ(x1)
...
µ(xn)
 ,

k(x1, x1) . . . k(x1, xn)
... . . .
...
k(xn, x1) . . . k(xn, xn)

 . (C.2)
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Appendix C. Gaussian Processes
In a more compact notation we can write
f(x) ∼ GP(µ(x), k(x, x′)),
where the mean function µ(x) and the covariance function k(x, x′) are defined as
µ(x) = E[f(x)]
k(x, x′) = E[(f(x)− µ(x))(f(x′)− µ(x′))]
At a first glance Gaussian processes presents two main strengths: the representative
power, being distributions over generic functions and the tractability of the distributions
involved in the process. Indeed, the marginalisation property, or consistency require-
ment (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006), of normal distributions permits to consider a
finite set of function instantiations, marginalising over all the other infinite unseen in-
puts. This simply means that if a GP specifies the distribution in (C.1), then the same
GP also specifies the single draw f(x1) ∼ N (µ(x1), k(x1, x1)), where Σ11 = k(x1, x1)
is the relevant submatrix of Σ.
Moreover, when modelling a stationary situation, the mean function is typically
(Damianou, 2015; Murphy, 2012; Rasmussen and Williams, 2006) selected as µ(x) =
0, that permits to describe the Gaussian process only relying on the second order statis-
tic, namely the covariance function. The key idea in using the kernel functions as
covariance is that if x and x′ are close in the input space, then we expect the output of
the function at those points to be similar or close, too.
For example, a typical squared exponential (SE) (or radial basis function (RBF))
kernel function is defined as
kSE(x, x
′) = σ2SE exp
{
−1
2
(
x− x′
λ
)2}
(C.3)
where the lengthscale λ > 0 and the amplitude σSE > 0 are the hyperparameters. The
former describes how smooth the function is, while the latter determines the variation
of function values from their mean. In Figure C.1a are shown three latent functions ran-
domly drawn from a zero-mean GP prior with SE kernel function and λ = 0.8, σSE =
0.5, that in probabilistic terms gives (omitting the conditioning on hyperparameters) the
conditional density P (f |X) = N (f |0, K).
As said above, we are primarily interested in capturing the knowledge that the train-
ing data provides rather then drawing random functions from the prior, by just trans-
forming the prior into a posterior.
Let us first consider the simple case where the observations are noise free, that is
when we have the dataset D = {(xi, fi) | i = 1, . . . , n}. By denoting with X∗ and
f∗ the input-output test and by using standard rules for conditioning Gaussians (see
(Bishop, 2006b)), the posterior on test has the following form
P (f∗|X∗, X, f) = N (f∗|µ∗,Σ∗) (C.4)
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(a) Three samples from the GP prior with SE ker-
nel function. Hyperparameters: λ = 0.8 and
σSE = 0.5.
(b) Three samples from the GP posterior obtained
observing five data points.
Figure C.1: Example of a Gaussian Process fitting observed data generated from a cosine
function. Each function sample is presented in three colours; the observed points are plotted
with black asterisks and two times the standard deviation is grey shaded.
where
µ∗ = µ(X∗) +KT∗ K
−1(f − µ(X)) = KT∗ K−1f
Σ∗ = K∗∗ −KT∗ K−1K∗
BeingK∗ = k(X,X∗) the cross-covariance between training and test inputs andK∗∗ =
k(X∗, X∗) the covariance between test inputs. Therefore, in the noise free case, GP
yields f(x) with no uncertainty acting as an interpolator of the training data (as shown
in Fig. C.1b).
Let us now consider the more realistic case in which we are asked to make predic-
tions using noisy observations, meaning that we do not have access to function values
themselves, but only to noisy versions thereof, i.e. when
yi = f(xi) + ,  ∼ N (0, σ2 ). (C.5)
Assuming additive independent identically distributed Gaussian noise  with vari-
ance σ2 , the prior on the noisy observations becomes
kSE(x, x
′) = σ2SE exp
{
−1
2
(
x− x′
λ
)2}
+ σ2 I, (C.6)
reason why the (C.4) may be rewritten as
P (f∗|X∗, X, y) = N (f∗|µ∗,Σ∗) (C.7)
where (assuming that the mean is zero for notational simplicity)
µ∗ = KT∗ K
−1
y y
Σ∗ = K∗∗ −KT∗ K−1y K∗
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Appendix C. Gaussian Processes
Figure C.2: Visualisation of a Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model, expressed as a PGM.
The grey circles represent the observed variables, while the white circles the latent ones.
being Ky the covariance of the observed noisy responses.
A direct extension of the classical supervised GP is the Gaussian Process Latent
Variable Model (GPLVM) (Lawrence, 2004, 2005), a probabilistic model for non-linear
dimensionality reduction and unsupervised learning that can be seen as a non-linear
generalisation of probabilistic PCA (Tipping and Bishop, 1999). In this model the
inputs are unobserved and are treated as latent variables, while only the output are
given by applying multiple GPs. Moreover, due to the difficulty to integrate out the
latent variables, they are optimized by using variational algorithms based on mean field
approximations, as in some Bayesian extensions of PPCA (Tipping and Bishop, 1999).
In this scenario, we assume that data are represented through multi-dimensional
variables which are collected in matrices where rows correspond to instances and columns
correspond to dimensions (or features). Thus, the output Y ∈ Rn×p can be approxi-
mated by a lower dimensional matrix X ∈ Rn×q through a vector valued non-linear
function mapping the i-th row xi of X in correspondent row yi of Y , such that
yi = f(xi) + i, i ∼ N (0, σ2 I) (C.8)
A GPLVM provides a solution to this approximation by employing p independent
GPs as prior for latent mapping f(X) = (f1(X), . . . , fp(X)) such that
fj(X) ∼ GP(0, kf (X,X ′)), j = 1, . . . , p.
A GPLVM can be represented via a PGM, as shown in Fig. C.2.
In this setting, the generative procedure shown in (C.2) can be rewritten as
yij = fj(xi) + ij, ij ∼ N (0, σ2 I),
providing the basic independence assumptions which allows to write the likelihood of
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the data given the inputs X by marginalizing out the function evaluations F as
P (Y |X) =
∫
P (Y |F )P (F |X)dF
=
∫ n∏
i=1
p∏
j=1
P (yij|fij)
p∏
j
P (fj|X)dF
=
p∏
j=1
N (yj|0, Kff + σ2 I)
The above partial tractability of the model gives rise to a straightforward MAP
training procedure where the latent inputs X are selected according to
XMAP = arg max
X
P (Y |X)P (X) (C.9)
This is the approach suggested by Lawrence (2005). The same optimization holds also
for the hyperparameters (not mentioned here for sake of simplicity).
The optimisation process of a GPLVM made adopting a MAP approach, however,
hides two main drawbacks as pointed out in Damianou (2015). First, the sensitiveness
to overfitting caused by the fact that MAP is a point estimation and tends to maximise
with respect to X and the hyperparameters. Second, this approach cannot be used for
automatic selection of the latent dimensionality. An increase on the latent dimensions,
indeed, results in an increase of the optimal size.
For these reasons, in Titsias and Lawrence (2010) it is presented a variational Bayesian
approach to marginalise the latent variablesX , optimising the resulting lower bound on
the marginal likelihood with respect to the hyperparameters.
Following the typical Bayesian methods, the goal is to compute the logarithm of the
marginal likelihood of the data
logP (Y ) = log
∫
P (Y,X)dX
= log
∫
P (Y |X)P (X)dX.
Anyway the non-linear presence of X in the covariance matrix term makes the
previous likelihood intractable. In this case, the standard variational Bayesian approach
(Beal, 2003) comes to give a slight hand, refer to Chap. 6 for a wider derivation. The
basic idea is to consider a variational distribution Q(X) that approximates the true
posterior distribution P (X|Y ) and has a Gaussian form over the latent variables
Q(X) =
q∏
i=1
N (xi|mi, Si).
Based on Jensen’s inequality (Jensen, 1906), we can obtain the standard variational
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lower bound on the log marginal likelihood
logP (Y ) = log
∫
P (Y |X)P (X)dX
= log
∫
Q(X)
P (Y |X)P (X)
Q(X)
dX
≥
∫
Q(X) log
P (Y |X)P (X)
Q(X)
dX
=
∫
Q(X) logP (Y |X)dX −
∫
Q(X) log
Q(X)
P (X)
dX
= F(Q(X))−KL(Q(X)‖P (X)) (C.10)
where
F(Q(X)) =
p∑
j=1
∫
Q(X) logP (yj|X)dX
=
p∑
j=1
Fj(Q(X))
But, even in this case, the term Fj(Q(X)) is computationally intractable because it
involves an analytically intractable integration.
A possible solution comes from Lawrence (2007) and results in the introduction of
m auxiliary inducing variables U ∈ Rm×p that constitute the latent function evaluations
at a set of pseudo-inputs Z ∈ Rm×q. The augmented full joint probability takes then
the form
P (Y, F, U,X,Z) = P (Y |F )P (F |U,X,Z)P (U |Z)P (X)
=
p∏
j=1
P (yj|fj)p(fj|uj, X, Z)P (uj|Z)P (X) (C.11)
where
p(fj|uj, X, Z) = N (fj|KfuK−1uu uj, Kff −KfuK−1uuKuf )
is the conditional prior and
P (uj|Z) = N (uj|o,Kuu)
is the marginal GP prior over the inducing variables. Here, Kuu denotes the covariance
matrix constructed by evaluating the covariance function on the inducing points and
Kuf is the cross-covariance between the inducing and the latent points. The above
explained processes follows the graphical representation in Fig. C.3.
The lower bound of the intractable term of Fj(Q(X)) results in
logP (yj | X) ≥
∫
φ(uj) log
P (uj)N (yj|αj, β−1IN)
φ(uj)
dud
− β
2
Tr(Kff −KfuK−1uuKuf ) (C.12)
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Figure C.3: Visualisation of a Variational Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model, expressed
as a PGM. The grey circle represent the observed variable, while the white circles the latent
ones.
with αj = KfuK−1uu uj and φ(uj) is a variational distribution over the inducing variables
uj . Replacing the computed lower bound (Eq. C.12) in the functional Fj(Q(X)) we
have
Fj(Q(X)) ≥
∫
Q(X)
[∫
φ(uj) log
P (uj)N (yj | αj, β−1IN)
φ(uj)
dud
−β
2
Tr(Kff ) +
β
2
Tr(K−1uuKufKfu)
]
dX (C.13)
Performing firstly the integration with respect to X and maximizing the resulting
lower bound with respect to φ(uj) permits to obtain the closed form of the lower bound
Fj(Q(X)) ≥ log
[
β
N
2 |Kuu| 12
(2pi)
N
2 |βΨ2 +Kuu| 12
e−
1
2
yTj Wyj
]
− βψ0
2
+
β
2
Tr(K−1uu Ψ2) (C.14)
where W = βIN − β2Ψ1(βΨ2 +Kuu)−1ΨT1 , while
ψ0 =
N∑
i=1
∫
k(xi, xi)N (xi | µi, Si)dxn
Ψ1 is a matrix N ×M
(Ψ1)nm =
∫
k(xn, zm)N (xn | µn, Sn)dxn
and Ψ2 is an M ×M matrix such that Ψ2 =
∑N
n=1 Ψ
n
2 and
(Ψn2 )mm′ =
∫
k(xn, zm)k(zm′ , xn)N (xn | µn, Sn)dxn
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Appendix C. Gaussian Processes
Figure C.4: Visualisation of a variational GPLVM dynamical model, expressed as a PGM. The
grey circle represent the observed variable, while the white circles the latent ones.
As pointed in Wang et al. (2006, 2008); Damianou et al. (2011) when dealing with
time-series data, as the ones considered in this thesis, the learning of latent space could
benefit from the introduction of a dynamical prior. The ‘spatial constraint’ introduced
in the classical GP, in fact, here is extended also to time. In particular we wish that two
points x and x′ that are temporally close, are nearby also in the latent space, resulting
in a non-linear but smooth mapping.
This results in the so called GP-LVM dynamical model, where the observed data
yi are considered drawn from a multivariate time series {yi, ti}ni=1 together with the
time ti ∈ R+ at which they are observed. In particular, a temporal latent function
x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xQ(t)) with x(t) ∈ Rq governs the generation of latent variables,
such that the individual components are taken from a Gaussian process with covariance
function kx(t, t′)
xj(t) ∼ GP(0, kx(t, t′)), j = 1, . . . , q.
The covariance function kx, in this case, determines the properties of each tem-
poral latent function xj(t) and, based on the temporal behaviour of data, it could be
assumed Markovian (e.g. Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (Uhlenbeck and Ornstein, 1930b)) or
non-Markovian (e.g. squared-exponential) process.
According to the updated PGM shown in Fig. C.4, the full joint probability in
Eq. C.11 should be rewritten as
P (Y, F, U,X,Z | t) =
p∏
j=1
P (yj|fj)P (fj|uj, X, Z)P (uj|Z)P (X|t)
and the variational lower bound in Eq. C.10 reflects the same behaviour
logP (Y ) = F(Q(X))−KL(Q(X)‖P (X|t)).
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The first term captures the relation between observations and data point through the
variational distribution, as happened in Eq. C.10, while the second one only involves
the prior over data. Therefore the solution follows the one presented above for the
variational GPLVM.
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